

# NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

Series Editor: Stuart Croft



## Pursuing Strategy

NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi

*Edited by Håkan Edström and  
Dennis Gyllensporre*



*New Security Challenges Series*

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# Pursuing Strategy

## NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi

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Introduction, selection and editorial matter © Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre 2012  
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-0-230-29280-2

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First published 2012 by  
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-33250-2      ISBN 978-0-230-36419-6 (eBook)  
DOI 10.1057/9780230364196

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12

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# Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Palle Ydstebø, head of the Department of Strategic Studies at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, for his decision to approve the funding of the project. Without his vision and ambition there would not be a book.

We also would like to thank Christina Brian, Julia Willan, Ellie Shillito and Geetha Williams at Palgrave Macmillan for their encouragement and support throughout the project. We are privileged to have such a splendid publisher.

We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Erik Noreen and Professor Jan Ångström and their colleagues at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, for providing a creative research environment.

Finally, we would like to extend our appreciation to our friend Anders Josefsson who has been a long-time source of inspiration and unconditional support. This book is dedicated to him.



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# List of Abbreviations

ACO	<i>Allied Command Operations</i> (NATO)
ACT	Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
AFRICOM	[United States'] African Command
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
AJP	Allied Joint Publication (NATO)
AMF	Allied Mobile Force (NATO)
AMIS	African Union's Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union's Mission in Somalia
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AU	African Union
AUHQ	African Union's Headquarters
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy (African Union)
CAS	Close Air Support
CBRN	Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CC	Component Command
CENTCOM	[United States'] Central Command
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CINSOUTH	Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces (NATO)
COIN	Counter Insurgency
COMISAF	Commander of ISAF
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (NATO)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPG	Comprehensive Planning Guidance (NATO)
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)
DITF	Darfur Integrated Task Force
DJSE	Deployable Joint Staff Elements
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DPC	Defense Planning Committee (NATO)
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (NATO)
EOC	Essential Operational Capability
EOD	Explosive and Ordnance Disposal
ESDP	European Security and Defence (EU) Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy ( <i>A Secure Europe in a Better World</i> ) (EU)
EU	The European Union
EUCOM	[The United States'] European Command
EUFOR	European Union's Military Force
EULEX	European Union's Rule of Law Mission (in Kosovo)
EUNAVFOR	European Union's Naval Force
EUPAT	European Union's Police Advisory Team (in Macedonia)
EUPM	European Union's Police Mission (in Bosnia-Herzegovina)
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
GOP	Guidelines for Operational Planning (NATO)
G8	Group of Eight
ICC	International Criminal Court
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFOR	Implementation Force (in Bosnia-Herzegovina) Also known as <i>Operation Joint Endeavour</i> (NATO)
IMS	International Military Staff (NATO)
IRC	International Red Cross
IS	International Staff (NATO)
ISAF	International Security Assistant Force

JCD	Joint Capstone Doctrine (NATO)
JFC	Joint Forces Command (NATO)
JFCB	Joint Forces Command Brunnsom (the Netherlands)
JFCN	Joint Forces Command Naples (Italy)
JFHQ	Joint Forces Headquarters (NATO)
JFHQL	Joint Forces Headquarters Lisbon (Portugal)
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JSS	Joint Security Stations
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
MAD	Mutually Assured Destruction
MC	Military Committee (NATO)
MCM	Mine Counter Measures
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MMR	Minimum Military Requirement
MRO	Military Response Option
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NAEW&CF	NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHQSa	NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo
NHQSk	NATO Headquarters in Skopje
NLA	National Liberation Army
NMA	NATO Military Authorities
NMR	National Military Representative (NATO)
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSA	NATO Standardization Agency
NTMI	NATO's Training Mission in Iraq
OAF	<i>Operation Allied Force</i> (NATO)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
OEF	<i>Operation Enduring Freedom</i> (NATO)

OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
OPLAN	Operations Plan
PMR	Periodic Mission Review
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (ISAF)
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
RCN	Regional Command North (ISAF)
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (in Bosnia-Herzegovina) Also known as <i>Operation Joint Guard</i> and <i>Operation Joint Forge</i> (NATO)
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (NATO)
SLMT	Special Military Liaison Team
SMLO	Senior Military Liaison Officer
SNMG	Standing NATO Maritime Group
SOR	Statement of Requirements
TFF	Task Force Fox (in Macedonia; NATO)
TFH	Task Force Harvest (in Macedonia; NATO)
ToA	Transfer of Authority
UNAMID	United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (in Macedonia)
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia)
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
USFOR-A	United States Forces in Afghanistan
WEU	Western European Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

# 1

## From Strategy to Operations – or the Other Way Around?

*Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre*

### Prologue – in pursuit of a strategy

In late August 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of NATO's International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) and United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), publicly presented his multidisciplinary assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. He called for additional forces and other resources in order to achieve the strategic objectives. However, focusing on requirements misses the critical point, according to McChrystal. In his view there was an 'urgent need for a significant change to our strategy' (McChrystal, 2009, p. 1-1). Put simply, McChrystal's recommendations called for less emphasis on traditional combat operations. Instead critical success factors included commitment to empower Afghan leaders, improved coordination of the international community's efforts, and training of the Afghan security forces. Soon the NATO political authorities endorsed the report and *McChrystal's Strategy* became the commonly acknowledged recipe for success (The Washington Post, 2009).

This episode is instructive for the study of strategy as it illustrates several important and complex aspects on how strategies are prepared. It suggests that sometimes reality is divorced from theory. The body of theory argues that overall strategies radiate from the political leadership at the strategic level, albeit influenced by subordinate levels. In this case strategy was formulated by a military officer on the operational level, only two months into the job. The responsibilities that rest with the strategic level and the role of the military *vis-à-vis* the political leadership appear to be less clear cut than the theory accounts for. Clearly, to understand strategy formulation the interaction between the strategic and the operational level needs to be examined. The real role of General McChrystal is yet to be established by historians, was he an agent for change or a true maverick?

One way to understand the events during these months is that the Alliance had formulated a blueprint for success, a *plan* on how to implement stability and security in Afghanistan. The origins of the plan and the role of General McChrystal then become of secondary interest. An alternative interpretation is that by following the chain of command, General McChrystal's assessments were a response to a request by his military superiors in the NATO chain of command as well as American military hierarchy, and ultimately the Secretary General of NATO (and the United States' Secretary of Defense). His recommendations were hence the result of an ongoing *process*, involving not only the operational but also the military strategic and political strategic levels.

Neither the strategic authorities of the Alliance in 2009, nor General McChrystal, are unique in their pursuit of a strategy. Over the two decades that have passed since the end of the Cold War, NATO entities, national diplomats and senior generals have been in similar positions. Why, then, does it seem to be so hard to formulate guidance for the use of military power that NATO has at its disposal? Is formulating strategy really that difficult? Who is to be blamed; the politicians, the strategic commanders or the generals on the battlefield? Can the interactions between these levels of decision contribute to enhancing the understanding of the strategy formulation?

### **The problem and the purpose of the book**

Indeed, strategy formulation is evasive. The purpose of this book is to enhance the understanding on NATO strategy formulation in conjunction with military operations. To this end, the dynamics between the strategic and operational levels will be analysed.

This section continues with an introduction of the theoretical framework related to strategy, and with an elaboration on the specific empirical problem related to NATO as a case. In the next section the research design is presented. In the third, and final, section the findings and conclusions are presented.

### **Introducing the theoretical framework**

Definition of key terms is critically important in research. This goes for this study as well. The key term in this book is, however, not easily defined:

The concept of “strategy” has proven notoriously difficult to define. Many theorists have attempted it, only to see their efforts wither beneath the blasts of critics.

(Murray and Grimsley, 1996, p. 1)



Colin S. Gray provides a point of departure. After elaborating the definitions of, among others, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895–1970) and André Beaufre (1902–75), he proclaims: “By strategy I mean the use that is made by force and the threat of force for the ends of policy” (Gray, 1999, p. 17). Building on this realisation others have defined strategy as a matching set of ends, ways and means (Lykke, 1989). This trinity encompasses considerations to justify the military mission and ensures that it is addressing the political objectives (ends), assessment of the economy of force (means) as well as considerations on the application of force (ways). From this viewpoint strategy is defined as a harmonious balance between these elements. Notably, this definition does not provide information on the actors involved, let alone their division of labour.

As political institutions and military organisations became complex, diversified and specialised a separation in distinct hierarchical levels was established. This development has been theorised in the dictums of Max Weber (1864–1920). The top levels include political strategic level; military strategic level; and operational level (Liddell Hart, 1991; Jablonsky, 1994; Homan, 2008).

It is tempting to conclude that the political level is formulating the ends while the military strategic level is responsible for finding the proper means to attain the political objectives and that the operational level would be responsible for designing the operation that is to decide ways for force employment. However, the political level has the overall responsibility for all elements of the strategy. It will not only decide the political objectives but also allocate resources and approve the operational plan (OPLAN) and rules of engagement (ROE). Recalling Betts’ approach to the politico military interaction based on concentric circles of scientific subfields, he argues that a discipline in an outer circle governs its immediate inner circle (Betts, 2000). This suggests a one way communication from the strategic to the operational level that is from political to the military leadership. But what if the (planning) process is initiated by events on lower levels (or inner circles)?

An alternative approach to strategy has been described as a dynamic process based on two way communication (Murray and Grimsley, 1996). This approach allows the subordinate military levels to be involved in crafting of the strategy. Each level has its unique view on the proper balance between ends, ways and means. With the risk of oversimplifying, the political level strives for ambitious and visionary ends while minimising costs and political risks. The military strategic level argues for modest and precise political objectives and sufficient resources to rapidly meet the objectives and mitigate military risks.

At the operational level commanders argue for a mandate that allows maximum flexibility in utilising the capabilities apportioned, that is a high degree of operational autonomy.

The theoretical problem is not only about finding the proper balance at each level but also accepting trade offs between the preferences at each level. Luttwak applies five levels and two dimensions in his analysis of strategy. He also emphasises that their interaction is critical and must be understood. The two dimensions are understood as the impact between the levels, the vertical dimension, and within each level, the horizontal dimension (Luttwak, 1987).

The discussion above only touches upon how the perception of a proper balance is established on each of the levels. What are, in other words, the cognitive points of departure for vertical interaction and trade offs? To understand how strategy is understood and formulated at each level pertinent questions such as *Why, What, When, Who, Where* and *How* can provide explanatory power (De Wit and Meyer, 1994; Edström, 2003; Lindley-French, 2007; Gyllensporre, 2010).

In summary, a theoretical framework has been introduced above. It identifies elements and interactions. The range and complexity of factors to be studied and their mutual dependence put a premium upon a method that allows a holistic study. Rather than focusing on specific elements, the book aims to create an overall understanding of strategy. Consequently, it is insufficient to only study and measure isolated aspects of strategy. A holistic approach is justified. It implies that the 'research design is open to gathering data on any number of aspects of the setting under study in order to put together a complete picture' (Quinn Patton, 1990, p. 40). Leading contemporary theoretical strategists argue for a holistic approach to strategy adopting context, process, and content as dimensions, instead of studying elements of strategy (De Wit and Meyer, 1994). Analysing a multinational organisation such as NATO it is not least important to recognise the impacts of alliance dynamics in each of these dimensions (Snyder, 1997; Yoda, 2005).

### **Framing the empirical situation**

Only six months after its birth NATO started producing strategic documents. The first strategic document to be approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was the first strategic concept of the Alliance. The Korean War had an immediate impact on NATO and the strategic thinking of the Alliance. Together with the first enlargement, the accession of Greece and Turkey, the developments led to the drafting of NATO's second strategic concept. It was approved by the NAC in December 1952.

Two years later NATO invited the Federal Republic of Germany to become a member, which it effectively did in May 1955. Concurrently the first official NATO documents to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons were presented. They introduced the concept of massive retaliation. This is normally associated with NATO's third strategic concept which was issued in its final form in May 1957. The new concept advocated massive retaliation as a key element of NATO's strategy. The new strategy relied heavily on the United States' nuclear capability and its will to defend Europe in the case of a Soviet nuclear attack. As the Soviet Union's nuclear potential increased, NATO's competitive advantage in nuclear deterrence diminished. Concepts such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) were hence introduced.

The Cold War peaked with the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. The quest for a stronger non-nuclear posture led to an urgent need of a flexible response option. However, the assassination of President Kennedy, the United States' military involvement in Vietnam and the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure froze all discussions on a revised concept. NATO's fourth strategic concept was therefore delayed and not adopted until December 1967. This became the last concept with bipolarity as an underlying assumption. During this period some 20 strategic documents were produced at political and military level. Most of them address defense considerations on different regions of the NATO territory, including seaways.

In 1991, in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, NATO issued its fifth strategic concept. Since it was unclassified and addressed a broad audience it differed dramatically from its predecessor. Less than eight years later, in the year of NATO's 50th anniversary, NATO adopted a new strategic concept. This concept was also released to the public. At the NATO summit in April 2009, NATO leaders nevertheless called for a new concept.

The preface of the strategic concept issued in 2010 suggests immaterial values remain the foundation of the Alliance. Indeed, the document asserts that 'while the world is changing, NATO's essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values' (NATO, 2010, p. 1). The concept clearly reflects NATO's increased emphasis on a broader and more global perspective regarding the strategic environment it confronts and the roles of the Alliance within this evolving environment. What the document does not do, however, is clarify the relationship between NATO's concepts of security, peace, and stability,

and its identity as a community of shared values. The total absence of attempt to sort out partners due to their values is striking: 'We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that shares our interest in peaceful international relations' (NATO, 2010, article 30). On the other hand, in a subsequent article the cooperation with the European Union is said to be unique due to the fact that 'both organisations share common values' (NATO, 2010, article 32).

The message is repeated in the Partnership Policy, endorsed in April 2011. NATO's ambition to establish even closer relations with old as well as new partners is explicitly stressed. The Alliance seeks a wider engagement, including political dialogue and practical cooperation, with like-minded nations that do not have a formal partnership arrangement in order to enhance regional security all across the globe (NATO, 2011).

To summarise, the 60 years of conceptual developments can be divided into three periods. During the first period (1949–69) four strategic concepts were introduced. All of them were classified and designed for internal consumption. During the second period (1970–90) no new concept was introduced. During the last period (1991–2011) three strategic concepts have been presented. All of them unclassified and released to the public. While no NATO-led military operations<sup>1</sup> were conducted during the first two periods, the third period was intense with regards to executing operations in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in North America, at the Mediterranean Sea and at the Indian Ocean. Clearly, the third phase is unique in that it offered many opportunities for politico military interaction. The experiences of these operations have, presumably, had impact on the shaping of strategy and strategic guidance. It is this dynamic, between the strategic and the operational levels, this book is focusing on.

The time period that will be examined, the post Cold War era, implies three distinct phases of the NATO development based on the three most recent strategic concepts. The first phase is defined by the strategic concept agreed upon in 1991, against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War. While maintaining collective security of the Alliance as the central proposition, it redefined its former adversaries and outlined dialogue and cooperation as opposed to confrontation as the desired principles to interact with countries that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. The strategy buried the long standing Forward Defense concept that was dependent on standing deployments *en masse* in Central Europe. Instead it introduced a more flexible concept based on immediate reaction forces, rapid reaction forces, main defense forces and augmentation

forces. To implement the new concept two key strategy documents were agreed upon. The *Military Committee (MC) Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept* (a classified document referred to as MC 400). A separate classified document, NATO's Political Principles for Nuclear Planning and Consultation was also agreed upon to update the guidelines for NATO's nuclear planning and decision making process. The new concept gave impetus to planning for NATO's flanks and complemented the collective defense focus with an increase of capabilities for crisis management. The disintegration of the Soviet Union took place only days after the strategy was finally adopted; NATO became increasingly influenced by requirements originating from crisis management and out of area operations. This was encapsulated in a new doctrinal document, *MC 327 Peace Support Operations*. However, due to internal disputes it was never approved by the political authorities.

Within the framework of the *Long-Term Study*, initiated in 1994, NATO's military strategy document was revised again in 1996. A revised *MC Directive for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy* (MC 400/1) was approved that reflected decreased emphasis on planning with respect to general collective defense and much increased emphasis on *Peace Support Operations*, crisis management and regional collective defense. The document also incorporated formerly highly controversial doctrinal elements such as the idea that *Peace Support Operations* might form a continuum of operations from humanitarian aid to peace enforcement and even collective regional defense.

The second phase is defined by the strategic concept agreed upon in 1999. In 1997, it was agreed that the strategy should be re-examined to reflect the significant changes that had taken place in Europe since its adoption and to ensure that the NATO strategy was fully adapted to the challenges of the twenty-first century. The 1999 strategy defined the Alliance's fundamental security tasks, both in terms of collective defense, and in terms of new activities in the fields of crisis management and partnership that the Alliance is undertaking in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

As a consequence, the *MC Directive for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy* was updated. MC 400/2 outlined Essential Operational Capabilities (EOCs) that would ultimately orient NATO towards developing a force structure capable of both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. This led to a revision of the *NATO Force Structure* (MC 317), in July 2002. The revised MC 317/1 provided detailed guidance on the structure of allied forces. The 11 September terrorist attacks did not generate an immediate review of the strategy. However, threats emanating

from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction came at the forefront of NATO's strategic agenda. Also a *Comprehensive Political Guidance* was agreed upon in 2006. This strategic document sets out the framework and priorities in a ten to 15 years perspective. It analyses the probable future security environment and acknowledges the possibility of unpredictable events. Against that analysis, it sets out the types of operations that the Alliance must be able to perform.

The third phase is defined by the strategic concept agreed upon in 2010. Arguably, it is still in the making as the military implementation (MC 400/3) is expected to be agreed upon in June 2011. Notwithstanding, one operation has been launched following the approval of this strategy.

Mindful that most decisions made by the NAC and the MC, respectively, are classified, the research draws on secondary sources, in addition to the empirical data provided by unclassified NATO documents. These secondary sources are instrumental in reconstructing the strategic guidance exercised by key NATO bodies. This research situation is by no means unique when examining strategic guidance for military organisations. Both Edström (2003) and Gyllensporre (2010) addressed similar methodological considerations in their doctoral dissertations. The unclassified empirical data includes, but is not limited to, strategic guidance documents, Comprehensive Political Guidance, and declarations and statements issued in conjunction with NATO Summits. Notably, the research focus is on the strategic guidance exercised, not the strategic documents themselves.

## **The research design**

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to *safeguard* the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to *promote* stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to *unite their efforts* for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

(NATO, 1949, Emphasis added)

## **Addressing some key questions**

In his analysis of NATO, Julian Lindley-French mentions the key questions *what, why, when, where* and *how* as an 'authoritative statement

of NATO's grand strategic mission' encompassing not only the political but also the military means of the Alliance (Lindley-French, 2007, p. 59). As indicated in the quotation above, the opening paragraph of the North Atlantic Treaty explicitly indicates two of the main dimensions of the Alliance. The first dimension is related to the question *what*. NATO is to defend stability, well-being, peace and security. The core objectives are fundamental democratic values such as freedom, liberty and the rule of law. These are principles which together constitute Western civilisation. The second dimension is related to the question *where*. NATO is to defend Western civilisation in the North Atlantic area. The geographical aspects are further elaborated and clarified in article 6 of the treaty.

Both lines are egocentric since the objectives are 'the civilisation of their peoples' and 'North Atlantic area'. They are paradoxical since freedom, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law are conceptual and transnational in their character, while North Atlantic is territorial. The question is if these borderless, immaterial values are defensible in just a small part of the world or if NATO has to operate globally in order to 'safeguard' them? Moreover, can NATO 'promote stability and well-being' in a specific area of the world solely by acting from *within* that area? Due to globalisation and the increased interdependency among international actors, NATO might have to go global and promote from the *outside* as well.

In 1949 these questions were of no concern. Democracy, freedom and the rule of law had then recently been defended against the Nazis and were still absent in Eastern Europe. Even in Western Europe some countries were governed by authoritarian regimes. Well-being was not guaranteed; the Marshall plan had yet to be fully implemented. Stability was threatened, not only by the Soviets, but by some of their collaborators in the West as well.<sup>2</sup> During the Cold War the two dimensions were hereby intimately connected. The struggle between the two superpowers and their allies was not only spatial. It was also ideological in its character as Marxism Leninism was defined as the antithesis of democracy, liberty and human rights. Some European states might have lacked the awareness of NATO being only one among several British and American arrangements for the very same purpose. Even if they had that understanding, some of the British and American allies in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) might not have fitted that well in the ideological dimension (at least not from a liberal European standpoint).<sup>3</sup> They did, however, fit well in the overarching strategy

of containment. Today it is fair to argue that fundamentalism has replaced communism as the major threat against democratic values. Since NATO is the only remaining treaty organisation from the Cold War, it can be argued that NATO has to meet the new challenges on behalf of not only its members, but of the Western community as a whole. The transnational character of modern threats might make the tasks even harder to avoid.

Wallace J. Thies argues that the presence or absence of divisive ideologies should be used as a variable when analysing alliance behaviour (Thies, 2009, pp. 288–9). *What* then, should NATO safeguard and promote? And against whom, one could add.

Karl-Heinz Kamp asserts that the geographical settings of the NATO allies impacts on the views of the *raison d'être* of the Alliance. He points out four crucial questions that the members have to agree upon. The first question is related to the balancing of defending NATO territory, on the one hand, and providing security far beyond the borders of the Alliance on the other (Kamp, 2009, pp. 22–4). *Where* then, should NATO get involved in military conflicts?

According to the opening paragraph of the treaty, NATO's members are 'resolved to unite their efforts'. Some NATO allies seem to espouse these words more than others. The British government, for example, argues:

The full spectrum of capabilities is not required for large scale operations, as the most demanding operations could only conceivably be undertaken alongside the US, either as a NATO operation or a US led coalition, where we have choices as to what to contribute.

(The British Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 2)

Arguing strongly for a collective defense, on the one hand, and concurrently arguing for 'balanced defense' (that is all capabilities within your national armed forces) on the other, does not seem to be logical. The objective of the united efforts is, furthermore, not solely the collective defense of NATO allies' territory. Another objective, as important as the territorial aspect, is the preservation of peace and security. This objective is, however, not limited to the North Atlantic area, at least not explicitly. *How* then, should NATO allies unite their efforts in order to conduct military operations? In their analysis of NATO's policy and strategy, Stephen J. Cimbala and Peter K. Forster focus on collective defense and burden sharing. Two of the five cases they explore, the Balkans and Afghanistan, are further elaborated in



this book. The scope of 'the united efforts' is summed up in their introduction:

NATO is committed to war fighting, stability and security operations, social and economic reconstruction, and creative diplomacy for regional stability.

(Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 5)

In Chapter 2 the key questions in relation to shaping strategy are further analysed and presented within the broader picture that constitutes the dynamics between the strategic and operational levels in the NATO context.

### Structure of the analysis

To address the aforementioned central problem, empirical data is retrieved from NATO missions. The number of initiated missions requires some prioritisation to limit the scope of the study. To this end, key missions have been clustered in distinct groups, reflecting principally different responses.

The first overt NATO operations that employed use of lethal force were conducted in *Bosnia-Herzegovina*, starting in 1992. These operations were initially executed under the 1991 strategy and became influential in the design of future operations. These missions are analysed by Kersti Larsdotter in Chapter 3.

Another area of study focuses on the first major offensive operations in 1999 to address the humanitarian situation in *Kosovo*. Key elements of the engagement involved use of force without a United Nations' Security Council authorisation. The mission is analysed by Ryan C. Hendrickson in Chapter 4.

A third theme of interest is the *inter-institutional cooperation* in the Balkans. As the European Union was becoming increasingly committed to address the security situation in the Balkans, the NATO-EU cooperation evolved in Brussels as well as in the field. These relations are analysed by Håkan Edström in Chapter 5.

In 2001, following the 11 September terrorist attacks NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time ever. Operations for *homeland defense of NATO territory* had, however, been launched already during the Gulf war a decade earlier. All these activities constitute the fourth cluster of operations. These missions are analysed by Magnus Petersson in Chapter 6.

In 2003, NATO assumed responsibilities over the International Security Assistance Force in *Afghanistan*. It is a mission conducted

far away from the NATO homeland and by most accounts the most demanding operation undertaken by the Alliance. This unique operation forms the fifth category of missions. The mission is analysed by Benjamin Schreer in Chapter 7.

The sixth, and last, area of study pertains to *engagements in Africa*. Three missions are examined. In NATO's first ever mission in Africa the Alliance provided support to the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Sudan (AMIS). The first NATO anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia is also examined. Finally, the operation to implement the United Nations' Security Council's resolution on the protection of civilians in Libya is analysed. These missions are reviewed by Dennis Gyllensporre in Chapter 8.

In the Table 1.1 NATO's major operations after the Cold War are presented. Additional operations and activities are introduced in some of the empirical chapters.

*Table 1.1* NATO's major operations after the Cold War in chronological order

NATO Operation	Where	Started	Ended	Chapter
<i>Anchor Guard</i>	Turkey	Aug 90	Mar 91	6
<i>Ace Guard</i>	Turkey	Jan 91	Mar 91	6
<i>Agile Genie</i>	The Mediterranean Sea	May 92	May 92	6
<i>Maritime Monitor</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jul 92	Nov 92	3
<i>Sky Monitor</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Oct 92	Apr 93	3
<i>Maritime Guard</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Nov 92	Jun 93	3
<i>Deny Flight</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Apr 93	Dec 95	3
<i>Sharp Guard</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jun 93	Oct 96	3
<i>Deliberate Force</i>	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Aug 95	Sep 95	3
<i>Joint Endeavour</i> (IFOR)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dec 95	Dec 96	3
<i>Joint Guard</i> (SFOR)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Dec 96	Jun 98	3
<i>Joint Forge</i> (SFOR)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jun 98	Dec 04	3
<i>Allied Force</i>	Kosovo	Mar 99	Jun 99	4
KFOR	Kosovo	Jun 99	on-going	4
Essential Harvest	Macedonia	Aug 01	Sep 01	5
Amber Fox	Macedonia	Sep 01	Dec 02	5
<i>Eagle Assist</i>	The United States	Oct 01	May 02	6
<i>Active Endeavour</i>	The Mediterranean Sea	Oct 01	on-going	6
Allied Harmony	Macedonia	Dec 02	Mar 03	5
<i>Display Deterrence</i>	Turkey	Feb 03	Apr 03	6
ISAF	Afghanistan	Dec 03	on-going	7
<i>Distinguished Games</i>	Greece	Jun 04	Sep 04	6
<i>Allied Provider</i>	The Indian Ocean	Oct 08	Dec 08	8
<i>Allied Protector</i>	The Indian Ocean	Mar 09	Aug 09	8
<i>Ocean Shield</i>	The Indian Ocean	Aug 09	on-going	8
<i>Unified Protector</i>	Libya	Apr 11	on-going	8

Notably, only selected missions mentioned in the table above are explored in depth in the following chapters.

## **The findings**

In Chapter 3 Kersti Larsdotter stresses that NATO's engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina began already in 1992, with naval support to the United Nations monitoring operations in the Adriatic. After these engagements in the early 1990s the Alliance contributed to both close air support and other forms of air strikes in support of the United Nations' Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Since NATO in addition issued a number of ultimatums and also deployed its own Rapid Reaction Force on the ground Larsdotter concludes that NATO was not a sub-contractor of the United Nations' peacekeeping mission. The Allies had, however, different aims and NATO seemed, according to Larsdotter, to be unable to unify the states around a single strategy. A United States aspiration was, for example, a 'lift and strike' strategy, with the aim of making the Bosnian Muslims capable of defending themselves and to use NATO air strikes to defeat the Bosnian Serbs. The European allies concurrently continued to support a strategy where the aim of NATO's engagement was limited to supporting the United Nations. Since the special representative of the United Nations had veto on all decisions to use NATO force, the implementation of NATO strategy was conditioned by external actors. Larsdotter argues that the Alliance became more cohesive after the violent Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo in February 1994. She concludes that the development on the ground forged a more active and coherent NATO approach to the conflict. Still there was no unity among the allies regarding the formulation of a comprehensive strategy. When the war broke out in mid-1995, after a four month truce between the belligerents, NATO had already prepared for the deployment of its Rapid Reaction Force. Larsdotter stresses that the first signs of a unified NATO strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina are to be found at the London Summit in July 1995. When the Dayton peace agreement was signed in December the same year it was agreed that NATO was to command the new peacekeeping force. Hence, most of the obstacles that had hampered the Alliance during the first three years of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were removed, giving a more promising future for a cohesive and rational NATO strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In Chapter 4 Ryan C. Hendrickson suggests that the political context plays a critical role in determining how a strategy is both initiated

and then implemented. Despite the presence of a new strategic concept and the Alliance's expressed willingness to address non-Article 5 threats, the initiation of *Operation Allied Force* was shaped, Hendrickson concludes, largely by context specific factors, including perceived success in Bosnia-Herzegovina, human rights abuses, failed diplomacy, Javier Solana's diplomatic break-through, and President William 'Bill' Clinton's domestic political challenges. These variables were crucial in determining if NATO could initiate the broader strategic concept that it had agreed to already in 1991. In practice the absence of a shared military strategic vision to implement the bombing campaign during *Operation Allied Force* led to considerable internal debate on how to defeat Serbia and the Milosevic regime. These differences were evident through the conflicting national perspectives held on how to use force against Serbia, and internal American debates on strategic bombing, but also resulted in rather close cooperation and coordination between NATO's political strategic level, personified in the secretary general, and military strategic level, personified in SACEUR. The different national perspectives on the appropriate governance forum for the conflict also led to an arguably competitive role for the European Union, as France and Germany inserted the Union into the diplomatic dialogue. Furthermore, the United Nations' Secretary General Kofi Annan also played a supporting role for NATO, as Annan and Solana remained in close contact throughout the operation, which indicates how important context specific variables, including inter-institutional cooperation, are in explaining the implementation of NATO strategy. Although many conclusions can be drawn from the Kosovo case, Hendrickson mentions especially the fundamental role played by the SACEUR in both initiating and then implementing the operation. General Wesley Clark, according to Hendrickson, pushed hard for a NATO intervention and even situated himself at the operational centre of the actual bombing campaign. At the same time, General Clark was placed in an unusually difficult position, in which he faced multiple forms of political pressure over the conduct of the operation. More generally, it is clear that context specific variables resulted in the SACEUR, along with the Secretary General, having instrumental roles in defining and then implementing central strategic and tactical aspects of *Operation Allied Force*.

In Chapter 5 Håkan Edström comes to the conclusion that NATO is considering cooperation with the European Union to be necessary since it provides an option to withdraw American resources and/or to decrease the use of some critical capabilities that are more urgently needed elsewhere but at the same time ensure a remaining and overarching role

for NATO. The key concern is not necessarily the numbers of troops but rather the specific capabilities of the different units. The military strategic relationship between the two organisations is, according to Edström, asymmetric since the European Union has no permanent military strategic headquarters and since the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) actually is one of the potential headquarters of the Union at this level. The Berlin Plus Agreement is perceived as a symbolic product for NATO at the military strategic and operational level, created solely for political reasons. Furthermore, the operational cooperation between the two organisations seems to be artificial. Edström has not found any compelling military argument for the cooperation from a NATO perspective. Instead the empirical material indicates that the motives are to be found at the political strategic level and, as in the case of Macedonia, within the host nation. In addition the national interests of key members are considered to be a driving force. The tailoring of the cooperation seems, according to Edström, to be more policy driven than based on true strategic needs. In case of a hand over of the military responsibility to the European Union, providing a back up force as a strategic reserve is an option that seems to be preferable for NATO's political strategic level. As soon as the European Union is ready to accept the political risks and economic costs that come with leading military operations, NATO seem to be willing to change the guards as long as the political strategic influence of the Alliance is guaranteed. Keeping military presence with advisory teams seems to be the preferred option. Edström finds the reluctance of SHAPE to include non-military aspects in its considerations striking. The police missions of the European Union are, for example, neglected by NATO's military strategic level. Since the Berlin Plus Agreement solely focuses on military cooperation SHAPE has been provided with an argument to continue its combat oriented approach to the inter-institutional cooperation. Since the operational level has to live with the strategic realities the cooperation is, Edström concludes, conducted in a practical and pragmatic manner from case to case. NATO is hereby considered to be a back up or deterrent force for the European Union's missions.

In Chapter 6 Magnus Petersson tries to identify to what extent strategic guidance for NATO 'homeland defense' has existed after the end of the Cold War. He is hereby exploring both the declaratory, that is what has been explicitly said, and the operational, that is what has actually been done, dimensions. Petersson concludes that in the former dimension there exists quite clear formulated strategic guidance in all the strategic concepts NATO has developed after the end of the Cold War.

In the latter dimension several ‘homeland defense’ operations clearly indicate, according to Petersson, that NATO also has had their focus on the direct security of the member states. NATO has, for example, contributed with what has been perceived as suitable means when member states have requested it. Petersson furthermore discusses whether the strategic guidance regarding ‘homeland defense’ had been initiated mainly from below (bottom-up) or above (top-down), and how logically consistent the interaction between the political strategic, military strategic and operational levels had been, in relation to the rational ideal type of the making of strategy (that is top-down and high degree of logical consistence). Petersson concludes that the making of ‘homeland defense’ strategy was similar to the ideal type and, thus, quite similar to the situation during the Cold War. Petersson goes even deeper and tries to estimate to what degree NATO’s strategy for ‘homeland defense’ has been sufficient. He concludes that this is not necessarily the case. Several of NATO’s member states seem, for example, to be frustrated by the ‘insufficient’ focus on ‘homeland defense’. Petersson supports the claims by these states. He concludes that there was only limited contingency planning for the territorial defense of several NATO allies until 2010. Provocatively Petersson raises the question whether NATO has forgotten its most central task – to guarantee all the allies territorial integrity – or not. Has the dimension of ‘homeland defense’ been lost due to the focus on ‘out-of-area’ operations? He concludes that this is not the case. Petersson stresses that the important question instead should be if the ‘homeland defense’ strategy is sufficient to meet the threats and challenges directed toward NATO territory.

In Chapter 7 Benjamin Schreer makes four observations about NATO’s strategy for the mission to Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. The first observation is that NATO’s strategy making process between 2001 and 2008 can be viewed as an example of reversed direction of strategy making mentioned by, among others, Richard Betts. In the absence of coherent leadership at the political strategic level of NATO allies, Schreer concludes, the operational level aimed to adjust strategy and strategy making capabilities through a series of bottom-up initiatives. Yet, the lesson to be learned was that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations such as Afghanistan by reverting to a bottom-up process of strategy making when fundamental support at the political strategic level is lacking. The second observation is from the period between 2009 and 2011. The strategy process for the ISAF operation was, according to Schreer, by then ‘harmonised’. Substantial efforts were made, for example, to better link the strategic and operational levels. Importantly,

the political strategic level largely set aside the differences between allies and agreed on a renewed strategic effort for ISAF. Schreer stresses, however, that non-US NATO allies largely 'outsourced' strategy making after 2009 in the sense that the conduct of the Afghan operation became 'Americanised' given the disproportionate amount of resources allocated by the United States. NATO's strategy for ISAF was, according to Schreer, largely US-driven. While NATO declared the strategy a success in 2011, Schreer warns that this conclusion might be premature. There is, however, no doubt that progress has been made since 2009, Schreer argues. He concludes that this might support the paradigm that a top-down process of strategy making is needed if the Alliance is to stand a chance of making strategy effectively. The third observation made by Schreer is that the strategy making for Afghanistan has been significantly determined by broader considerations of alliance cohesion which had nothing to do with operational realities in Afghanistan. The reluctance of many European members to get involved between 2001 and 2008 was as much related to an internal dispute about the general course of the alliance, as it was the result of a deep transatlantic rift over the United States' decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Opposition to American President George W. Bush's foreign policy came to influence the approach of many European allies to NATO's Afghanistan operation. The fourth and last observation made by Schreer is that strategy making in complex operations such as Afghanistan critically depends on the political leadership of the United States. European allies expected American leadership in what they basically perceived to be an operation led by the United States, and not a NATO-led operation. This implies, Schreer concludes, that strategy in large-scale NATO operations will be dominated by the United States.

In Chapter 8 Dennis Gyllensporre states that NATO does not have an official strategy on Africa. This is not the same, however, as a total absence of a *de facto* strategy Gyllensporre argues. Based on his empirical examination he uses *ends*, *ways* and *means* as the building blocks constructing an implicit strategy. According to Gyllensporre the ends, or the long term political objectives, transcend the Alliance's shared values on the continent, as enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty, in order to prevent Africa from destabilising NATO territory, especially in the Mediterranean region. The threats include organised crime, terrorism, piracy, proliferation of WMD, illegal immigration, and the spread of diseases. Gyllensporre argues, however, that there is no ambition from NATO to address the root causes of insecurity in Africa. Instead the short term political objective of the Alliance seems to be

acceptance of the status quo. Only immediate threats to the prosperity of the allies and urgent humanitarian violations may, Gyllensporre concludes, qualify for NATO actions. In order to meet the ends NATO pursues, according to Gyllensporre, a strategy of indirect and reactive approach: 'African problems are best addressed with African solutions'. Hence NATO is engaging in consultations and provides support to the capacity building of the African Union. The indirect approach does not preclude NATO from striving for a visible role and being a part of the solution without significant military commitments. The military clout of the Alliance must, according to Gyllensporre, be utilised to influence African counterparts. In addition military actions are to be conducted by proxy organisations like the African Union. NATO's own military actions are reactive and only contemplated based on specific invitations by the United Nations and/or the host nation. If NATO is considering a military engagement the strategy is aiming to contain the situation Gyllensporre concludes. NATO's considerations on military engagements will, according to Gyllensporre, primarily be done based on a top-down approach, with only limited impact from the military level. When it comes to ways Gyllensporre finds it most unlikely that NATO troops will deploy on the ground in Africa. Other indirect means will, Gyllensporre argues, presumably be used instead. Employing naval and air forces to contain the threat is such an example. The limited ability of the African Union's military institutions to conduct consultations at the military strategic level and operational level hampers, Gyllensporre stresses, military cooperation and provides a driver for top-down consultations at the political level.

## Conclusions

When studying NATO operations over the two previous decades, four trends regarding the *contextual* impact appear to be of significance. First, NATO seldom acts as a first responder to an international crisis. Only in the initial phase of the Kosovo case did NATO intervene without mandate from the United Nations. In all other cases, NATO has either been invited by the United Nations to implement a resolution or been requested, by the host nation or allied nation, for homeland defense. Presumably this means that the inviter has at least some influence in framing the settings. NATO cannot, in other words, conduct its operations without taking the political strategic, military strategic and operational constraints of others into account.

Second, NATO has taken over the military responsibility from the United Nations on three occasions. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the



United Nation's Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was transferred to Implementation Force (IFOR) and in Macedonia NATO was asked to replace the United Nations' Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) when the United Nations led operation was terminated. In Afghanistan NATO did not even change the name of the International Security Assistant Force (ISAF) when the Alliance took over responsibility. It seems reasonable to assume that NATO, at least in the initial phase, had to build its own action on the strategy formulated by its predecessor. The strategy formulation of the Alliance might, in other words, very well have been nothing but a reformulation.

Third, when the European Union launched its *European Security and Defence Policy* in 2000 NATO gained a partner, but at the same time a competitor. NATO operations in Europe have ever since taken a complementary role to, and remained either functionally or temporally separated from, the operations conducted by the European Union. In all three cases, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the European Union established police missions (functional separation). In the former two NATO has had the role of handing over military responsibility (that is temporal separation). It seems to be only a matter of time before the European Union takes over responsibility of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) as well. The future role of NATO in *peace support operations* on the European continent is challenged. When the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in December 2009 this challenge was explicitly expressed by the European Union. However, following the inability of the European Union to unite and play a key role in response to the Libya crisis in 2011, questions of the future role of the Union in crisis management have been raised. It remains to be seen if the European members in the future prefer to address the operations the Alliance have conducted related to defending NATO territory through EU-channels. The scope of these operations is no obstacle for such transformation of responsibility.

Four, in the context of naval warfare NATO is conducting an Article 5 operation in the Mediterranean Sea. This operation has no competitor. Instead partners are invited to participate. In the Indian Ocean the Alliance is, however, challenged by, *inter alia*, the European Union led naval operation. The inter-institutional arrangements have led to a spatial separation between the operations. Not having full control over the total area of operations presumably impacts on the shaping of strategy.

To summarise, NATO independence in strategy formulation is curtailed due to contextual aspects. The strategic assessments and ambitions of other actors, especially the United Nations and the European

Union, have impact. Together with NATO's own reluctance, as will be elaborated below, this leaves only a confined functional, temporal and spatial space for the Alliance to act.

When it comes to the impact from *process* related factors three aspects are of crucial importance. First, key partners such as the African Union and the European Union lack a corresponding chain of command structure which very well might be the essence of the Alliance. Most significant is the absence of an institutionalised military strategic level. When NATO is interacting with these partners all strategic affairs are hence channeled through the political strategic level.

Second, the dynamics within NATO are to a large extent policy driven. This is not the same as accusing the political leadership of micro management. The consequences of the introduction of the new guidance for operational planning are, however, intended to be a shift from a bottom-up approach manifested in the previous Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) to a top-down approach articulated in the new Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD). In spite of this increased hierarchical approach there exists a pragmatic culture at the operational level. The pragmatism is, however, more oriented to dealing with the challenges in the theatre than to participating in strategy formulation. Hence it is questionable if the successors of General Eisenhower fully agree with his conclusion that 'plans are nothing – planning is everything'. On the other hand the statement might have been expressed by a politician in the making rather than by a battle proven general.

Third, NATO has fundamental problems with the parallel chains of command, taking into account the exercise of national authority over deployed forces and the practice of 'dual-hatting' senior commanders. Although General McChrystal, for example, had received directions from both his NATO and American superiors, his assessments were primarily processed through the United States channels. All levels in the United States' chain of command were included; Pentagon at the political strategic level and CENTCOM at the military strategic level. Within NATO, the Secretary General at the political strategic level and SACEUR at the military strategic level were addressed, but the operational commander at Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Brunssum was excluded in the promulgation through the NATO channels. Why is that? Was it because the JFC commander was not an American general? Even if this is only speculation it raises questions as to whether *McChrystal's strategy* was anything more than just an American strategy after all.

To summarise, when cooperating with external partners the military strategic level in NATO (SHAPE/ACO) is marginalised. In the internal

procedures and processes within NATO the operational level (the JFCs) are considered to be of less importance. Hence the dynamics in the strategy formulation process are dysfunctional. Since the interactions increasingly are following Betts's suggested top-down direction, and since diplomats and civil servants are replacing flag officers as key actors in the process, there is a fundamental risk that the difference between NATO policy and strategy finally will vanish.

When it comes to *content* two key findings are identified. First, the temporal aspects are crucial. The longer an operation is conducted the more influence the operational level will gain. It takes, in other words, time to make the operational level relevant in the dynamics of formulating strategy. This statement is supported by the fact that the bottom-up driven interaction is initiated by the Periodic Mission Review (PMR) document presented by the operational level six months after the OPLAN was executed. This document can be seen as a request by the operational commander to reformulate the initially formulated means, that is the resources needed, and the ways, that is the mandate or ROE. Another key document is the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) which is initially formulated during the force generating process but revisited when conducting PMRs. Even if this document focuses on means it provides the operational level with an opportunity to express concerns about the whole strategy, that is ends and ways as well. Furthermore, the larger numbers of military units involved, the more the strategic levels have to consider the concerns expressed by the operational level. As a consequence, the commander of ISAF becomes more influential in the strategy formulation process than the commander of KFOR. An additional aspect is the unofficial 'quick in – quick out' approach that is the policy established by the political strategic level to strive for as short an engagement as possible. This approach gives military commanders' few opportunities to influence the strategy formulation process. Instead of being catalysts of PMRs their function will be as pure executioners.

Second, on the African continent NATO is willing to engage only indirectly and preferably only with air and maritime forces. This strategy (or policy?) is, however, not explicitly expressed. Nevertheless it impacts on the behaviour of the Alliance. While maritime forces, mentioned above, have sustainability to operate far away from their bases over a long time, air forces do not. As long as NATO remains reluctant to establish more long term presence on the African continent the Alliance will be dependent on either bases on NATO territory or carriers. Since the transfer of command of carriers to NATO is unlikely to occur this means

that NATO use of air power is either limited to the range of bases close to the area of operations or dependent on national deployment of carriers in support of NATO operations. Even with air refueling capability these kind of operations are complex. NATO is, for example, dependent on a nation's willingness to open their air space for the activities of the Alliance. The core problem with this approach is that it is hard, perhaps even impossible, to reach lasting results. Most likely neither NATO nor any other actor operating along the shores of Somalia will, for example, bring the piracy to an end solely by 'being-a-fleet'.

To summarise, implicitly formulated policies limit not only the influence but, more importantly, the opportunity for operational commanders to get involved in the strategy formulation.

### **Final discussion**

To sum up the project, pursuing strategy is a never ending story. As long as political leaders at the political strategic level are unable and/or unwilling to formulate a universal logic, that is similar ends leading to the use of similar means, there will be a need to formulate context specific strategies.

In relation to the three key questions identified in the research design the empirical investigations suggest that there are some commonalities at the aggregated level. The first question concerns the justification of the operation: *What* should NATO safeguard and promote? The findings demonstrate that all operations are grounded, directly or indirectly by authorisation of the Security Council, in the logic and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. Some operations are based on the inherent right of self defense, individually or collectively, as articulated in article 51 of the Charter. These operations are primarily homeland defense operations, as explored in Magnus Petersson's chapter. In addition, Håkan Edström discusses the operations in Macedonia that were initiated following a request made by the Macedonian President as the nation faced threats to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In this case article 51 of the Charter is also applicable. A third case of direct application of the Charter is elaborated by Ryan C. Hendrickson. The air campaign in Kosovo during *Operation Allied Force* was initiated based on a realisation that Kosovo posed a threat to peace and security in the region and that a humanitarian catastrophe was imminent. Also, the Secretary General of the United Nations was advocating actions to be undertaken by the international community. Notwithstanding, the Security Council failed to agree to such actions. Against this backdrop the Alliance decided to act in the spirit of the Charter, as articulated

in the preamble, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. Other operations have been launched indirectly in response to a United Nations Security Council Resolution mandating the international community to take action.

The second question addresses the spatial domain of the operation: *Where* should NATO get involved in military conflicts? The findings suggest that the Alliance has yet to define its spatial ambitions. As Magnus Petersson describes in Chapter 6, there seems to be no interest in NATO to draw up defense plans for former Soviet bloc NATO allies in Central and Eastern Europe. If there is low ambition to defend members, there is presumably even less interest to engage further east. Furthermore, as Håkan Edström describes in Chapter 5, the appearance of the European Union as a competitor, not least on the European continent, indicates that even if NATO truly has ambitions the space left for the Alliance to act is decreasing. This might be a result of a vanishing role for the military strategic level. Furthermore, as Dennis Gyllensporre describes in his chapter, the case of Darfur, as well as the other operations in Africa, indicates the existence of an implicit policy aimed at minimising risks. Engaging with as little resources as possible and, in addition, exposing them during the shortest possible time makes it extremely hard for the operational level to mobilise a response. When (not *if*) a similar uprising takes place in Belorussia, Moldova and/or Ukraine, as currently has taken place in Libya as well as other places in the Arab world, one can ask whether the Alliance will be willing to get involved or not.

The third, and last, question focuses on the options to employ military forces: *How* should NATO allies unite their efforts in order to conduct military operations? The findings suggest that the *modus operandi* of NATO is conditioned by the geographical location of the operation. Kosovo and Darfur exemplified how the similar objective, in this case 'protecting civilians', was met with different means and ambitions. To make it even more complex, Kosovo and Libya exemplified how similar ends were met with similar means but in different ways. In Kosovo the air strikes hit Serbian strategic targets such as command posts and critical infrastructure. In Libya tactical targets such as Gaddafi's military forces were attacked. As Ryan Hendrickson describes in Chapter 4, the political strategic level was deeply involved in the targeting process in Kosovo. It is, however, too early to judge whether this was also the case in Libya.

Contrasting the aforementioned earlier NATO concepts of massive retaliation and flexible response the current overarching strategy of NATO may be labeled *passive retaliation* or *reluctant response*.

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## Notes

1. Still, a number of exercises and preventive activities were performed as a show of force to deter hostile actions from the Warsaw Pact.
2. Two examples of dictators in the West were Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal. Three examples of communist impact on stability in the West are the United States' and the United Kingdom's support to the Hellenic government against the communist insurgency, the membership of the communist parties in Italy and France in the Soviet led Cominform, and Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-communist activities in the United States.
3. The members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States.

# 2

## Painting the Theoretical Landscape

*Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre*

This chapter provides a foundation for the empirical investigation in subsequent chapters. It examines the theoretical foundations of strategy as well as its practical implementation by NATO. The ambition is descriptive. No distinct conclusions are drawn. Instead the synthesis is presented in Chapter 1. Moreover, we do not intend to provide a complete set of questions that ought to be addressed. Based on individual methodological considerations, each of the authors of the empirical chapters will instead use his/her own set of questions to explore strategy formulation.

### **Strategy in theory**

The theoretical elaboration covers a historical account of the evolution of strategic thought, dynamics between strategy and operations as well as alliance dynamics. The original ideas, stemming primarily from the military realm, have had a remarkable longevity. Only recently has a new branch, from business management, enriched the body of theory. This section combines these disjoint repositories of strategic considerations. Finally, a holistic approach to strategy including the dimensions of context, process and content is elaborated to provide structure for the subsequent section.

### **The science and art of strategy**

Throughout the evolution of strategic thought two opposing forces of influence have inspired strategists. The scientific approach suggests that there is a set of generic critical successful factors that, if adhered to, will lead to victory. The counter approach stresses the uniqueness of every situation. Mastering conflict, it maintains, is an art that cannot be



reduced to a set of simple rules. Instead decision makers must use their professional instinct. In comparison, the former approach is driven by top-down guidance while the latter approach has an implicit need for interaction between different levels of command.

Military strategy has a long historical pedigree in theory and practice. It is perceived as the origin of strategy applied in other areas.<sup>1</sup> The term 'strategy' was coined around 500 B.C. in ancient Greece where *Strategos* was a position held by ten elected Athenian tribe leaders who also acted as military leaders and collectively formed a Council (Cummings, 1993, p. 133). Hence, the underlying meaning of the word was linked to the military domain from the onset. *Strategos* is a composite formed from *stratos*; meaning dispersed army and *agein*; to lead. Accordingly, the term was soon used in a military context designating the senior ranking officer, or general, and more specifically the art of the general (Harvard Business Press, 2006, p. xiii).<sup>2</sup> Ever since the first application of the term strategy has evolved and its meaning remains elusive. Mintzberg (1996, p. 10) points out that:

Human nature insists on a definition for every concept. But the word *strategy* has long been used implicitly in different ways even if it has traditionally been defined in only one.

While the term initially was closely associated with military leadership, it later proliferated in the area of statecraft (Margiotta, 2000, p. 1003) and now it is also assimilated in business management literature, including marketing theory.<sup>3</sup> Still the longevity of some of the early elaborations on the topic bears witness to some enduring characteristics. Influenced by the Confucian thinking in ancient China, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (around 500 B.C.) appears as one of early accounts of strategic thinking. Based on the five Confucian virtues of human nature; humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom or knowledge and faithfulness (Chan, 1963, p. 452), Sun Tzu takes an idealistic approach to conflict. In this seminal treatise strategy revolves around preventing conflict by subduing the enemy's mindset (Sun Tzu, 2009, p. 8). His book falls short of defining strategy, but his account makes it clear that it is a broader and more abstract concept than achieving battle-field victories.<sup>4</sup> Victory without bloodshed is the ultimate goal. To this end, a broad set of instruments of power must be exercised, including diplomatic and information efforts. Information dominance, through for instance deception, plays a key role. So does the economy of force concept. Use of military force is seen as the last resort.

While the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), might desire conflicts being resolved without resorting to violence, he does not pay much attention to this idealistic prospect. Instead his work rests firmly on realist premises. Contrasting the prosaic and concise writing tradition of Sun Tzu is also Clausewitz's dialectic and generous language, often perceived as a source of ambiguity. Influenced by the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz's *On War* (posthumously published in 1832) provides compelling arguments for employing lethal military force. He argues that 'direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration' (Clausewitz, 1976, p. 228). To this end, military forces are to be concentrated at decisive points. In his definition strategy includes the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the objective. Despite these fundamental differences, both Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's writings were underpinned by an understanding that war and conflicts are unpredictable by nature. Sun Tzu highlighted the infinite complexity in war (Sun Tzu, 2009, p. 126). Along the same lines Clausewitz introduced the notions of the 'fog and friction of war' and 'chance'. In their views strategy is a phenomenon based on *coup d'œil*, or intuition, and thus broadly approached as an art (Handel, 2001, pp. 26–31).

In contrast, Henri Jomini (1779–1869), a Swiss born contemporary general of Clausewitz that served in the French and later in the Russian Army, advocated a scientific approach to strategy. Key to success was to apply these principles better than the adversary (Shy, 1986, p. 146). In his *Art of War* (1832) strategy is defined as the 'art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion' and includes 13 specific considerations for strategists (Jomini, 2009, p. 9). Coincidentally, Sun Tzu also offered 13 guidelines as each chapter addresses a specific topic and Clausewitz also provided principles on the attainment of strategy, albeit these were not as prescriptive as the mechanistic approach applied by Jomini. Influenced by Jomini, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), an American navy officer and historian with war experience from the Civil War, recognised the need to develop an economic strategy as well as a naval strategy. Based on Jomini's principles his strategy emphasised the need to concentrate naval forces and take the logistical challenges into consideration (Sumida, 1997, p. 43). In his *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* he advocated dominating the seaways. His thinking was underpinned by the assumption that control of trade and securing resources to wage war was crucial. The industrial aspect was further advanced by Jean de Bloch (1836–1902), who maintained that war was ultimately a duel of industrial power

(Bloch, 1914, p. xvi). Mahan also represents the body of strategists that took inspiration in the industrialisation.

Another influential historian and former officer for that period was Hans Delbrück (1848–1929). His point of departure was Clausewitz and the link between politics and the military. When commenting on the unfolding World War I he argued that conduct of military operations required tighter political control. Military strategy must be conditioned by the aims of the state policy (Craig, 1986, p. 327). Another theoretical response to the World War I was provided by Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895–1979). After serving as a British officer during the war he took up writing and in his view direct attacks against an enemy should be avoided. Instead, he advocated an indirect approach. He qualified earlier thinking on concentrating forces by adding that they must be employed against the weakness of the enemy (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 334).

During World War II, as airpower became an important instrument of war, strategies emerged in this area. In Giulio Douhet's (1869–1930) *Command of the Air* (1942) an offensive and independent role of air forces is envisaged. His cynical views on war are divorced from the human elements of the duel. Instead, he argued that the mechanistic characteristics of Total War absorbed the human elements. In this context airpower was a viable instrument of populations to directly attack other populations allowing them to 'come to blows and seize each other's throats' (Douhet, 1998, p. 195).

Another line of strategy development is underpinned by the notion of asymmetric warfare. It is a response to guerilla warfare. Mao Tse-tung (1893–1976) pioneered this discipline in theory and practice. The guerrilla warfare concept is seemingly influenced by Liddell Hart's indirect approach. When guerilla forces attack conventional forces they avoid attacking the latter's strength. More importantly they attack and withdraw to avoid being exposed to counterattacks. Guerilla forces are persistent and use time to their advantage. In guerilla strategy, a conventional decisive attack is not launched until the enemy is depleted (Mao Tse-tung, 2000). Roger Trinquier (1908–86), a French army officer who served in Indochina and Algeria, realised that countering guerilla warfare required another approach. In his *A French View of Counterinsurgency* (1961), he emphasises the ability to adapt to the enemy and to draw support from the local population (Trinquier, 1985).

A widely accepted military application of strategy uses ends, ways and means as building blocks (Lykke, 1989). This approach rejects the notion that strategy is merely a plan or an idea on how to solve a problem. Instead strategy has three distinct facets. In the case of NATO

at the military strategic level it addresses *how* (ways, course of action or concepts) the *forces* (means, capabilities or resources) available to achieve *objectives* (ends) that support the political end-state and interests defined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). To explain the importance of balance in the strategy Arthur F. Lykke used a three-legged stool as a metaphor, with the ends, ways and means representing each of the legs. (Lykke, 1989). If these aspects were not in balance the legs would have different lengths and as a consequence the stool would tilt. The angle or degree of tilt defines the risk associated with an unbalanced strategy. If the stool tips over then the risk is too great.

### **The dynamics between strategy and operations**

When Gustavus Adolphus (1594–1632) and Frederick the Great (1712–86) issued strategies they embodied both the head of state and the military field commander (Margiotta, 2000, p. 232). Staff was seldom involved in the strategy formulation. Projection of power often involved employment of military (land) forces and during execution the field commander directed forces from a central location where he could oversee the battlefield and gather the information required to make decisions. Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the ruler was generally separated from the state and the state itself became an abstract organisation (Creveld, 1999, p. 127).<sup>5</sup>

The progress was achieved by the development of a bureaucratic structure that emancipated itself from royal control and civil society. The need to curtail the ruler's ability to use military power drove development of civilian control by governmental institutions over the military organisation (Huntington, 1957). Gradually the focus shifted toward controlling the armed forces. As the political and military organisation became separated different levels of strategy emerged. Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929), a French statesman argued during World War I that '[w]ar is too important a business to be left to soldiers' (Honary, 2007, p. 73). His views inspired the development of grand strategy as the highest national level of strategic deliberation, including the national objectives, diplomacy and allocation of resources for the conduct of warfare. However, this concept was not new. The holistic view adopted by Sun Tzu is in many ways consistent with grand strategy although the concept was not developed. Moreover, the grand strategies of the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire have recently been explored (Luttwak, 1979, 2009). Liddell Hart (1991, p. 322) provides a widely accepted view on grand strategy:

[T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the

attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy [...] Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity.

While both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz saw the military as an agent for the political leadership, the dynamics between the political level and the highest military level did not start to receive scientific attention until Samuel P. Huntington published *The Soldier and the State* in 1957 and Morris Janowitz followed suit with his *The Professional Soldier* in 1960. Both books highlight the tension between maximising civilian control and maintaining military professionalism by allowing freedom of action. Underlying this divide is a fundamental difference in values and traditions. On the one hand the mindset officers are conservative and military organisations, although well organised, are reluctant to change, despite changes in the environment. On the other hand the liberal and unstructured society is more adaptable to external changes. In an empirical investigation on Finland, Norway and Sweden five critical success factors are identified for interaction between the grand strategic level and the highest military level. At the grand strategic (or political strategic) level geopolitical principles should be established and alliance membership should be included for small states. At the military strategic level the loyalty of the officer's corps towards overall goals as well as the political involvement in military matters are important factors. Moreover an institutionalised coordinating mechanism is needed to ensure transparency and foster dialogue (Edström, 2003).

Returning to the early military organisations, they too require attention. As military organisations became more complex with various diversified and specialised capabilities and moreover, as technology gradually improved and provided significant support – intelligence as well as mobility – to command and control, the military organisation became separated in distinct levels and focus of effort. This development was theorised in the dictums of Max Weber (1864–1920). In his bureaucracy model hierarchic authority, detailed job-descriptions and dividing of work by function are prominent characteristics. If a task is too complex it is divided into sub-tasks or functions and thereby a hierarchical organisation is created. Armies became organised in brigades, divisions and corps with increasingly specialised tasks. It would turn out that complexity rendered these traditional concepts obsolete (Jablonsky, 1994). During

World War I three overlapping conceptual levels of military command emerged. Subordinate to the grand strategic level, a military strategic level was added to interpret political guidance into military direction for fulfillment of policy objectives. At this level the military component of grand strategy is advanced. Military strategic authorities are responsible for setting out the requirement for military assets (Homan, 2008). As a consequence, the traditional concept of strategy, as defined since the time of Clausewitz, became the operational level at which 'campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives [...] Activities at this level link tactics and strategy' (Jablonsky, 1994, p. 21). It deals with joint and combined forces and apportioning resources to tactical units. Battles and engagements takes place at the subordinate tactical level.

While this is a straightforward and commonly accepted division of levels among practitioners, scholars have made additional contributions. Luttwak applies five levels and two dimensions in his analysis of strategy.<sup>6</sup> He also emphasises that their interaction is critical and must be understood. The two dimensions are understood as the impact between the levels, the vertical dimension, and within each level, the horizontal dimension (Luttwak, 2001).

### **Alliance dynamics**

This section addresses the forces at play within an alliance, primarily between the contributing states that constitute the joint venture. Alliances are based on formal international agreements to manage existing but unrealised threats whereas coalitions are *ad hoc* arrangements to deal with challenges that have materialised (Yoda, 2005, p. 2).

NATO and its initial strategy is a product of the third wave of effort to co-bind states in collective security architecture. The first wave of collective security was successfully implemented by the Concert of Europe to prevent war between great powers in the early and mid nineteenth century, following the costly Napoleonic Wars (Bennett and Leggold, 1993). A key objective among the victors of the Napoleonic wars was to contain France. The second wave of collective security was driven by the outcome of World War I and the desire to reduce the power of Germany. Inspired by the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations was also underpinned by an idea of cooperation among great powers to prevent and mitigate international conflict (Lindley, 2003).

In the aftermath of World War II the notion of collective security re-emerged as a viable concept to manage interstate conflict. The third wave of collective security demonstrates similar characteristics. It emerged

after a war involving great powers. Based, somewhat, on the failure of the League of Nations a tighter security regime was crafted (Kennedy, 2006). The founding of the United Nations in 1945, including the Security Council, as a body empowered to settle international disputes. When nations started their recovery from World War II the Marshall Plan was devised in 1947 to provide economic stimulus in Europe and rebuild the continent (Judt, 2005). As the Cold War mounted Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels establishing the Western Union in 1948. The Treaty included, *inter alia*, provisions for mutual defence assistance. During the negotiations the Europeans tried to lure the United States into joining (Kaplan, 2004, p. 2). Only an American involvement would make the security alliance credible. However, the US was reluctant to commit. It took another year of negotiations until the signatories of the Western Union joined the United States in signing the North Atlantic Treaty and in effect creating NATO. Their calculus involved survival interests for the Western Europeans against the backdrop of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.

When NATO conducts operations, it habitually invites partners to participate, thus forming a coalition. Still, it is the alliance members who make the decisions at the strategic level in the various NATO bodies elaborated below. The strategic concept agreed upon in 2010 acknowledges the need for contributing partners to become more influential in the strategic decision making process by engaging in 'decision shaping' (NATO, 2010a). Moreover, non-NATO countries rarely get the opportunity to appoint commanders in the NATO chain of command at the operational and tactical level and therefore are also curtailed in their influence on the ground. Notwithstanding, whenever partners are influencing they do so both formally and informally and during different stages of the process, thus underscoring the iterative and non-linear characteristic of strategy formulation. Another issue for NATO is the strategic partnering with other organisations. In this book relations with the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations are addressed as these organisations collaborate in crisis areas.

Alliances exist to serve the interests of the participating states. When reviewing the bargaining that culminated in the Washington Treaty one can infer that NATO is no exception.<sup>7</sup> States have common as well as competing interests. Selfish competitive interests can be simplified as the power to influence allies to minimise own costs and risks. Managing alliances becomes an art of bargaining to strike an acceptable balance between these competing forces and at the same time making the alliance effective by maximising its output or 'joint benefits'. Within

an alliance the preparation of military plans, adoption of a unified diplomatic posture against an opponent and the peacetime burden sharing are the most demanding undertakings. The bargaining power of an alliance member rests on three factors: the state's dependence on the alliance, its commitment to the alliance, and its willingness to compromise (Snyder, 1997, p. 166).

Alliances typically bargain internally regarding preparedness, diplomacy and action during crises, with the latter as the most demanding. In these situations the relative interest in the conflict will also have significant impact on the bargaining power of alliance members. The bargaining situation is further complicated because two distinct issues are at stake at the same time: the immediate concerns and interests linked with the conflict and the long-term value and relevance of the alliance (Snyder, 1997, pp. 177–80).

A different calculus appears when considering how to engage with other key actors. Put simply, when confronted with a threat or challenge it can either ally with other to counter the threat band-wagoning or balancing. The dominant model created by Snyder has recently been challenged by professing an internal dimension of Alliance dynamics of equal importance as the external dimension, the 'alliance power dilemma'. It suggests that there is a desire to prevent allies becoming either too strong or too weak. From this perspective it is argued that the asymmetric relationship between NATO allies provides an incentive to cooperate (Locatelli and Testoni, 2009, p. 346).

Tatsuro Yoda approaches the value of cooperation by exploring ways to influence partners to allocate more beneficial alliance contributions for US-led operations. The study concludes that the burden sharing calculus should consider the external environment in which the public good is produced, the internal environment where the decisions on contributions are made, and the comparative advantages of the members in contributing different components to the alliance's production function for the public good (Yoda, 2005).

### **Strategy: Context, process and content**

The evolution of strategy as a theoretical construct is strongly influenced by how strategy was exercised. Early accounts on the practice of strategy include Thucydides' (460–395 B.C.) epic treatise of the *Peloponnesian War* (431 B.C.). When the Spartans set out to liberate Greece from the Athenians, Pericles, one of the Athenian *strategos*, or generals, devised a defensive strategy. While surrendering the countryside all efforts were concentrated to protect the city of Athens and supply it from the sea (Kagan, 1994, p. x).<sup>8</sup>



Other practitioners like Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.) and Napoleon I (1769–1821) were dedicated to other principles. Alexander the Great repeatedly demonstrated the ability to defeat larger forces by attacking their weak points. Napoleon I always strived to operate from a position of relative strength that would pose such a threat that the opponent had to respond thus making them subject to a decisive, but not necessarily major, battle (Paret, 1986, p. 131).

This brief overview covers only a limited number of strategists directly related to the application of military strategy. While some of these strategists elaborated on strategy in the continuum between military affairs and politics this exposé does not cover the body of theory that addresses strategy exclusively on the political level. When discussing different levels of strategy below both these approaches are touched upon. Instead we direct efforts towards synthesising the distilled historical knowledge on military strategy. The military experience has created a relatively coherent perception of the subject among military professionals. The characteristics of strategy can be summarised in five tenets (Gyllensporre, 2001, p. 45):

1. Distinctive goals, guidelines, sequenced planning of actions, and resource allocations are fundamental parts.
2. The focus of effort is on a few key concepts to enable coherent execution.
3. Contingency planning is conducted for management of uncertainties.
4. The strategy can be regarded as a plan communicating intent and will of the highest level of authority in the organisation.
5. The essence is to build up a posture strong enough to achieve the objectives despite 'the fog and friction of war'.

The concept of strategy, as summarised in five key tenets above, is straightforward. However, these tenets suggest that the notion of strategy concept is based on the epistemological tradition of positivism and a scientific understanding as outlined by Jomini and others. The characteristics clearly indicate causality from intent to performance. Influential management strategists like Michael Porter (1998) and Henry Mintzberg (1996) argue for a holistic approach to strategy instead of studying elements of strategy. Bob De Wit and Ron Meyer (1994, p. xi) capture the essence of their arguments:

Elements can be taken apart and examined in isolation, but this is not the case with the strongly interrelated aspects of process, content, or context. Strategic phenomena can be examined from a process, content, or context *perspective*.

Content is the most concrete dimension of strategy. It is the product that articulates what the organisation wants to achieve, the approach and resources to achieve the desired end state. Often it is described in terms of ends, ways and means. For military operations strategies are embodied in strategic planning guidance and initiating military directives for the operations. In essence the content addresses *What* the organisation wants to accomplish. Strategy products do not capture all aspects of the strategy. Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) argued that ‘Plans are nothing – Planning is everything’ (De Wit and Meyer, 1994, p. 35) suggesting that the process is a critical element. Formulation of strategies involves many processes: formal, informal, rational as well as irrational. From a process oriented perspective there is a relationship between the processes and the performance of the strategy.

Mintzberg and Waters (1985) highlight the lack of linkage between intent and performance since some intended strategies are not executed while other strategies emerge as the situation unfolds. Strategy is not just a plan, it also encompasses execution. In addition, the concept of strategy indicates a rational planning where uncertainties can be managed by attaching an appropriate probability. The climax of the strategic process is decision making. The strategy process defines *How* strategies are developed. The context of the strategy must also be considered. Mintzberg (1978) argues that strategy can be viewed as a pattern or a posture. Each decision and action environment, that is the other actors within the context, will be subject to some interpretation. Hence, strategy can be viewed as a pattern. In some sense all strategies try to convey a message to the environment. However, the same patterns of actions and decisions can be interpreted differently and even in contradictory ways, but still be logically based on cultural background and underlying values. The context of the strategy determines the circumstances for the content as well as the process. The context completes the strategy considerations in that it addresses the remaining questions: *Where, When, Who, and Why* (De Wit and Meyer, 1994, p. 30). Clearly, understanding strategy requires a multi-faceted mindset. To be understood it must be examined through prisms of art and science and cover perspectives of content, process and context.

### **Strategy in practice: Strategising in NATO**

In this section we shift focus from the theoretical aspects of strategy to the practical ones and in particular those that have relevance for NATO. Mindful of the aforementioned theoretical contributions, including the holistic approach based on context, process and content as dimensions

to strategy, it is prudent to regard strategy formulation as a bidirectional and iterative process when examining NATO.

Recalling the aforementioned theoretical discussion on strategy comprising ends, ways and means, NATO also bases its military strategic thinking on this model. A successful strategy is conditioned by clear and unambiguous objectives including a strategic end-state and an exit strategy (ends). Given the strategic objectives forces and capabilities are allocated based on identified needs, originating in the Statement of Requirement (SOR) (means). Based on the objectives and the resources, plans are prepared to maximise the effects (ways) (NATO, 2010b, article 0407).

### **The context of strategy – identifying key drivers**

During the Cold War the logic of global strategy, that shaped NATO's *raison d'être*, was symmetric in, at least, three ways. First, the main actors were all states. Second, the international relations were focused on a static diversity between the two superpowers. Third, the two superpowers had the same relative power in the most important aspects of the system; political influence and military capability. In the very near future the logic of global strategy may, however, be asymmetric. The main actors do not, for example, necessarily have to be states. Challenges from regional integration and non-state actors will probably continue to decrease the importance of the state. Furthermore, the international relations do not necessarily have to be focused on a static diversity between the main powers in the system. Dynamic and spontaneous coalitions may rapidly change the rules of the game. Finally, the main powers do not necessarily have to have roughly equal power in all important aspects of the system; military capability, economic strength and political and societal influence. The strategic context might, in other words, be in transformation from a bipolar, via a unipolar, towards a multipolar world order (Buzan et al., 1993, pp. 13–14; Kissinger, 1994, pp. 809–36; Russett and Starr, 1996, pp. 106–9; Deutsch and Singer, 1999, pp. 85–8).

When addressing this new logic and designing the strategy for the next decade, NATO has to take some important key drivers into consideration. One cluster of key drivers is related to external factors and the possible poles in the system. Henry Kissinger elaborates with the United States, China, Europe, Japan and India as great powers (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 829–30). It might have been relevant to treat Japan as a great power some 20 years ago. We have, however, decided to exclude Japan in favour of inter-institutionalism. Hence we have included the United

Nations and the African Union in the group. In addition, we focus on the European Union instead of Europe. We furthermore treat the United States as a member of the Alliance rather than as a pole in the system.

Another cluster of key drivers includes the strategy of NATO's key members. Concurrent with the release of NATO's 1991 strategic concept, Colin McInnes examined the security policies and perspectives of what he considered to be the key members of the Alliance: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (McInnes, 1992). We follow his example and focus on all four key members in the realm of the 2010 strategic concept.

### *The role of international key actors*

The strategy of global key actors has been explicitly expressed in white papers and other strategic documents presented from 2008–10. The focus in this section is on the goals of the national security strategies and on how each of the key actors views their relations with NATO. The aim is not to present a total overview but rather to introduce the new strategic settings. To explore NATO in the multi polar world is an object for research in itself.

*Russia* adopted a national security strategy in May 2009. The conceptual development might have been stimulated by the conflict in Georgia in August 2008. Due to our linguistic limitations in Russian, secondary sources in other languages have been used.<sup>9</sup> We have chosen to study a research review provided by the research division of the NATO Defense College. According to the author of the review, the language used to describe NATO is softer in the new Russian strategy compared to the previous strategy from 2000. NATO enlargement is, for example, viewed as a problem but is no longer considered to be a fundamental threat. Arms control, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and the settlement of regional conflicts are the prioritised Russian interests. The review concludes that the Russian strategy no longer has a narrow geopolitical point of departure but a holistic and integrated approach:

The new strategy breaks a trend. With its upbeat tone and air of aspiration, and its step away from the narrative of victimhood, it is a product of a Russian leadership that feels stronger and more confident of its ability to influence the world.

(Giles, 2009, p. 11)

*China* presented a defence white paper in January 2009. The paper identifies the major changes that have taken place in Chinese international

relations over the last years. The Chinese economy is, for example, considered to be an important part of global economy and the increased global interdependence is said to impact on China as well. It is claimed that the world cannot enjoy stability and prosperity without China. The aim of China's national defence policy is 'protecting its territory and people, and endeavoring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity' (Information Office, 2009, p. 1). The objectives are to safeguard national interests, and to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The direction provided by the white paper aims at winning local wars. The evolution of modern warfare is said to be taken into account when addressing the major security threats facing China. Throughout the 109 pages of the document, NATO is only mentioned once:

China values and actively carries out international exchanges and cooperation in the field of non-proliferation and export control. China has held regular arms control and non-proliferation consultations with a dozen countries and the EU, and non-proliferation dialogues with NATO.

(Information Office, 2009, p. 79)

*India* has, in comparison with other global key actors, a slightly different tradition when it comes to long term strategic documents. Instead of publishing strategies and white papers, India annually presents a defence report. Changes are, however, at hand and a draft version of a national security strategy has been prepared and is being evaluated. In addition a defence capability strategy is under preparation. In the annual report of 2009–10 ideology linked to terrorism and the proliferation of WMD are identified as a key factor of not only Indian security but of India's extended neighbourhood and the overall international order as well. Ensuring the safety and security of its citizens remain an important priority for India. In the analysis of the global security environment, several actors are mentioned. India's relations with the United States, Russia, Japan and the European Union are all considered to be of great importance. NATO is, however, not mentioned. ISAF is noticed but related to the United States rather than to the Alliance. China is also mentioned but related to the regional security environment rather than to the global (Indian Ministry of Defence, 2009).

*The European Union* has gradually evolved as an actor in international security. It sees itself as 'inevitably a global player' (European Council, 2003, p. 1) that has to share the responsibility of building a better world

and serve as an ethical role model for international actors. The development has been curtailed to avoid competition with NATO and to avoid challenging the Member States' prerogatives over defence matters. As a consequence, foreign policy has initially divorced from defence policy and a sharp distinction exists between internal and external security. The foreign policy objectives are articulated in the Treaty. They include, *inter alia*, 'safeguarding its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity' as well as 'promoting an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance' (European Council, 2010, pp. 28–9).

The European Union has a rich, but incoherent, body of policy documents in the realm of international security. The European Security Strategy (ESS) *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (The European Council, 2003) is by far the most influential policy document. The document provides a historical narrative in which it is concluded that Europe should take on responsibilities for global security. It discerns the global security environment and identifies global challenges. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime are regarded as key threats. Moreover, the document concludes that the strategic objectives necessary to address these threats include extending the zone of security around Europe, strengthening international order, and paying particular attention to new threats. The strategy also asserts that 'with the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad' (The European Council, 2003, p. 7). Based on this argumentation a list of policy implications is outlined. The European Union must be more active, more coherent, more capable of working with partners. The elaboration on multilateralism puts emphasis on the transatlantic relationship:

One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship.

(The European Council, 2003, p. 9)

*The United Nations* has a unique role in international security. Based on the Charter of the United Nations it is vested with the power of international arbitrator. While initial self-defence is authorised the Charter obligates those involved in self-defence to immediately report the breach to the United Nations Security Council who will critique that judgment, and, when deemed necessary, take actions to reverse and

restore international peace and security (Corn and Gyllensporre, 2010, p. 507). Notably these fundamental principles are explicitly referred to in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO. Conversely the United Nations envisages regional institutions to be the chief implementing organisations of the United Nations rulings, that is a mandate to use force:

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.[...]

(The Charter of the United Nations, Article 53).<sup>10</sup>

Despite the clear-cut principles in the Charter of the United Nations there are several areas that have been disputed including mitigating intra-state conflict, action against terrorism, pre-emptive self-defence and intervention in civil conflicts (Arend and Beck, 1993, p. 37). The practical application of the Charter of the United Nations has created an additional exception as the concept of peacekeeping evolved. The notion of peacekeeping was coined when the United Nations dispatched troops in conjunction with the Suez Crisis in 1956. It was not formalised until 1992, when the United Nations' Secretary General issued his *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali, 1995). Notwithstanding this elevated position the United Nations does not have an explicit security concept. The policy document closest to expressing the organisations aspirations is the Secretary General's report issued in 2005, following the Millennium Declaration. It proposes, in addition to the need to strengthen the United Nations, three lines of approach; freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity (Annan, 2005). The elaboration on security emphasises the need to address international terrorism and crime, as well as weapons of mass destruction.

*The African Union* has, based on its Constitutive Act, a broad political mandate in the field of conflict prevention, management and resolution. The political objectives of the African Union include aspirations to 'promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples' as well as 'defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States' (Organization of African Unity, 2000, p. 4). While the European Union focuses on security abroad, the African Union security considerations are devoted to its own continent. The Durban Protocol outlines the

role and mandate in the realm of peace and security. The African Union has been given extensive powers, including authorising the mounting, deployment and monitoring of peace making and peace building activities for the resolution of conflicts (African Union, 2002, p. 5). The Protocol envisaged an African Stand-by Force. The Solemn Declaration advanced further the aspirations of a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) identifying common threats and interests (African Union, 2004). The common internal threats include inter-state conflicts/tensions, intra-state conflicts/tensions, unstable post-conflict situations, and grave humanitarian situations. Also, a Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact was agreed upon in 2005. The African Union security architecture is designed to complement the UN-system and its efforts on the African continent. The political framework gives little indication of aspirations to cooperate with other security organisations such as NATO.

#### *The strategy of key members*

The strategy of NATO's key members has been explicitly expressed in white papers and other strategic documents presented from 2003–10. The aim in this section is not to present a total overview but rather to introduce some aspects that might impact on the dynamic within NATO. The focus in this section is on the goals of the national security strategies of the major European members, in addition to the United States, and on how they view the future of NATO. To explore NATO in the new Europe is an object for research in itself.

*The United States* is committed to NATO and the Alliance is considered to be the cornerstone of transatlantic security. NATO is furthermore considered to be critical to the stability of Europe by addressing a wide range of security issues both inside and outside the treaty area of the Alliance. The United States is said to ensure a strong NATO, including lending credibility to article 5 and the deterrence of security threats, by guaranteeing access to American capabilities. According to the United States' Department of Defense, the relations between the United States, the European Union and NATO have in recent years become more important when it comes to projecting transatlantic power. At the same time, the United States' Department of Defense underlines the importance of NATO developing its own comprehensive civil-military capability.

Another important issue for NATO to deal with is considered to be the integration of Eurasian countries into the transatlantic institutions. The objectives for this effort are to improve energy



security and counter transnational threats and challenges such as proliferation. Peacekeeping, stability and reconstruction operations, non-proliferation activities and energy security initiatives are, however, said to be tasks not only for NATO but for other regional defence cooperation as well (The United States' Department of Defense, 2010). The relationship with the European allies is said to be the foundation for the United States' international engagement. NATO is not, however, considered to be the only option to organise the transatlantic relationships. Bilateral arrangements are also mentioned although NATO is considered to be the world's preeminent security alliance. Together with other NATO allies, as well as NATO partners, the United States is said to be able to strengthen the collective ability to promote security and to deter vital threats. The objectives of the United States' national security strategy are the enduring American interests outlined in the following:

They are: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

(The White House, 2010, p. 7)

*The United Kingdom* considers the stability of Europe together with the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship to be the fundamental to British security and defence policy. The capacity to provide military forces in peace support and intervention operations alongside the United Kingdom's NATO allies is considered to be a vital component of this policy. In the British defence white paper NATO's preeminence, as the organisation upon which the transatlantic area depends for collective defence and global crisis management, is recognised. Strong support for developing the European Union's military capability as a complement to, rather than competing with, NATO is expressed in the paper (The British Ministry of Defence, 2003a). In the supporting essays of the white paper it is argued that NATO will remain the cornerstone of European collective defence. It is, however, argued that NATO has to become more flexible in order to deliver relevant armed forces to meet the challenges of the evolving global environment. The flexibility is related to 'underpinning broader coalitions to meet a wide range of

expeditionary operations' (The British Ministry of Defence, 2003b, p. 1). The United Kingdom is said to have a wide range of global interests; economic well-being based around trade, overseas and foreign investment, and the continuing free flow of natural resources. The goal of the United Kingdom's security policy in 2003 was to:

[D]eliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability.

(The British Ministry of Defence, 2003a, p. 4)

In the first national security strategy of the United Kingdom the single overarching British national security objective was said to be:

[P]rotecting the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world.

(The British Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 5)

*France* considers NATO and the European Union to be complementary. In order to be able to get to grips with future crises and threats both organisations, according to France, are needed. This conclusion has led France to advocate full French participation in NATO-structures. There are, however, three main principles that limit the participation; complete independence of the French nuclear forces, full freedom for French authorities to conduct independent assessments, and permanent freedom for French authorities to make independent decision. The last principle implies that no French forces are to be permanently placed under NATO command in peace time. The French position is guided by three main goals when it comes to the renovation of NATO. First, France proposes that the members of NATO should reach a joint assessment of what threats are to be included in the future missions of the Alliance. Second, France strives for a better sharing of responsibility between Americans and Europeans. Third, France stresses the need of rationalisation of NATO's command structures. (When it comes to the structure of France's armed forces, intervention abroad is recognised as the key determinant.) The French core impression of NATO is that the Alliance is 'an organisation for collective defence which unites North America and Europe, in particular when faced with the risk of major aggression. The Alliance must also provide a response to the diverse

new threats that face the allies' (Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 8). The goal of France's national security strategy is to:

[D]eal with the risks or threats which may affect the life of the Nation. Its first aim is to defend our population and territory. The second is to contribute to European and international security. The third is to defend the values of the republican compact which binds together the French and their State: the principles of democracy, including individual and collective freedoms, respect of human dignity, solidarity, and justice.

(Presidence de la Republique, 2008, p. 10)

*Germany* considers the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union to be one of the pillars of the European and transatlantic security architecture. According to German considerations, the European Union and NATO are not competitors but vital contributors to German security. As France, Germany argues for a rationalisation of NATO's obsolete structures. (When it comes to the structure of Bundeswehr, the transformation towards an expeditionary force is said to continue). In the German defence white paper it is argued that the new global environment has led to changes in the tasks to be managed by the Alliance. These missions are said to range from collective defence, through robust stability operations, to humanitarian operations. The geographical scope is said to range from Europe through the continent's periphery, to far beyond the boundaries of NATO's members. A German argument is that the Alliance, within this wider set of tasks, 'must be prepared to conduct a number of concurrent operations of varying type and intensity over increasing distances and to sustain them for prolonged periods'. The conclusion is the future efforts of the Alliance will 'to an increasing extent focus on stabilisation operations and military support for the rebuilding of state structures. [...] At the same time it will be crucial to retain the capability for collective defence and for conducting intensive military operations' (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006, pp. 27–8). The goal of Germany's national security strategy is:

[S]afeguarding the interests of our country, in particular: to preserve justice, freedom, and democracy for the citizens of our country, as well as their security and welfare, and to protect them from threats; to assure the sovereignty and integrity of German territory; to prevent, whenever possible, regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany's security and to help manage such crises; to confront

global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to help uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the basis of international law; to promote free and open world trade as the basis for our prosperity and, by doing so help close the gap between the poor and wealthy regions of the world.

(Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006, p. 6)

To summarize, the four key members seem to have similar objectives for their national strategies. One objective is related to values. It can be generally expressed as universal values or specified as democracy, freedom, human rights and justice. A second objective is related to human beings described as citizens or population. A third objective is related to territory. A fourth objective is related to the international economic system, trade and the free flow of resources. All these objectives constitute *what* is to be defended. Another part of the strategies focuses on *where* the objectives are supposed to be defended. This variable has a wide range of outcomes ranging from Europe, through the continent's periphery, to far beyond the boundaries of NATO's members. France seems to focus abroad, while the United States and the United Kingdom mentioned both home and away. A third variable that is present in all four strategies is *how* the defence of the objectives is supposed to be conducted. Collective defence is mentioned by all four key members. At the other end of the spectrum expeditionary operations and interventions are to be found.

### **The process of strategy – the bureaucratic dynamics**

This section examines how strategies are put into practice to conduct operations at the political strategic, military strategic and operational levels, respectively. Planning mechanisms and key institutions are introduced. NATO's strategy is first and foremost crafted in Brussels by the Alliance members and NATO institutions by reflecting the diplomatic landscape and the political aspirations. These are promulgated through the organisation as well as through Allied and partner organisations. This perspective reflects a rational and linear strategy process. However as complexity and uncertainty have been identified as key elements for strategy, this top-down description does not sufficiently capture the dynamics in strategy formulation. As another stream of influence, realities on the ground or more precisely how they are perceived by those in the mission area as well as how media portrays them, form a quintessential input to the strategy. Strategies can be planned and deliberate.

However, from a practical perspective strategy can also be defined as the overall picture an outsider obtains when observing a series of actions and the pattern it generates (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 67). Consequently, strategies need not be planned and deliberate, they can also emerge unintended. It has been suggested that crafting is a better metaphor than planning for strategy formulation (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 66). It embodies a fluid process in which there is a harmonious relationship between strategists and the strategic products. As craftsmen, successful strategists need to be highly professional, well experienced, and attentive to details (Mintzberg, 1987, p. 66).

NATO has delineated the responsibilities between the different levels in the organisation:

Within the Alliance the strategic level concerns the application of Alliance resources to achieve strategic objectives set out by the NAC. Operations by Allied joint forces are directed at the military-strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels. Actions are defined as military-strategic, operational or tactical, based on their intended effect or contribution to achieving the stated objectives.

(NATO, 2010b, article 0113)

These levels are elaborated further below.<sup>11</sup>

#### *Organisation and procedures at the political strategic level*

The NATO organisation deserves some attention since its design has some unique features. Beneath the surface NATO, like all big bureaucracies, cannot be regarded as a homogenous entity. A variety of interests exists in the organisation. National interests are projected into the institutions at various levels. Military logic is mixed with diplomatic traditions. The NATO Handbook outlines 39 principal committees that govern the Alliance (NATO, 2001). In the committees Alliance members participate with national representatives. NATO has a civilian as well as military structure at the strategic level. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal decision-making body. It is the only body formally established by the North Atlantic Treaty and as such it is the only body which derives its authority explicitly from the Treaty. The NAC is chaired by the Secretary General and meets at different levels; Permanent (Permanent Representatives and/or Ambassadors); Ministerial (Foreign and/or Defense Ministers); and Summit (Heads of State and Government) (NATO, 2010b, articles 0303 and 0304).

The NAC is supported by the International Staff (IS) and sub-committees, in particular the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and the Military Committee (MC). The Defense Planning Committee supports the NAC as the principal decision-making authority on matters relating to the integrated military structure of NATO. The MC is the senior military authority in NATO and it provides advice to NATO's political authorities on policy and strategy and issues military guidance to the military bodies of NATO (NATO, 2010b, article 0113). In preparation of operations the MC considers contribution of military forces to the achievement of the political objectives and outlines potential Military Response Options (MROs). The development of MROs requires input from the military strategic level (NATO, 2010b, article 0114). The Military Committee is supported by an International Military Staff (IMS). In this book the political strategic level is constituted by these actors at NATO headquarters in Brussels. They all forge decisions by consensus through a process in which no government states its objection. Generally no formal vote is conducted. As an issue percolates through the committees allies have at least two opportunities to intervene and influence the decision-making (Gallis, 2006, p. 87). In terms of preparing operations, NAC approves not only the political objectives but also the resources allocated and the OPLAN, including ROE. The bureaucracy in NATO HQ employs some 1,750 personnel (Deni, 2007, p. 30).

#### *Organisation and procedures at the military strategic level*

Beneath the political strategic level is the military organisation. The military command structure for operations is also multinational. However Alliance positions are not officially taken into account. Instead officials represent NATO, regardless of citizenship, and are expected to advance the interests of NATO and to ensure military effectiveness in the execution. Layers of military commanders and associated headquarters separate the political level from the forces. Following the end of the Cold War these headquarters have assumed new responsibilities as NATO is increasingly deploying and sustaining forces in operations around the world. At the birth of NATO three regional commands were organised to maintain command and control over NATO territory: Allied Command Europe located in Mons, Belgium; Allied Command Channel in Northwood, the United Kingdom; and Allied Command Atlantic in Norfolk, the United States. They were in turn supported by subordinate staff. Based on *Operation Allied Force* in Kosovo and the strategic guidance issued in 1999 a major streamlining of the

organisation was implemented, reducing the number of headquarters from 65 to 20 (King, 2011). The 11 September terrorist attacks and the NATO Prague Summit, emphasising transformation triggered another important change in the command structure.<sup>12</sup> Allied Command Atlantic in Norfolk was re-established as a transformational command (Allied Command Transformation, ACT) without territorial responsibilities.<sup>13</sup> At the same time Allied Command Europe and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located in Mons, Belgium became *Allied Command Operations* (ACO) with global responsibilities for all operations. The Commanding officer of ACO is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and responsible under the MC for the overall direction and conduct of military operations for NATO. Hence, all military planning and execution radiates from Mons and it is inferred that the military strategic level rests with ACO. 'At the military strategic level, armed forces are deployed and employed within an overarching political framework as part of a collective strategy in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance' (NATO, 2010b, article 0114). If a military operation is deemed appropriate, NAC issues an Initiating Directive to initiate planning.

SACEUR is responsible for the development of the strategic level Operations Plan (OPLAN) outlining the mission, command and financial arrangements plus command and control responsibilities. When endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the OPLAN would be provided to the operational commander for finalization of the operational level OPLAN prior to SACEUR approval. Thereafter, SACEUR would monitor the operational level planning and execution of the campaign.

(NATO, 2010b, article 0114)

To deal with the non-article 5 operations following the Cold War NATO developed a common procedure for operational planning. NATO's Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) provides the conceptual framework for the planning, execution and evaluation of military operations (NATO, 2005). It was introduced in the late 1990s and approved in 2005 (King, 2011). GOP represents a bottom-up perspective to the dynamics between the levels. In contrast to the defence and force planning it explicitly invites interaction between the different levels:

Before designing an operation or campaign it is necessary to clearly identify the desired end-state of the Alliance [...] The alliance's

(political) end-state is established by the NAC, based on advice from the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and the relevant NATO Senior Committees prior to the initiation of operational planning.

(NATO, 2005, pp. 3–6)

However, it is not only before the designing of the specific operation that the political end-state is communicated. Throughout the planning, in each of the five planning sequences (initiation, orientation, concept development, plan development, and plan review), the commander at the operational level reconsiders the guidance given at the strategic levels.

A new planning procedure Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) has been approved as a draft in 2010 to replace the GOP. The COPD is based on a realisation that successful crisis management necessitates employment of both civilian and military measures. Any military operation fielded by NATO must operate in concert with other crisis management efforts. In the Alliance this is termed 'NATO's contribution to comprehensive approach'. This approach calls for a shared understanding of the crisis and its dynamics. Lines of functional activities, including delineation of responsibilities among the participating crisis management actors, must be established. Also, objectives toward a commonly accepted end-state are defined. These requirements put significantly more emphasis on the initial phase of planning and the unique characteristics at the military strategic level. Information management and assessment of information have been elevated in importance in a way that effects both the staff organisation and the planning process. While the GOP advocates the same products at all planning levels the COPD outlines tailored planning products at the military strategic level. In addition, the interaction between the political strategic level and military strategic level is strengthened with a continuous dialogue as opposed to the discrete events for exchanging information.

#### *Organisation and procedures at the operational level*

At the subordinate level of ACO, the operational level, three permanent Allied Joint Force Command (JFCs) are organised: JFC Brunssum (JFCB), the Netherlands, JFC Naples (JFCN), Italy, and JF Headquarters Lisbon (JFHQL), Portugal. They constitute the operational level. These three headquarters are jointly responsible for planning and commanding the operations (King, 2011). Based on the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept staff are organised functionally in a 'J-structure'<sup>14</sup>



in support of the operational commander. The CJTF concept also calls for tactical commands, or component commands (CC), in support of the operational commanders. Hence, at the tactical level service specific staff (air, land and maritime) are organised. JFCB is supported by CC Air in Ramstein, Germany; CC Land in Heidelberg, Germany, and CC Maritime in Northwood, the United Kingdom. JFCN is supported by CC Air in Izmir, Turkey; CC Land in Madrid, Spain, and CC Maritime in Naples, Italy. JFHQ does not have any permanent CC. In conjunction with introducing COPD organisational changes are being implemented. JFC are augmented with six Deployable Joint Staff Elements (DJSEs) designed to be employed in theatre to support the operational level commander (NATO, 2010b, article 3A11).<sup>15</sup> Also the operational level will be subject to another round of streamlining once the new strategic concept in 2010 has been initiated.

According to the NATO definition the operational level is 'The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations'. (NATO, 2004, p. 2-O-2) It applies operational art to attain strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of campaigns or major operations, that is linking military strategy to tactics (NATO, 2010b, article 0115).

### **The content of strategy – framework for the conduct of operations**

In the above the context and process dimensions of strategy have been elaborated. The latter generates a body of strategic guidance documents. These are generic or mission specific. The generic guidance emanates from NATO cyclic planning and policy formulation including defence and force planning as well as doctrine development. The mission specific guidance is produced during the deliberation for the operation concerned, mainly as a result of the operational planning.

#### *Generic guidance – doctrine and force planning*

The term doctrine stems from the Latin *doctrina* (teaching, learning, instruction) and in the military domain it is generally associated with how forces are intended to operate to meet their objectives (Margiotta, 2000, p. 294). At the political-strategic level the military doctrine provides the overall orientation for the use of force in support of political objectives. It must also facilitate horizontal coherence and consistency with other, civilian, crisis management instruments as well as ensuring vertical integration by linking practices at lower military command

levels (Gyllensporre, 2008). The definition on doctrine agreed upon in NATO is also widely applied in the Western world: 'Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application' (NATO, 2004, p. 2-D-7). In national settings the salient principles at this level are often embodied in an umbrella document or a Joint Capstone Doctrine. If the military doctrine at the highest level is understood as to how the military instrument is utilised, its role on the lower levels is to be the 'glue of tactics' that assists commanders to accomplish cohesive and effective actions (Hughes, 1986, p. 28).

According to Barry Posen military doctrine can be defined along two dimensions. One includes a mix of offense, defence and deterrence. Due to the need to agree and share risks and costs coalitions tend to opt for defensive doctrines. The second dimension involves a combination of integration and innovation. In offensive minded states the civilian intervention as well as innovation will be more significant. In alliance constellations both intervention as well as innovation will be weakened due to the horizontal efforts to maintain the alliance (Posen, 1994, pp. 34–5). Doctrine defines the principles on *how* to achieve an objective and therefore it is the military's link to political objectives.

From the onset NATO doctrine has been an important vehicle for the Alliance to advance the strategic objectives. Following the Cold War the focus shifted from preparing Article 5 operations to Crisis Response Operations, advancing the political aspirations of the Strategic Concept agreed upon in 1999 (King, 2008, pp. 9–11). Following the NATO Riga Summit, the doctrinal development has embraced the notion that security operations in tandem with development aid efforts as well reconstruction need to be conducted in concert. This realisation has given impetus to the Comprehensive Approach and the Effects Based Approach to Operations (Williams, 2006). While the Comprehensive Approach seeks to achieve better horizontal political coordination between NATO and other organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union, the Effects Based Approach to Operations caters for its implementation in the military context (Prescott, 2008). The ISAF mission has also triggered the application of counterinsurgency doctrine (McChrystal, 2009). Allied Joint Publication 01(AJP-01) is NATO's capstone doctrine, the most recent version, AJP-01(D), was issued in conjunction with the new strategic concept in December 2010.<sup>16</sup> It provides a framework of understanding for the approach to all allied operations. The AJP-01 'explains the principles that underpin the planning and conduct of Alliance campaigns and

major operations by giving commanders the strategic context for such operations, identifying the challenges to commanders and their staffs at the operational level and providing the commander in particular with guidance and strategies to direct successful campaigns' (NATO, 2010b, article 3).

In order to have military forces ready to meet the challenges and threats of the future, the defence planning has to be initiated several years in advance. The grand-strategic or political strategic level has the overarching responsibility to look into the future. Hence the 'strategic' hierarchy also has a temporal dimension. In addition, this circumstance also implies a top-down perspective, that is planning originating at the highest level, that is in NAC's strategic concept and MC's directive for military implementation of the strategic concept (MC400), command structure (MC324/1), force structure (MC317/1), missions of the strategic commanders (MC109/2), and guidance for defence planning (MC299). While the role of defence planning is to identify the forces, capabilities and structures required to respond to the most demanding challenges, the force planning addresses the requirements for the upcoming decade.

The research of, among others, Paul Cornish (1997), Sten Rynning (2005) and John Deni (2007) indicates that the top-down perspective on the dynamics between the different levels uses several years in the temporal dimension. The defence and force planning, and its related strategic guidance, seems to be strict hierarchically without institutionalised procedures to involve the operational level. In identifying the gap between existing capabilities and the required capabilities of the future, the outcome of the planning rather focuses on the dialogue between the members on how to share the burdens and responsibilities of developing and procuring these capabilities.

### *Mission specific guidance*

The military strategic level, SACEUR, is responsible for preparing the strategic-level Operations Plan (OPLAN) outlining the mission, command and financial arrangements plus command and control responsibilities. To come into effect it is endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC. The OPLAN is subsequently issued to the JFC level and the operational commander for finalisation of the operational level OPLAN which is approved by SACEUR. Thereafter, SACEUR monitors the operational level planning and execution (NATO, 2010b, article 0114).

The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) is one of the deliverables from the planning process. Commanders identify the

capabilities needed to support their plan and meet the political objectives based on the minimum military requirement (MMR) principle. The principle limits the package to an absolute minimum of forces required to accomplish the mission (Toczek, 2006). These requirements are compiled in a Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). The approved CJSOR is issued to Allies and Partners for national pledges. NATO consults nations informally throughout the planning process. At the end of the process this is formalised during Force Generation whereby nations commit. Force generation conferences are led by ACO and often chaired by Deputy SACEUR that requests nations offer units for each serial in the CJSOR (Toczek, 2006). The National Military Representative (NMR) responds by pledging forces in accordance with their national ambitions. Shortfalls are analysed and may limit the scope of the mission. In conjunction with deployment of these units Transfer of Authority (ToA) is conducted to integrate them in the NATO command organisation. This procedure also entails a clarification on the level of authority relinquished to NATO, including the tasks that could be assigned to a unit as well as any geographical limitations within the area of operation. The troop contributing nations also specify under which circumstances units are authorised to use force based on nation law and policy. This is codified in Rules of Engagement (ROE). Once the operation has commenced commanders conduct Periodic Mission Reviews (PMRs) every six months to review the mission and if deemed necessary recalibrate the force requirements. As a consequence the CJSOR may change and force generation conferences are scheduled to address these changes and also to ensure that nations reconfirm their commitments.

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## Notes

1. However, some argue that biology and natural competition constitute the true origin of strategy; See for instance Henderson (1989). The deliberate application of strategy is still widely recognised to stem from the military realm.
2. The Greek word στρατηγός (stratēgos). 'Stratos' – meaning army and 'ago' – which is the ancient Greek for leading/guiding/moving.
3. See for instance the acclaimed books of Kotler (2001) and Porter (1998).
4. For instance Sun Tzu argued that 'All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.'



5. This transition was neither immediate nor universal. For instance when Napoleon I (1769–1821) issued strategies he also embodied both the head of state and the military field commander. On the other hand, Napoleon was an ardent student of military history to improve his decision-making. Moreover some campaigns were fought dispersed with subordinate generals empowered with the authority to make crucial decisions for the battle.
6. The five levels are the technical, the tactical, the operational, the theatre strategic and the grand strategic.
7. See generally Kaplan (2004, pp. 1–8).
8. See also Lendering J *The Peloponnesian War* published at [http://www.livius.org/pb-pem/peloponnesian\\_war/peloponnesian\\_war.html](http://www.livius.org/pb-pem/peloponnesian_war/peloponnesian_war.html).
9. The official document in Russian 'Strategia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda' is found at <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>.
10. The Charter is available at the UN webpage: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml>, date accessed 25 May 2011.
11. The tactical level is beyond the scope of this chapter.
12. In conjunction with the newly adopted strategic concept further reductions are anticipated.
13. Allied Command Channel in Northwood, the United Kingdom had earlier been deactivated and assumed responsibilities as a maritime component command.
14. J1 Personnel, J2 Intelligence, J3 Operations, J4 Logistics, J5 Planning, J6 Communications, J7 Training, J8 Finance, J9 Civil-military cooperation.
15. See NATO webpage (<http://www.aco.nato.int/communities.aspx>).
16. The previous version, AJP-01(C), was approved in March 2007.

# 3

## The Development of a NATO Strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina

*Kersti Larsdotter*

### Introduction

In 1992, NATO engaged in military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the Alliance's first-ever deployment 'out-of-area'. Three years on when it deployed ground forces, it also became the Alliance's first-ever ground force deployment. (NATO, 2004) Up until that point NATO had been reluctant to undertake non-Article 5 operations, and it was not until 1991 that the 'management of crisis and conflict prevention' was included in NATO's strategic concept for the first time (NATO, 2010, p. 26). At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO announced that 'it could undertake non-Article 5 operations, which included future roles in conflict resolution, crisis prevention, and peacekeeping' (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 51). Hence, when the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out in 1992, NATO had no experience with this kind of operations.

According to Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (in the introduction to this book) 'strategy is about the use of military power for political purposes'. In order to be successful in military operations, it is argued that there needs to be a logical connection between ends and means; that there needs to be 'a distinct plan *between* policy and operations, an idea for connecting the two rather than either of the two themselves'. (Betts, 2000, p. 7) Furthermore, it is also often argued that the political end state needs to be decided upon first, to be followed by the planning of how to achieve those ends. (Betts, 2000; Strachan, 2010) Since the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a new experience for NATO, the development of strategy might be especially interesting to scrutinise. NATO's lack of experience of this kind of operations could suggest that the ends-means rationality might be underdeveloped in the

Bosnia-Herzegovina case. Indeed, some researchers have even argued that 'Western policy-making towards the Balkan wars was driven by *ad hoc* reactions to events' (Bono, 2003, p. x).

The aim of this article is, therefore, to scrutinise the development of NATO's strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina from the beginning of NATO's military engagement in the war in 1992 to the end of the war in late 1995. During this period, NATO conducted six operations: *Operation Maritime Monitor*, *Operation Maritime Guard*, *Operation Albanian Guard*, *Operation Sky Monitor*, *Operation Deny Flight* and *Operation Deliberate Force*. At the end of 1995, the belligerent parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed a peace agreement, the so-called Dayton peace agreement, and NATO's engagement changed. Between 1992 and 1995, NATO conducted operations in support of a peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), but after the agreement was signed, UNPROFOR was withdrawn and NATO took over the command of the deployment of a 60,000 strong Implementation Force (IFOR, also known as *Operation Joint Endeavour*) between December 1995 and December 1996 and the subsequent Stabilisation Force (SFOR, also known as *Operation Joint Guard* and *Operation Joint Forge*) between December 1996 and 2004. However, since the development of a strategy might be most visible during the initial operations, I have only included operations before NATO took over the command.

Although several researchers have studied NATO and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see, e.g., Jakobsen, 1998; Findlay, 2002; Talentino, 2005; Cimbala and Forster, 2010; Kaplan, 2010; Aoi, 2011), the development of NATO's strategy between 1992 and 1995 has not been more closely analysed. Hopefully, this chapter will contribute to a better understanding of the development of NATO's strategy in the new, post-Cold War, environment.

The development of strategy can be studied in several ways. However, data on actual decisions and plans are sometimes difficult to attain. Therefore, I have chosen a different way of analysing the development of a NATO strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead of beginning to analyse the ends of a military engagement, I begin with identifying changes in the use of force during an operation. Changes in the use of force by NATO could reflect a change of strategy, therefore indicating important stages in the development of strategy. The argument, of course, being that the developments on the ground should be reflected in a strategy if regarding strategy as discussed above.

Since brute force is rarely used in peace operations or humanitarian operations, I have divided the operations into several periods according

to their level of *coercive diplomacy*. Coercive diplomacy is, according to Alexander L. George, to make an opponent stop doing or undo something by using the threat of force, 'to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment of noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand'<sup>1</sup> (George, 2004, p. 70). George divide acts of coercive diplomacy according to four criteria: what is demanded from the opponent; if there is a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; if there is some kind of threat of punishment for noncompliance; and if there are any additional inducements of a positive character for compliance. The strongest level of coercive diplomacy is the ultimatum. It includes a clearly defined demand on the opponent, a time limit, and a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is both credible and sufficiently potent. A so-called tacit ultimatum is less coercive: there is no explicit time limit but there is a sense of urgency, or there is no specific threat of punishment. The weakest form of coercive diplomacy is when there is only a clear demand, but no time limit or sense of urgency, and no clear threat of punishment (George, 2004, pp. 72–3).

NATO's operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be divided into four periods between 1992 and 1995 according to these criteria. The first period includes *Operation Maritime Monitor*, *Operation Maritime Guard*, *Operation Albanian Guard* and *Operation Sky Monitor* between July 1992 and April 1993. The second period only consists of *Operation Deny Flight* between April 1993 and February 1994, and the third period only *Operation Deny Flight* between February 1994 and April 1995. The fourth and last period includes *Operation Deny Flight* and *Operation Deliberate Force* between April 1995 and December 1995.

The structure of the chapter is straightforward. I have divided the chapter into four parts according to each time period. For each period, I begin with an overview of the conduct of operations during the period and continue with a discussion of the development of strategy for the respective period. I conclude the chapter with a discussion on the development of NATO's strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina over time.

## NATO monitoring operations

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out in April 1992 after a referendum where the Muslim and Croat population of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence. However, the Serb population boycotted the referendum, instead aiming for an independent republic connected to Serbia. The day after the international community officially recognised

Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, the war broke out. It continued until December 1995 (Burg, 2004a, p. 248; Kalyvas and Sambanis, 2005, p. 193 and p. 213; Talentino, 2005, p. 169; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 99–100; Aoi, 2011, p. 43).

The aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to create a 'Greater Serbia', incorporating Serb-inhabited areas in Croatia and Bosnia to the Serb-held territories in Serbia. The Serbs were superior in armaments. But, according to Chiyuki Aoi, since they were smaller in size, they relied on 'siege tactics using heavy weapons, as well as on paramilitary forces carrying out "demonstrative" atrocities for the purpose of terrorizing and harming civilians, thereby inducing a mass exodus from targeted territories' (Aoi, 2011, p. 43). They were very successful, and in early 1993 they had established a hold over more than 70 per cent of Bosnian territory. The war was characterised by the tactic of 'ethnic cleansing', not only by the Bosnian Serbs, but by the other parties as well. However, the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims were more restrictive than the Serbs (Burg, 2004a, p. 248; Kalyvas and Sambanis, 2005, pp. 212–13; Aoi, 2011, p. 43).

The initial international response to the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to address the humanitarian situation by ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid. Since the humanitarian situation rapidly deteriorated, the United Nations decided that the airport at Sarajevo needed to be reopened in order to receive airlifts of humanitarian supplies. On 8 June 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 758. The resolution authorised the deployment of military observers, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), at the Sarajevo airport in order to support humanitarian deliveries and to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons from the airport as well as the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in Sarajevo.<sup>2</sup> The efforts were successful, and on 3 July the airport was reopened for humanitarian airlifts (The United Nations, 1996; Jakobsen, 1998, p. 80; Burg, 2004a, p. 248; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 100; Aoi, 2011, p. 44).

However, the shelling of Sarajevo continued, and the humanitarian situation worsened (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 82; Aoi, 2011, p. 45). On 13 August 1992, the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, called upon member states 'to take [...] all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with the United Nations, the delivery [...] of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina' (the United Nations, 1992c). Through this resolution, the United Nations

authorised the use force in order to implement the mandate. However, only a month later, the Security Council adopted another resolution, UNSCR 776, which deviated from the use of 'all measures necessary', and instead adopted the United Nations Secretary General's approach with 'normal peacekeeping rules of engagement' and the use of force only in self-defence (The United Nations, 1992d. See also The United Nations, 1992a; the United Nations, 1996; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 101; Aoi, 2011, p. 44).

During this period, NATO conducted monitoring operations in support of the United Nations efforts in relation to two resolutions. On 30 May 1992, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 757, which called for sanctions against Yugoslavia and on 9 October, 1992, it adopted resolution 781, which called for a United Nations ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, except from UNPROFOR flights and flights in support of the United Nations operations (The United Nations, 1992b; The United Nations, 1992e).

In response to resolution 757, a joint NATO-WEU naval force was deployed on 16 July 1992: *Operation Maritime Monitor*.<sup>3</sup> It patrolled the Adriatic in international waters, in order to monitor compliance with the sanctions, and was supported by maritime patrol aircraft. However, it was not allowed to stop ships suspected of violations. This was the first NATO operation conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 83; NATO, 2003c). This operation was followed by another operation in November the very same year: *Operation Maritime Guard*.<sup>4</sup> All ships bound to or from the territorial waters of Yugoslavia were to be halted in order to be inspected. In December 1992, NATO warships were granted unrestricted access to Albanian territorial waters for the same purpose. This operation was called *Operation Albanian Guard* (NATO, 2003d).

In order to help the United Nations to implement the ban on flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, called for in resolution 781, NATO began monitoring activity over the Adriatic on 16 October, and on 31 October an additional orbit was commenced over Hungary. This operation was called *Operation Sky Monitor*. NATO dispatched a number of Airborne Early Warning Aircrafts that had been assisting in naval monitoring over the Adriatic (NATO, 2003b). However, according to Jakobsen, this operation did not have any enforcement rights either (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 84).

During the first year of NATO's engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO only contributed with monitoring activities. The demands on the belligerent parties of the conflict were vague and there were no explicit threats expressed towards the belligerent parties. Furthermore,

neither NATO nor the United Nations had any real display of force, especially during the first months when NATO forces did not even have the right to inspect the ships. Neither did they have any time limit for their vague demands or threats (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 83). Hence, before the spring of 1993, NATO did not engage in strong coercive diplomacy. Rather, the vagueness of the threats and the absence of explicit threats might even disqualify its actions as coercive diplomacy.

### **A strategy of avoidance?**

The decisions to deploy forces in support of the United Nations operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were taken at the highest level of NATO. The Western European Union (WEU) had earlier decided to deploy a maritime monitoring force to help the United Nations to implement resolution 757. This was welcomed by NATO, and a decision was taken at a NATO Foreign Minister meeting on 10 July 1992 to deploy a corresponding force, *Operation Maritime Monitor*. Five days later, on 15 July, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) together with NATO's Defence Planning Committee (DPC) made the final arrangements in order to implement the decision and authorised the operation (NATO, 2003c).

Although the decisions were made at the highest level of NATO, the aim of the operations was limited: to *support* the United Nations operations (Wörner, 1993). Decisions were taken in reaction to the United Nations decisions rather than proactively, and the will to engage in the war was weak at both sides of the Atlantic. The member states were afraid that even limited air strikes would lead to a long and difficult intervention (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 85–6; Hendrickson, 2006, p. 47). Already early in 1992, the Bush administration had made it clear that they considered the war essentially a European problem, and that they would not deploy ground forces (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 47; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 100). On 1 July, the United States' President George Bush announced that: 'I am appalled at the human suffering and the killing in Sarajevo and we will do what we are called upon to do. But right now we are not prepared to use those forces' (quoted in Jakobsen, 1998, p. 83). The support of military operations was no stronger on the European side. Even France, which experienced the highest domestic support for engagement, did not support NATO operations. On 13 August, President Mitterrand ruled out offensive military operations including air strikes (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 85–6). Since there was no interest for military operations on either side of the Atlantic, only limited engagement in support of the United Nations operations, and decisions taken only in reaction of the United Nations decisions,

it can be argued that NATO did not have its own overarching strategy for the deployment of military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period. Rather, it was a strategy of avoidance.

However, NATO's Secretary General Manfred Wörner was open for further engagement, and announced in a speech in Albania in March 1993 that: 'If and when a peace plan [for the former Yugoslavia] is agreed, the UN may look to NATO to play a major role in implementing that plan. I believe that the Alliance will respond positively' (Wörner, 1993).

## **NATO and coercive diplomacy**

Despite the efforts of the United Nations, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to deteriorate. In March 1993 Bosnian Serbs attacked several cities, including Srebrenica. The Serb offensive was devastating for the civilian population. Muslim areas around Srebrenica were attacked and occupied, and in mid-March, thousands of Muslims were seeking refuge in Srebrenica. According to UNPROFOR, 30–40 persons were reported dying every day from military action, starvation, cold weather and lack of medical treatment. Several Serb aircrafts violated the established no-fly zone, and dropped bombs on two villages east of Srebrenica (The United Nations, 1996). This made the United Nations extend the ban on military flights. Furthermore, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council authorised member states to take 'all necessary measures' to ensure compliance with the ban of flights, 'in the event of further violations' (The United Nations, 1993a).

However, the attacks continued, and after a successful attack on Srebrenica in April by the Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions where they established certain areas as *safe areas*. On the 16 April, resolution 819 was adopted, which established Srebrenica as a safe area. It demanded immediate withdrawal of Bosnian Serb paramilitary units from the area and the cessation of armed attacks against the town (The United Nations, 1993b; The United Nations, 1996; Jakobsen, 1998, p. 86). Less than a month later, resolution 824 was adopted, in which the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac also were declared safe areas (The United Nations, 1993c, p. 2; The United Nations, 1996; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 102).

Only a month later, the Security Council extended the mandate once again. With resolution 836 the United Nations signaled a more robust approach. It authorised the UNPROFOR to 'deter attacks against the safe



areas' and to 'occupy some key points on the ground'. It also authorised member states to take 'all necessary measures, through the use of air power, [...] to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate' (The United Nations, 1993d, p. 3. See also Gazzini, 2001, p. 398). Hence, this mandate opened up for close air support and air strikes, raising the possibility to coerce the belligerents into submission even more (The United Nations, 1993e; the United Nations, 1996; Aoi, 2011, p. 44).

In response to the United Nations resolution 816, the NAC approved NATO's plan for the enforcement of the resolution, and on 12 April 1993, *Operation Deny Flight* began (NATO, 2003a; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 101). In the beginning, the aim of the operation was only to 'conduct aerial monitoring and enforce the compliance with UN Security Resolution (UNSCR) 816'. However, the operation continued until the end of the war in 1995, and was expanded several times (NATO, 2003b). Initially, the operation included aircraft from France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 101–2).

The United Nations development of the safe areas engaged NATO even more in the war. In order to protect the safe areas, there was a need of forces which the United Nations did not have. While demonstrating the United Nations resolve to protect civilians, the establishment of safe areas also demonstrated its lack of military capabilities. Apart from Sarajevo, which had almost 7000 troops, the other areas had from 69 to 1244 troops with the task of protecting between 30,000 to 446,000 refugees and resident population (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 102). Therefore, the United Nations became dependent on the support of NATO troops for the implementation of the safe areas. According to Gazzini, it was indeed resolution 836 that 'paved the way to the direct involvement of NATO forces in the Bosnian conflict' (Gazzini, 2001, p. 398). At a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 10 June, it was agreed that NATO would provide protective air power in case of attacks on the UNPROFOR. Hence, the second aim of *Operation Deny Flight* became to 'provide close air support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, United Nations forces'. On 22 July, this led to the deployment of CAS aircraft to the Southern Region of Bosnia-Herzegovina (NATO, 2003b).

However, the Bosnian Serbs succeeded in taking two strategic peaks overlooking Sarajevo, making it possible for them to strangle Sarajevo. This made NATO issue a demand against the Bosnian Serbs. On 2 August, the NAC took the decision to prepare for stronger measures. They threatened to 'undertake "immediate preparations" for

“stronger measures, including air strikes” against the Bosnian Serbs if “the strangulation of Sarajevo” continued’ (Aoi, 2011, p. 47. See also Jakobsen, 1998, p. 91). This was followed on 9 August, when the NAC approved for the military planning of air strikes. The third aim of *Operation Deny Flight*, therefore, became to ‘conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas’ (NATO, 2003b).

During 1993, the United Nations increased its commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in terms of the number of troops and in terms of more coercive measures (the introduction of safe areas and the use of air power in defence of those areas). This development was followed by increased involvement and a more coercive approach by NATO. It used CAS to protect the United Nations safe areas and it opened up for the planning of air strikes. NATO did also issue some demands during this period. However, there were no explicit threats of punishment or sense of urgency, making these demands weaker than a full, or even a tacit, ultimatum (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 91–2).

### Several NATO strategies?

The second period of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was dominated by the lack of cohesion between NATO allies, and by the fact that the member states were still unwilling to engage in the war, especially with ground troops. During the course of the year, it became clear that there was a growing rift between several NATO allies. The main aim of the operations was still to support the United Nations operations, and not take the command. Furthermore, a new decision making arrangement for authorising attacks, the so-called dual-key policy, made it even more obvious that NATO’s role in Bosnia-Herzegovina was second to the United Nations (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 50).

In January 1993, the United Nations, together with the European Communities (the becoming European Union), promoted an ambitious peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the so-called Vance-Owen plan, which required a substantial number of ground forces (around 60,000–75,000). Since the United Nations did not have that kind of forces, the United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar turned to NATO in April 1993. However, the United States strongly opposed the idea and refused to commit American ground forces. Instead, they tried to convince the allies to implement the Clinton Administration’s policy of ‘lift and strike’, a policy that minimised the number of foreign ground forces. The idea was to lift the embargo against the Bosnian

Muslims, so that they could arm and defend themselves, at the same time as using large-scale air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 86–90; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 101–3).

However, most of the European allies together with Canada were concerned for the safety of their UNPROFOR troops. They feared that air strikes by NATO could put their UNPROFOR troops at risk, and that the plan would be militarily ineffective (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 88; Hendrickson, 2006, p. 50; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 103). France demanded American ground troops in order to accept air strikes, something they knew the United States would never agree to, while the United Kingdom could accept the use of air strikes, but could not accept the lift of the arms embargo (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 88–9). Soon, it also became clear, according to Hendrickson, that the United States was not ready to take the lead in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they would not offer an American leadership (2006, p. 48). The divide between the United States and the European allies widened. Since the United States did not contribute with ground forces to UNPROFOR or NATO, its actions were not considered as burden *sharing* by the European allies. The creation of the United Nation's safe areas only intensified the debate further, since it increased the risk of UNPROFOR troops (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 102–3).

Despite the reluctance of most of the European states with regards to more forceful NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the NATO Secretary General called for a more active and forceful engagement by NATO. Already in May 1993 he pushed for NATO intervention. Furthermore, Wörner was highly annoyed with the United States' reluctance to take the lead, and criticised them repeatedly for this (Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 52–4).

On 22 May 1993, it seemed that NATO had managed to solve its internal issues when the so-called Joint Action Plan was presented. However, according to Jakobsen, the plan 'was a collective excuse for inaction constituting a *de facto* acceptance of the Serbian gains on the battlefield' (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 91). The plan emphasised NATO's support of the safe areas, but there was no commitment to protect them with force. However, already in August, the divide between the United States and the European allies became more visible again. The United States once again voiced their support of air strikes while the Europeans and Canadians strongly opposed them. The member states were far from achieving a joint strategy (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 92–3). On 9 August the same year, the NAC finally approved of air strikes. However, the Council declared that the aim of the air strikes was 'limited to the support of

humanitarian relief, and must not be interpreted as a decision to intervene military in the conflict' (NATO, 1993).

Apart from the conflicting approaches to operation, both in terms of ends and means, which made it difficult to develop a joint strategy for NATO, a new decision making process between the United Nations and NATO also made it difficult for NATO to pursue a strategy separate from the United Nations. The dual-key policy was adopted after the strangulation of Sarajevo in August 1993, and it was 'the first joint UN-NATO air-strikes mechanism' to be established (Aoi, 2011, p. 47). The NATO 'key' was held by the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINSOUTH) while the United Nations 'key' was held by the United Nations Secretary General's special representative. This arrangement made the United Nations civilian leadership responsible for all decisions on target selection and the authorisation of attacks (NATO, 1993; Gazzini, 2001, pp. 398–9; Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 49–50). According to Cimbala and Forster, this arrangement made NATO a 'sub-contractor to the UN' (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 103) and as a consequence of this arrangement, most of the policy decisions remained at the United Nations Security Council, and not at NATO (Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 51–4).

The dual-key arrangement highlighted the differences between the United States and the European allies further. Most Europeans supported the dual-key arrangement since it provided control for the United Nations. It prevented NATO from becoming 'Americanized'. The United States, however, objected to the arrangement and its restraints (Marshall, 1993; Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 49–51; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 103). Since it gave the United Nations veto over NATO, NATO's Secretary General Wörner was also highly dissatisfied with the dual-key arrangement. Furthermore, it slowed down the authorisation of strikes too much at times (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 62).

This period was characterised by different approaches to the use of force between NATO allies and by the continued unwillingness by most of them to get involved in the war. The United States pushed for the empowering of Bosnian Muslims together with NATO support against the Bosnian Serbs through air strikes. The European allies rather wanted NATO to support the United Nations and its peacekeeping operation and opposed air strikes. This divide could indicate that even though the decisions for action were taken at the highest level of NATO, the level of NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, there was still no overarching strategy for NATO's engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, the main aim of its operations was to support the United Nations operations, and

not to take over the command. This, together with the development of the dual-key arrangement, which ensured that all important decisions would be taken by the United Nations Security Council, made NATO simply a 'sub-contractor' to the United Nations.

### **NATO's ultimatum**

The conflict continued to deteriorate during the first half of 1994, and the United Nations authorised NATO to conduct close air support several times, in order to protect the safe areas. Furthermore, after a mortar attack on the central market in Sarajevo, on 5 February, killing over 50 civilians and injuring almost 150 (The United Nations, 1996), the NAC issued a full ultimatum on 9 February. The NAC threatened to conduct air strikes against any party that failed to withdraw or to remove their heavy weapons from a 20 kilometre zone around Sarajevo or to turn them over to the UNPROFOR within ten days (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 105; Aoi, 2011, p. 47). The NAC also authorised CINSOUTH to

launch air strikes, at the request of UN, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo [...] which were determined by the UN Protection force (UNPROFOR) to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city.

(NATO, 2003b)

This was the first time NATO issued an ultimatum that included a clear demand, a credible threat and a time limit. It resulted in a cease fire on 23 February. Already on 28 February, the cease fire was broken and four Serbian jets violating the no fly zone were shot down by NATO. Serbian forces continued their offensive, and UNPROFOR requested NATO air support on several occasions (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 97; Gazzini, 2001, p. 400; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 106). After some retaliatory air strikes by NATO on Bosnian Serb forces at Gorazde in April 1994, the Bosnian Serbs escalated their efforts. They took 150 of the United Nations personnel hostage, shelled the UN-controlled airport in Tuzla, seized heavy weapons from an UN-controlled collection point near Sarajevo and shot down a NATO jet. This led to yet another full ultimatum, issued on 22 April by NATO. NATO demanded an immediate stop of attacks on Gorazde by the Bosnian Serbs, and that the Serbs should withdraw from the 20 kilometre exclusion zone around Gorazde within five days. Otherwise, they would use 'wide-scale air strikes'. The Bosnian Serbs obeyed once again (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 98).

However, the conflict continued elsewhere and, in late 1994, escalated quickly in northeast Bosnia. The Bosnian government had launched a combined operation with Croatia on the Bosnian Serbs' encirclement of Bihac. The Serbs, who had bases in the Croatian region of Krajina, answered by using napalm from the Udbina airfields in Krajina. On November 21 NATO responded forcefully: thirty-nine planes from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands attacked the Udbina airfields and Serbian surface to air missile (SAM) batteries. The air strikes led to yet more retaliation on UNPROFOR and United Nations personnel once again being taken hostage. However, the fighting was temporarily halted with a four month truce signed on 31 December (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 108–10).

During this period the situation deteriorated on the ground. This was followed by a more forceful approach by NATO and the issue of NATO's first full ultimatum in the war of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### **NATO strategy from the bottom-up?**

During this period, the Alliance was becoming more unified and it made some efforts to take increased control over the dual-key decisions. But, there were still noticeable differences between the member states.

The ultimatum issued on 9 February was endorsed by all Alliance members. According to Jakobsen, this 'was an unprecedented consensus within the alliance concerning the use of air power' (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 94). However, it also exposed some differences within the Alliance. France, who had to act because of domestic pressure, considered a large scale intervention too risky and advocated limited and low-cost action only. The United States first opposed the French call for air strikes, but soon changed their mind. They also endorsed the deployment by the United Nations of an additional 3500 troops, but rejected the United Nations request of 10,000 American forces. Germany supported the ultimatum but would not participate in its enforcement and the United Kingdom was initially opposed to air strikes, because they feared retaliation on their ground forces, but they changed their mind. They did not want to risk the unity of the Alliance (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 95–6; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 105).

The ultimatum issued in April as a response to the Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde, was not as strongly supported as the first ultimatum. The United States wanted more aggressive air strikes, while the United Kingdom had had enough when their jet was shot down earlier the same month (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 100). Nevertheless, NATO did issue a full ultimatum with clear demands, credible threats and a time limit.

In late 1994, the differences between the United States and the European allies became more visible again. The United States wanted to respond more aggressively to the Bosnian Serbs' napalm attacks in north-eastern Bosnia. Their proposal included direct attacks on advancing Serb forces, pre-emptive strikes against Serb SAM batteries, and a stricter enforcement of the no fly zone, including the use of airspace over Croatia. However, the European allies were not prepared to expand the military role to such an extent. They were still concerned about increased reprisals against UNPROFOR troops (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 109).

The relation between NATO and the United Nations also continued to be strained during this period. The dual-key arrangement antagonised some NATO allies. For example, Richard Holbrooke made it very clear that the United States would command its own forces if they got engaged: 'To whatever extent Americans are involved in the area or in any other way in Bosnia, we will not be limited or contained by this insane 'dual-key' system with the UN and NATO' (Holbrooke quoted in Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 106). NATO also requested greater latitude concerning the use of force: the right to identify multiple targets, any of which could be chosen for attack, the ability to use multiple strikes against single targets, and the elimination of advanced warnings to strike. Apart from increasing NATO's capacity for deterrence, this request reflected an increased will to take command over NATO's operations and it signaled a more comprehensive approach to operations. However, the United Nations refused the request (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 108).

NATO managed to unify its member states after the Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo in early 1994. The increase of violence against civilians by the Bosnian Serbs seems to have pushed the member states towards action. However, later during the year, the division between the United States on the one side and European allies on the other grew wider again, making it obvious that there were several approaches towards what strategy NATO should pursue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The NATO response to the events on the ground could indicate that NATO's strategy was driven from the bottom up, instead of the other way around. The efforts to increase NATO's freedom from the United Nations in relation to the dual-key arrangement could also indicate that NATO had become more prepared to go its own way, no longer only supporting the United Nations operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## NATO at war

The four-month truce between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs that was agreed on 31 December 1994, did not lead

to peace. Heavy fighting resumed when the cease-fire end date came closer. By April fighting had spread and Serb forces began to shell Sarajevo again. When the Serbs did not withdraw their heavy artillery from outside of Sarajevo, NATO launched air attacks on the ammunition depot near Pale. The Serbs countered by attacking Tuzla and taking around 400 peacekeepers as hostages (Jakobsen, 1998, p. 100; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 110). They also massacred around 8000 Muslim men and boys when they seized the safe area of Srebrenica (Kaplan, 2010, p. 149).

This led to the adoption of a more aggressive policy by NATO, including the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force equipped with artillery. In June 1995, NATO began to deploy the 10,000 troops strong Rapid Reaction Force. They also issued an ultimatum, threatening to use air power on an 'unprecedented scale'. The ultimatum included signs of both coercive diplomacy (to stop the attacks on Sarajevo) and deterrence (to prevent attacks on Bihac, Gorazde and Tuzla). However, the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force was slow, and it could not respond to the Serb offensive in July. Therefore, several safe areas fell to the Serbs (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 100–1; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 110–1).

The fighting continued and on 28 August, the Bosnian Serbs attacked a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing 38 and injuring 85. This triggered NATO's most cohesive and aggressive response in Bosnia-Herzegovina: *Operation Deliberate Force*. On 30 August, Rapid Reaction Force artillery and NATO jets attacked Bosnian Serbs. The United Nations issued an ultimatum the next day, demanding the Bosnian Serbs to immediately cease their hostilities throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by the suspension of attacks by NATO, giving the Bosnian Serbs time to comply. When they did not comply, the United Nations issued a new ultimatum on 3 September, and NATO resumed its attacks on 5 September. Tomahawk cruise missiles were used for the first time on 10 September, and four days later, the Bosnian Serbs complied and agreed to withdraw their heavy weapons and begin cease-fire negotiations. *Operation Deliberate Force* was terminated on 20 September to give the negotiations a chance. An effective cease fire followed in mid-October, and the Dayton peace agreement was reached on 21 November, with ratification on 14 December. It was also agreed that the UNPROFOR should be replaced by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) also known as *Operation Joint Endeavour* (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 100–1; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 113).



### **An emerging NATO strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina?**

The creation of the Rapid Reaction Force was a significant change in NATO's policy. This was the first time since the beginning of the war that NATO reached consensus on a military and political strategy allowing them to back diplomacy with force (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 111–2). It reflected a greater responsibility taken by the European allies, and it was a significant step in NATO's efforts to create a joint strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The dual-key arrangement between the United Nations and NATO also changed, transferring more decisions, and responsibility, to NATO.

Major steps in developing a joint NATO strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina were taken at the London Summit in July 1995, and a more aggressive use of force policy was chosen. The strategy was further developed in a series of NAC meetings. It was agreed on to use force in order to protect Gorazde and, later on, other safe areas. Simultaneously, the new NATO Secretary General, Willy Claes, openly supported more aggressive military options, often even more aggressive than the Clinton administration. At this time, he, together with most of NATO's military leaders viewed the Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 77; Kaplan, 2010, p. 150).

The government of the United Kingdom led the way to a more unified strategy by deploying combat troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once they had taken the step, others followed. Germany sent nine German Tornado fighters and 1000 troops to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Although the American President Bill Clinton supported the commitment of up to 25,000 troops to facilitate the withdrawal, provided they did not work under the dual-key policy, the United States' Congress did not authorise any troops. Therefore, the United States did not participate directly, but instead deployed an aircraft carrier. The deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force, together with the redeployment of UNPROFOR troops to more defensible positions, made large-scale air strikes possible. This, in turn, made it possible for the United Kingdom and France to support the United States demand for large-scale air strikes (Jakobsen, 1998, pp. 104–5; Kaplan, 2010, p. 153; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 111–2).

*Operation Deliberate Force* reflected the implementation of a more coercive war doctrine. NATO sought to use military force in order to force the Bosnian Serbs to comply with all the UN's conditions. According to Cimbala and Forster, it 'was a direct commitment to using force to stop the fighting and to punish the Serbs rather than responding with ineffective retaliatory strikes' (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 112). The planning

for *Operation Deliberate Force* had been going on for months, indicating a more unified approach by NATO (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 82). In a speech on 4 October 1995, Secretary General Willy Claes stated that:

For three years, Europeans and Americans talked past each other. While the United States pressed for decisive action from the air, the European Allies pointed to the dangers this would expose their peacekeepers to on the ground, who indeed were taking casualties. The gap was only bridged this summer when all Allies concluded that, before withdrawing and leaving the Balkan region to its fate, it was necessary to try robust action.

(Claes, 1995b)

However, according to Hendrickson, the onset of *Operation Deliberate Force* was only possible because the Secretary General Willy Claes did not call for a NAC meeting before the beginning of the operation. Instead, Claes rested on earlier commitments of the member states to the use of force. If he had called a meeting, discussions about the strategy would have been impossible to avoid (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 79).

During this period, it was also evident that NATO took a more independent role against the United Nations. After harsh critique of the dual-key arrangement, in a speech on 3 February 1995, Secretary General Willy Claes announced that:

NATO is more than a sub-contractor of the UN; it will keep its full independence of decision and action. There may even be circumstances which oblige NATO to act on its own initiative in the absence of a UN mandate.

(Claes, 1995a)

At the London Summit and in the following NAC meetings, it was decided to transfer the United Nations key from the Secretary General's special representative to an UNPROFOR ground commander. This minimised the United Nations civilian influence over NATO's action. As a consequence, NATO could develop three sets of targets, known as Options, allowing it more freedom in the choice of targets (Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 74–6; Kaplan, 2010, p. 152; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, p. 112). The change in the dual-key arrangement also signaled 'a new willingness to use force if any party violated the United Nations' international agreements' (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 78). On 10 August, the CINSOUTH and UNPROFOR commander concluded a 'memorandum of understanding

on the execution of air strikes by NATO forces', which became active on 30 August 1995, when the marketplace in Sarajevo was bombed (Gazzini, 2001, p. 403; Hendrickson, 2006, p. 78).

### **Conclusions: NATO's strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

NATO's engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina began already in 1992, with naval support to the United Nations monitoring operations in the Adriatic, and changed dramatically over the years. After the first engagement, when NATO forces were deployed without any enforcement authorisation, it contributed to both close air support, and later air strikes, in support of the UNPROFOR's mission. It issued a number of full ultimatums, with a clear demand, credible threat and a time limit. It also deployed its own Rapid Reaction Force on the ground, and conducted large-scale air strikes during *Operation Deliberate Force*. At this point, NATO was no longer only 'a sub-contractor' of the United Nations peacekeeping mission.

NATO's strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina also changed over the years. Initially, its member states did not want to commit to operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially not with ground forces. The initial aim of NATO's actions, therefore, was a limited one: to support the sanctions and the no fly ban of the United Nations. When the fighting on the ground increased and the humanitarian situation deteriorated, the United Nations authorised more forceful measures, although only for self-defence. NATO reacted to the United Nations decisions, and increased their engagement. However, different NATO allies had different aims, and NATO seemed to be unable to unify the states around a single strategy. The United States' aspiration was a 'lift and strike' strategy, with the aim of making the Bosnian Muslims capable of defending themselves and to use NATO air strikes to defeat the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, the European allies continued to support a strategy where the aim of NATO's engagement was only to support the United Nations peacekeeping. Large-scale air strikes were considered risky for their ground forces already deployed as part of UNPROFOR. Furthermore, the new decision-making process – the dual-key – tied NATO down since the United Nations special representative had veto on all decisions to use force.

However, after an especially violent Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo in February 1994, NATO seemed to become more cohesive, and all member states agreed on the limited use of air strikes. Hence, the development on the ground seemed to have forged common interests among the NATO allies. NATO's approach towards the United Nations

also indicates a more active approach. They requested greater latitude from the United Nations. However, the United Nations declined their request. Furthermore, during the course of the year, it also became evident that the United States still wanted NATO to pursue a more coercive strategy, dividing the member states once again.

In mid-1995, after a four month truce between the belligerents, the war broke out once again. This time, NATO had already prepared for the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force, of about 10,000 troops. At the London Summit in July of the same year, the member states also decided on a more coercive doctrine. The Secretary General argued that this was the first time since the beginning of the war that the gap between the United States and the European allies was bridged (Claes, 1995b). NATO did also change the dual-key arrangements and became more independent from the United Nations. At this point, NATO seems to have created a single strategy for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their efforts were also successful, ending in the Dayton peace agreement December 1995.

In the Dayton agreement, it was agreed that a new peacekeeping force numbering 60,000 would be deployed, and that NATO would command the new force. For the first time during the war, the United States deployed ground forces, almost 18,000, indicating a more cohesive strategy by the United States and Europe (Gawrych, 2004, p. 120; Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 113–4). In the Dayton General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), it was also guaranteed that NATO would not be hamstrung by narrowly written rules of engagement and that NATO would have full command and control authority of IFOR (Baumann, 2004, p. 95. See also Kim, 1997). On 20 December 1995, the authority of IFOR was transferred to NATO. The GFAP provided IFOR with clear and concrete tasks that were attainable during the mandate's one year duration. Furthermore, the mandate provided robust rules of engagement which made it possible for IFOR to be proactive, rather than reactive. GFAP empowered IFOR 'with the right to inspect any military installation and use force, if necessary, to carry out its inspection' (Gawrych, 2004, p. 120). Hence, most of the obstacles that had hampered NATO during its first three years of operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were removed, giving a more promising future for a cohesive and rational NATO strategy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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## Notes

1. Although, the notion of coercive diplomacy is developed for conventional wars (see, for example, Schelling (1966); Pape (1996); George (2004)), Daniel et al. argue that it is fruitful to think in these terms regarding peace operations as well. See pp. 21–2. See also, Posen (2004).
2. UNPROFOR was already established in February 1992 in Croatia. The mandate was, however, gradually expanded to also include the deployment of the United Nations forces in Bosnia in June 1992. See Burg (2004b, p. 53).
3. The WEU-part of the operation was called *Operation Sharp Vigilance* (NATO (2003c)).
4. Also conducted jointly with WEU: *Operation Sharp Fence* (NATO (2003d)).

# 4

## NATO's *Operation Allied Force*: Strategic Concepts and Institutional Relationships

Ryan C. Hendrickson

### Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) first sustained military operation came in the spring of 1999. This 78-day air bombing campaign aimed against the Yugoslavian military of Slobodan Milosevic, in many respects, ushered in a new era for the Alliance, demonstrating that NATO could act in radically different ways compared to its previously conservative Cold War mission, which focused almost exclusively on Article 5 and the protection of member states from external attack. Clearly, NATO's broader strategic view of the world, and its perceived place in European security affairs, had adapted in significant ways with the Soviet Union's absence.

At the same time, it is important to evaluate and assess the importance of the actual strategic context in which this bombing, *Operation Allied Force*, occurred. While NATO's strategic vision had clearly been adapted in 1991 at NATO's Rome Summit, other case specific variables in the months prior to *Allied Force* provide at least equal, if not greater, explanatory power in articulating how and why NATO chose to become engaged in this Balkan conflict. These contextual factors also shaped the conduct of the operation, and also how NATO interacted with other international organisations during these difficult months. This chapter examines the interplay between NATO's strategic concepts and the strategic context for *Operation Allied Force*. In addition, the chapter also examines how NATO's principal institutions, including the office of the Secretary General, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's Military Committee (MC), and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) influenced the strategic context of this operation. In doing so, NATO's relationship with the United Nations and the European



Union during Allied Force will also be examined. The findings presented here suggest that NATO leaders, as well as the different foreign policy inclinations of major states in the alliance, best explain why and how NATO became involved in this bombing campaign. While broad strategic concepts certainly provide the general logic and justification for military action, it appears in this case that very specific political variables influenced *how* NATO's broader strategies were applied and implemented.

### NATO's strategic evolution prior to Kosovo

As the Soviet Union began to crumble, NATO faced existential questions. Without the presence of a clearly identified external threat, many realist scholars were quick to predict NATO's demise (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993). Instead, this Cold War alliance evolved in significant ways, which in part, set the strategic milieu for its eventual uses of force in the Balkans.

NATO's first significant strategic shift came with the alliance's adoption of a 'New Strategic Concept' at its Rome Summit in 1991. At the Summit, allied leaders agreed to go beyond its traditional Article 5 mission, and noted their intent to address three new directions, which included a willingness to actively engage their former Soviet adversaries in Russia and Eastern Europe; to restructure their military forces such that they could take on crisis prevention and peacekeeping activities as necessary; and that European states would accept a larger security responsibility for themselves. Most important for the analysis provided here is the decision to accept a crisis prevention role. Though it was not clear for allied leaders how these ideas would be implemented, few doubted that NATO had begun the process of significant evolution. The New Strategic Concept was further built upon at NATO's Brussels Summit in January 1994, when allied leaders adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which provided the alliance with greater flexibility to more easily take on new, non-Article 5 missions. Though NATO was slow to use force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these major strategic changes certainly helped set the environment for the eventual uses of force and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans (Sloan, 2003, pp. 88–93; Yost, 1998, pp. 189–92).

Coupled with these major strategic conceptual shifts, Rebecca R. Moore makes a strong case for a shift in values across the alliance, which was especially evident in NATO's policies aimed at enlarging NATO's membership. The allies increasingly saw both the strategic

advantages and political virtues in encouraging a free, democratic and secure Europe with the fall of communism. NATO leaders understood that the moment was ripe for cultivating and advancing democratic politics and democratic civil-military norms across Central and Eastern Europe. In many ways, the many pronouncements of NATO's desire to see democracy flourish followed previous European ambitions to seek continental integration through the European Economic Community and later the European Union (Moore, 2007. See also Kirschbaum, 1999, pp. 197–215). In the 1990s, NATO officials began to speak differently about the larger purpose of the organisation. In this regard, as violence broke out in Kosovo, and Milosevic enacted discriminatory policies within Kosovo, such policies were later viewed as a direct challenge to the ideals that NATO increasingly advanced throughout the 1990s.

One additional strategic design in place, though not written within NATO's documents but rather imbedded within European political culture, was that military force should be used with great restraint and with many institutional checks in order to limit its destructive nature. Given that Europeans had experienced two world wars in the twentieth century, General Wesley K. Clark, who served as SACEUR during *Operation Allied Force*, makes a good case that many Europeans believed that force should be used only as a last resort, and when doing so, never with overwhelming firepower. The latter idea especially contrasted with many American strategic-military thinkers, and especially with what later became known as the Powell Doctrine, which maintained that once war was entered into, gradual or piecemeal military strategies should not be adopted, but instead force should be used in a dominant and devastating manner in order to accomplish a military objective as fast as possible. While these ideas, that military action must be checked and limited in scope, were never codified in NATO documents, Clark makes a good case for the presence of this norm across European political culture, and in this sense, constitutes a broader aspect of NATO's strategic environment that shaped how force would be used by the alliance, which clearly had a major impact on the conduct of *Operation Allied Force* (Clark, 2001, pp. 7–8). As is evident below, the Europeans and especially France and Germany, expressed strong reservations and opposition to how force was used during *Operation Allied Force*, which was reflective of the strategic cultures in place that varied widely from the United States.

These three broad strategic concepts helped create the conditions for the military strikes to come in *Operation Allied Force*. NATO's evolution in strategic thinking, both in terms of the alliance's willingness to take on non-Article 5 military missions, and NATO's interest in promoting a

democratic and secure Europe, no doubt provided the strategic milieu that allowed NATO to use force against Milosevic. At the same time, these ideas alone do not explain why and how NATO eventually initiated the military campaign in 1999. At least four additional 'context specific' factors provide insight on when the alliance intervened.

First, it is critical to recognise the importance of NATO's previous military air campaign in the Balkans, *Operation Deliberate Force* in 1995. This military operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded with no NATO combat casualties, took less than three weeks, and included some degree of military backing from most of the allies (Owen, 2000). NATO viewed this operation as a very successful application of military force. In addition, the perceived lesson learned from *Deliberate Force* was that Slobodan Milosevic would respond to limited military action. In the aftermath of this conflict, allied leaders felt that they understood Milosevic. Military force employed against him was necessary to change his behaviour, but it would not take overwhelmingly military action to compel him to negotiate with the allies. Thus, another limited military strike on him in 1999 would ostensibly result in favourable policy and behavioural outcomes. In this respect, NATO's perceived success in Bosnia-Herzegovina was instrumental in shaping how allied leaders thought about the mission prior to the use of force. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and General Wesley Clark were arguably the most explicit in expressing this view, although many others in the alliance shared similar perspectives on how much force it would take to coerce Milosevic in new policy directions. Thus, NATO military planners entered *Operation Allied Force* with only three days worth of targets, due mostly to the belief that military strikes would produce a rapid policy change from Milosevic (Henriksen, 2007).

Another significant contextual factor regarding *Operation Allied Force* stems from the broader strategic ideal in place regarding European preferences for limitations on how and when force is used. One important aspect of this belief is the notion that prior to the use of military force, United Nations Security Council authorisation must be gained. This belief varies in intensity across the European allies, but nonetheless is still an important norm that confronted the alliance in 1999, which was compounded by the intense opposition within the United Nations from China and Russia to military action against Milosevic; both China and Russia maintained that the Kosovo crisis was an internal affair occurring within a sovereign state. In fact, European concerns against military actions arguably square with NATO's own Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which indicates that all NATO operations act in accordance with

the principles of the United Nations, and thus in effect, *prima facie* imply that specific authorisation by the United Nations must be gained before NATO can use force. Among the Europeans, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain were the most vocally opposed to the use of force without explicit approval by the United Nations (Guicherd, 1999). Thus, as the pressure to act militarily grew within the alliance, the absence of authorisation by the United Nations created an important diplomatic and arguably strategic challenge to overcome.

This diplomatic and legal hurdle was overcome through the exceptional diplomatic skill of NATO's then secretary general, Javier Solana. Through extensive and private discussions among NATO leaders, Solana discovered that if NATO used the words 'sufficient legal basis' to justify a military strike, the NATO allies were prepared to move forward with military action absent authorisation by the United Nations. Thus, on 13 October 1998, NAC agreed to authorise the use of force against Milosevic if he did not comply with previous demands by the United Nations and NATO to cease the violence. Solana was personally credited by many who were involved in this decision making process in October 1998 as the individual who was critical in overcoming this key diplomatic challenge to NATO military action without authorisation by the United Nations, which indicates the institutional importance of NATO's secretary general in guiding the allies through a contentious strategic moment (Hendrickson, 2006, pp. 100–2).

Solana's leadership success appears to have been partially shaped by his use of the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan's previous reports to the United Nations Security Council on the crisis in Kosovo. In Annan's own analyses, he was quite clear in condemning the actions of the Serb militias, and pointed to the gross violations of human rights that had taken place. Annan also repeatedly called on the international community to take action to address this crisis, which was taking place in a sovereign state. In his attempt to convince the NATO allies to authorise military action, Solana used Annan's reports to help advance the idea that NATO could legitimately use force without explicit approval by the United Nations. These arguments apparently had some influence in convincing the more sceptical members of the alliance to eventually approve of NATO military action (Kille and Hendrickson, 2010, pp. 512–4).

In addition, as NATO moved toward military action in 1999, Solana and Annan maintained a close diplomatic relationship, as Annan continued to send important diplomatic signals that he supported NATO's efforts to end Milosevic's human rights violations. When NATO's

bombings ensued, Annan himself defended the United Nations Security Council's broader role in authorising military action, but also maintained that '[t]here are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace' which provided his own tacit approval for NATO's conduct (The United Nations, 1999). Thus, this inter-institutional dialogue between the secretaries general of the United Nations and NATO played an important role in helping NATO eventually use force, and helped to overcome the larger strategic constraint of using force without explicit authorisation by the United Nations.

Along with NATO's previous success in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Solana's effective leadership within the NAC, two additional context specific events help explain the actual decision to use force. On 15 January 1999, Serb militias engaged in an especially brutal attack on Kosovo-Albanian civilians in Racak, resulting in the deaths of 45 people. Among the deaths were women, children and elderly men, a number of who were massacred, mutilated and beheaded. When this news and their corresponding images reached the international community, these events prompted a new diplomatic initiative led by the United States, which occurred two weeks later at the French chateau outside of Paris, Rambouillet. At this meeting, the Serbs were required to accept the United Nations and NATO's demands to end the violence. If Milosevic did not agree to the conditions set forth, NATO would follow with military action (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, p. 71). The Rambouillet meetings occurred in two cycles, eventually ending without agreement. Although the Kosovo-Albanians were initially unorganised and divided on the diplomatic goals, it was equally clear that the Serbs had no serious intent to engage in meaningful diplomatic dialogue, all of which culminated in a diplomatic failure and the eventual initiation of *Operation Allied Force* on 24 March 1999 (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000, pp. 77–84). In sum, the events at Racak and Rambouillet provide another important contextual element and explanation for *Operation Allied Force*.

Finally, one additional context specific element of NATO's decision to use force, which has no tie to any strategic concepts, is the domestic political crisis faced by American President Bill Clinton in 1998 and 1999, when Clinton underwent his impeachment proceedings for his extra-marital relationship with the White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Some analysts note that as the conditions in Kosovo deteriorated, Clinton remained focused on his own domestic political battle to retain his presidency. This battle resulted in a White House that was focused on the president's political survival, and a commander in chief

who was distracted from the Balkan crisis. Former American National Security Council Staffer Ivo Daalder specifically argues that given President Clinton's domestic political condition during the House and Senate impeachment proceedings, there was little chance that the United States would engage American troops in a sovereign state's own domestic political crisis, especially given that the national security interests in doing so were not entirely clear (Henriksen, 2007, p. 134; Richardson, 2000, p. 151). During this time, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair was pressing aggressively for military action against Milosevic, though he was unable to win this debate until President Clinton had overcome the Republican's impeachment challenge (Richardson, 2000, p. 161). Once this American political drama ended, the Clinton administration's attention turned more aggressively to Kosovo, which allowed the United States to exercise heightened leadership within the alliance.

In sum, it is important to recognise that while broad strategic concepts shape the thinking of allied leaders, yet other context specific factors and events provide a more complete explanation for how and why the alliance became engaged in this conflict. Strategic concepts alone did not steer the alliance into war with Milosevic, but rather required intervening political variables that served as catalysts for military action.

### **Strategy and conduct of *Operation Allied Force***

The conduct of *Operation Allied Force* is very instructive on how under-developed NATO's military 'strategy' was heading into the conflict. Although the atrocities in Kosovo seem to comport with the kinds of threats NATO envisioned in the 1991 New Strategic Concept, and would clearly then require the resources discussed and advocated for in NATO's Combined Joint Task Force, the evidence is also clear that there was almost no military strategy at the conflict's initiation, with the exception of the belief that three days of bombing would coerce Milosevic into negotiation. The absence of a meaningful and comprehensive strategy had a profound impact on how Allied Force was conducted, and on the various roles that NATO's principal institutions played during this conflict (Henriksen, 2007, p. 11).

NATO's targeting decisions were made on a daily basis, with input from many different political entities. In practice, targeting decisions began with an American proposal, often led by American Lieutenant General Michael Short, the air component commander for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). Short would also consult with

Vice Admiral Daniel Murphy, who was the commander of Strikes and Support Forces at AFSOUTH, both of whom were considered the operational commanders of the mission. These proposals would then go through AFSOUTH commander Admiral James Ellis, and on to the SACEUR, General Wesley Clark at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Political tension existed at these levels, especially between generals Clark and Short, who had different perspectives on the appropriate use of airpower and on the targets selected. Short sought more aggressive targets on Milosevic's command centres, though Clark felt compelled to listen to more conservative factions within the alliance who were more resistant to hitting targets that risked civilian casualties. Clark often approved of military strikes on Serb forces operating in Kosovo, which was far less aggressive than Short sought. The result was an intense intra-American debate over how to employ force, involving the SACEUR and his principal operational commanders (Lambeth, 2001, pp. 189–92; Halberstam, 2001, pp. 444–5).

Once General Clark, who was deeply involved in the operational minutia of the targeting process, approved of the selected targets, the proposed sites would then be shared with the allied countries in the NAC, which also included additional input from the White House. This practice invited and generated a range of views on the appropriateness of particular target locations. France was the most frequent ally to veto proposed target sites, and was especially critical of strikes aimed at electrical power grids or anywhere near Serbian civilians. Intense negotiations took place between French and American military planners on the likely civilian impacts of hitting certain proposed targets. French President Jacques Chirac later asserted that France personally monitored and evaluated each individual target proposed. Greece also was unafraid to express its targeting preferences. Moreover, the Dutch reportedly opposed a strike on a presidential palace due to the presence of a Rembrandt painting in the building (Peters et al., 2001, pp. 25–9; Lambeth, 2001, p. 40).

As the mission progressed, the NAC was eventually removed from the decision making process, as Javier Solana was granted some discretion to advise General Clark on the members' targeting preferences. At times, Solana would exercise a veto against Clark's targeting proposals if the strikes threatened alliance cohesion. The NAC's decision to grant Solana this degree of leadership indicates the trust the NAC had in Solana. In this regard, NATO's secretary general took on novel and heightened institutional importance in leading the alliance through this new period in NATO's existence (Hendrickson, 2006, p. 112).

In Solana's personal advisory capacity to General Clark, it is also clear that the secretary general and the SACEUR worked together very closely. Solana became a trusted and honest advisor to Clark, at times giving Clark important political advice on how to proceed with the allies and even the United States. Apart from European concerns over target selections, Clark also faced political roadblocks within his own Defense Department due to the Pentagon's opposition to Clark's more aggressive calls for military strikes. Clark also had an especially difficult relationship with the United States' Secretary of Defense William Cohen (Halberstam, 2001, p. 456).

In this respect, a novel and close intra-institutional relationship existed between the secretary general and the SACEUR, in contrast to the Cold War, when the SACEUR exercised far greater political influence inside NATO. While other NATO secretaries general, especially Manfred Wörner, have exercised their influence on NATO's strategic thinking, NATO's Cold War leaders were always challenged by the nearly omnipotent presence of strong SACEURs (Hendrickson, 2010. See also Jordan with Bloome, 1979).

However, in *Operation Allied Force*, with a strategically ambiguous operation and many tactical military decisions being shaped by political forces and pressures, the importance of the Solana-Clark relationship is a critical facet of how NATO's 'strategy' was implemented.

Nonetheless, as the mission moved forward, the eventual targets chosen were still shaped largely by the diplomatic political process that took place between the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, whose foreign ministers would speak by phone to discuss specific targets and the general operational direction of the mission. The evidence is clear that each state had strong perspectives on how force should be employed. The Germans were especially adamant that they could not support the introduction of NATO ground troops into the conflict (Rudolf, 2000, pp. 135–8).

Like France, Italy would often express concern over the direction of the campaign (Peters et al., 2001, p. 28). Thus, while General Clark remained at the operational center of the mission, the actual military planning procedures varied from day-to-day due to the array of perspectives that were permitted in the planning process. This *ad hoc* decision making process also resulted in NATO's Military Committee, an organisation consisting of senior military officials from each of NATO's member states, being left out of the decision making process. NATO's Military Committee was not only subordinate, but clearly tertiary as an institutional player during the bombing (Henriksen, 2007, p. 21). Again, the novel nature of what NATO had undertaken, coupled with the



unanticipated resistance from Milosevic, resulted in the largest NATO allies assuming central advisory roles to the SACEUR.

From the United Nations, there was no interference or involvement in the daily military planning process. Approximately one month into the operation, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, along with the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, criticised the humanitarian aid services being provided by NATO to Kosovo's refugees, but otherwise there was no inter-institutional coordination on NATO military decisions during Allied Force. Rather, Annan provided tacit approval for NATO's military actions during the full course of the military campaign. Annan did create his own diplomatic lobbying team intended to foster a peaceful resolution to the conflict, but these efforts did not conflict with senior NATO officials' actions during this time period (Kille and Hendrickson, 2010, pp. 514-5). At the same time, it is also clear that Kofi Annan was kept informed of key diplomatic initiatives, in part because of senior NATO officials' recognition that the eventual peacekeeping deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) would occur under a mandate from the United Nations, and thus strong political incentives were in place to keep the United Nations leaders informed of NATO's diplomatic actions (interview with senior NATO official, 8 April 2009).

Like the United Nations, the European Union was also largely a sideline participant in *Operation Allied Force*. At certain points during the bombing, France campaigned aggressively for a role for the European Union, seeking to keep NATO's role limited exclusively to military matters, with civilian issues reserved for the European Union. France succeeded in gaining support from the European Union for an oil trade embargo on the former Yugoslavia, which NATO then also endorsed. In addition, France also initially sought an administrating role for the peacekeeping operation anticipated with the conflict's conclusion, but later dropped this proposal once France's then Health Minister, Bernard Kouchner, was named as head of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (Macleod, 2000, p. 120).

During the operation, Germany held the presidency of the European Union and similarly worked to utilise the European Union as a forum to help resolve the crisis, but in the end, it was NATO emissaries and envoys that negotiated the cease fire and helped set the stage for the reentry of the United Nations in determining KFOR's presence and complexion (Cremasco, 2000, p. 173). The French and German proposals, however, highlighted the different strategic cultures evident among the allies, and at the time, the desire to have the European Union

shape NATO and American actions. The European Union, then, had a limited role in shaping NATO's operational or strategic approach to the conflict.

## Conclusions

This volume focuses largely on how NATO's strategic concepts may or may not be influenced by context specific events facing NATO operations. The findings presented here suggest that the political context plays a critical role in determining how a strategy is both initiated and then implemented. Despite the presence of NATO's New Strategic Concept and the alliance's expressed willingness to address non-Article 5 threats, the initiation of *Operation Allied Force* was shaped largely by context specific factors, including NATO's perceived success in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the human rights abuses in Racak, the failed diplomacy at Rambouillet, Javier Solana's diplomatic breakthrough in October 1998, and President Clinton's domestic political challenges through January and February 1999. These variables were instrumental in determining if NATO could initiate the broader strategic concept that it had agreed to initially in 1991, which eventually came to fruition in March 1999, but certainly required these intervening variables.

In practice, once *Operation Allied Force* ensued, the absence of a shared military strategic vision to implement the bombing campaign led to considerable internal debate on how to defeat Milosevic. These differences were evident through the conflicting national perspectives held on how to use force against Milosevic, and internal American debates on strategic bombing, but also resulted in rather close cooperation and coordination between NATO's secretary general and SACEUR. The different national perspectives on the appropriate governance forum for the conflict also led to an arguably competitive role for the European Union, as France and Germany inserted the European Union into the diplomatic dialogue. Institutionally, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan also played a supporting role for NATO, as Annan and Solana remained in close contact throughout the operation, which again highlights how important context specific variables are in explaining the implementation of NATO strategy.

Although many additional lessons can be learned from *Operation Allied Force*, a final point worth highlighting is the critical role played by the SACEUR in both initiating and then implementing the mission. General Clark pushed aggressively for NATO intervention, in part as a fulfillment of his vision for NATO's newly evolving role in European

security, and then situated himself at the operational centre of the actual bombing campaign. In part, Clark likely played such a strong role due to the force of his own personality and ambition (Priest, 2003, pp. 248–9).

At the same time, General Clark was placed in an unusually difficult position, in which he faced multiple forms of political pressure over the conduct of the operation, and by some accounts, handled the pressure exceedingly well (Halberstam, 2001, p. 463). More generally, it is clear that context specific variables resulted in the SACEUR, along with the secretary general, having instrumental roles in defining and then implementing central strategic and tactical aspects of *Operation Allied Force*.

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# 5

## Cooperating with the European Union in Europe: Policy or Strategy?

Håkan Edström

### Introduction

It might be confusing to read yet another chapter on the Balkans after reading Chapter 3 on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Chapter 4 on Kosovo. There are, however, some important aspects that justify this additional chapter. First, since Chapters 3 and 4 focus solely on a single country and Chapter 5 focuses on the whole region, there are important spatial differences. Second, the chapters are separated in the temporal dimension as well. Third, and more importantly, while Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the dynamics related to the *interventions*, Chapter 5 focuses on the *inter-institutional cooperation* between NATO and the European Union.<sup>1</sup> In other words while Chapters 3 and 4 provide important insights to be used in comparison with the chapter on the intervention in Afghanistan, this chapter provides insights to be used in comparison with the chapter on the inter-institutional cooperation in Africa. The chapter will focus on three cases of cooperation between NATO, on the one hand, and the European Union on the other; in chronological order these are Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

In *Macedonia* the Alliance launched three operations between August 2001 and March 2003. One of the objectives was to provide protection to the monitors of the European Union who were observing the implementation of the Macedonian peace plan. On 31 March 2003 NATO handed over responsibility to the European Union and its *Operation Concordia*. In order to assist further security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards, the Alliance maintains representation in the country (NATO, 2004c; NATO, 2010b).

As the security situation in *Bosnia-Herzegovina* improved (see Kersti Larsdotter's chapter for detailed background), the Alliance brought

SFOR to a conclusion. The SFOR mission was officially ended on 2 December 2004. In its place, a military force led by the European Union was deployed; *Operation Althea*. The Alliance is providing support for the European Union mission in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreement. In order to assist further defence reforms the Alliance maintains representation in the country (NATO, 2004a; NATO, 2004b).

In the aftermath of *Kosovo's* declaration of independence in February 2008, NATO agreed to maintain its presence on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (see Ryan C. Hendrickson's chapter for more detailed background). In June 2008, the Alliance decided to help the establishing of a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF). Throughout Kosovo, KFOR continues to work with the authorities and to assist other international actors. NATO is, for example, supporting The European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (NATO, 2010a).

How has the dynamic between NATO's strategic and operational levels developed during the inter-institutional cooperation in the Balkans? What kind of dynamic occurs, for example, when NATO operations are conducted concurrently with the activities of other organisations? Does this dynamic differ from the dynamic occurring when NATO operations are conducted more temporally separate from the activities of other organisations?

The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the shaping of NATO strategy in the context of inter-institutional cooperation in Europe. The continuation of this chapter is divided into four sections. The strategic framework and the methodological considerations are presented in the next section. The following section introduces, in chronological order, the cases of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Then key areas of cooperation are analysed while the conclusions are presented in the last section.

## **Methodological considerations**

The scope of the NATO-EU cooperation was defined in January 2001 and in December 2002 the NATO-EU Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was signed. An additional step in the cooperation was taken in March 2003 when an agreement on the framework for cooperation was agreed. Representatives of NATO and the European Union meet regularly to discuss topics of mutual interest. The levels of the meetings range from foreign and defence ministers to more informal meetings between military officers. As

an example, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) met the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the European Union in November 2008 to discuss the situation in the Western Balkans. Another example is the personal meeting between the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and NATO's Secretary General in May 2010. In addition to the meetings there is regular staff contact between both the strategic military staff and the defence agencies of the organisations. In order to establish a more permanent arrangement a NATO liaison team has been detached to the European Union's Military Staff since November 2005. A European Union liaison cell was set up at SHAPE in March 2006. Occasionally the two organisations jointly draft documents on common policy and visions. One example is *Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans* which was published in July 2003 (Rupp, 2006; Lindley-French, 2007; Moore, 2007; NATO, 2010c; Shea, 2010).

The overarching theoretical framework of this chapter is provided by the elaborations in Chapter 2. The dependent variable is Luttwak's vertical dimension, that is the dynamics between the strategic and operational levels within NATO. The independent variable is Luttwak's horizontal dimension, that is the interaction between each of the NATO levels with their counterpart within the European Union context (Luttwak, 2001).




Figure 5.1 The inter-institutional cooperation in theory: The vertical and horizontal dynamics

Written material will be used in the first phase of the analysis which aims to identify key areas of the inter-institutional cooperation. Textual analysis will also be used in the second phase to explore the identified areas. The main empirical source in this phase will, however, be interviews conducted with representatives from the political strategic (IS, IMS), the military strategic (SHAPE) and the operational (JFC, theatre headquarters) levels. Since some of NATO's operations, and hence cooperation with the European Union, have been terminated interviews might not be considered to be the most relevant source of information. I have, however, been assured that the respondents represent the institutional memory of each of the headquarters. In addition interviews provide insights that are hard to find in textual material. The analysis will focus on two empirical questions (Gyllensporre, 2010; Cimbala and Forster, 2010):

- *Why* is/was NATO action and cooperation with the European Union needed?
- *How* is/was conflict response, that is the burden-sharing between NATO and the European Union, tailored?

In addition, the overarching question elaborated in the two initial chapters of this book will be addressed when answering the two questions above:

- *How* can the character of the interaction dynamics between levels of command be described?

## **NATO-EU cooperation in the Balkans**

The empirical cases in this section are presented in chronological order. The section is hence following the same logic as the Balkan chapters of the book, starting with the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s (Chapter 3), following with the intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s (Chapter 4) and ending up with this chapter focusing on the inter-institutional cooperation after 2001. Since the case of Macedonia has not been introduced in the previous chapters it is given more space than the two other cases.

### **Case 1: Cooperating in Macedonia: August 2001**

In late 2000 and early 2001 a similar pattern as the insurgency in Kosovo occurred in Macedonia. It was not, however, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) but a group called the National Liberation Army (NLA) that claimed responsibility for the attacks against Macedonian armed



forces and police. The United States and the European Union joined forces and organised negotiations between the Macedonian government and representatives for the Albanian minority. The negotiations led to an agreement signed on 13 August in Orhid, a town in southern Macedonia. The signatory parties of the Orhid agreement explicitly invited the international community to assist in the implementation of the agreement and requested the efforts to be coordinated (EU Council of Europe, 2001).

As a part of the broader plan to establish peace in Macedonia, the ethnic Albanian insurgents agreed to voluntarily hand in their weapons. The initial NATO operation, *Operation Essential Harvest* (27 August–25 September 2001), was conducted by a task force, Task Force Harvest (TFH). TFH was composed of about 3500 NATO troops. Infantry units (company size) were provided by Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In addition the TFH included explosive and ordnance disposal (EOD) units from Hungary, Norway and Portugal, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) as well as air transport units from the United States and Italy and military police from Italy. The task force had one single mandate; to collect the weapons handed in. Several thousand weapons and several hundred thousand mines and other explosive items were collected. Concurrently the implementation of the peace agreement was monitored by the European Union. The responsibility to provide security remained with the Macedonian government. The insurgency lasted, however, throughout most of 2001 and did not end until November. A subsequent NATO operation, *Operation Amber Fox* (27 September 2001–15 December 2002), was initiated on the request of the Macedonian government. The operation was conducted by a task force, Task Force Fox (TFF). TFF was composed of about 700 NATO troops. Infantry units (company size) were provided by France, Germany and Italy. In addition the TFF included several liaison teams and a Danish mobile reconnaissance platoon. The primary responsibility for the security of the international monitors remained, however, with the Macedonian authorities. The task of the TFF was to provide additional security. The operation was only authorised for three months. There was, however, an option to prolong the operation if the situation in the country was considered to be too unsafe for the monitors. Following official requests from the Macedonian government, the operation was extended three times. As a result of the improved security and stability in Macedonia the Alliance and the Macedonian government agreed not to extend *Amber Fox* when the last mandate expired.

The Macedonian authorities, however, invited NATO to maintain its presence in the country. This third NATO-operation, *Operation Allied Harmony* (16 December 2002–31 March 2003), was launched in order to provide continued support for international monitors and to assist the Macedonian government. The forces were reduced to about 450 while almost the same number of liaison teams was kept. The operational parts of the new mission included tasks to liaise and maintain the established contacts with local authorities and other international organisations. In addition potential crisis areas were to be monitored. The advisory part of the mission included tasks to provide military advice to security sector reform activities including military training. In addition advice on border security was provided when it was found to be appropriate. On 1 April 2003 the European Union launched *Operation Concordia* by which the Union took over the operational tasks from NATO. In order to fulfill its advisory tasks, the Alliance maintained its military presence in Macedonia. The European Union's forces deployed for *Concordia* comprised about 350 troops. *Concordia* ended in December 2003 and was the first EU operation based on the Berlin Plus agreement in which NATO assets were available to the European Union. On the same day that *Concordia* terminated the European Union launched a police operation, *Proxima*. The police operation was terminated after exactly two years. It was followed with another police mission, The European Union's Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) that lasted for six months (NATO, 2002a; NATO, 2003a; NATO, 2004c; NHQSk, 2010a; NHQSk, 2010b; NHQSk, 2010c; Gazzini, 2003; Rupp, 2006; Moore, 2007; Yost, 2007; Yost, 2010; Goldgeier, 2010; Gyllensporre, 2010).

To summarise, the Macedonian case provides three key areas of cooperation:

- NATO forces providing security to EU monitors.
- The European Union taking over responsibility for military operations from NATO and NATO providing support to EU-led military operations.
- The European Union's police forces complementing NATO military forces in supporting the host nation.

### **Case 2: Cooperating in Bosnia-Herzegovina: January 2003**

NATO was not the only international organisation that experienced its first ever crisis response operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first EU mission conducted within the frames of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union's Police Mission (EUPM),

took place in the very same country. Although the decision was made already in March 2002 the EU forces were not deployed before January 2003. The mission is still ongoing. For almost two years SFOR organised Multinational Specialized Units in order to assist EUPM in helping the local authorities develop police forces of their own. SFOR was not, however, mandated to provide direct security to the European Union's mission. Nevertheless, SFOR activities indirectly contributed to the creation of a safe and secure environment. On 23 November 2004 the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution (2004/1575) providing the legal framework for the European Union's *Operation Althea* to act as the successors of the NATO mission. Less than ten days after the adoption, SFOR was ended and the still ongoing Althea was launched with NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe as its commander. In addition the European Union located an operational headquarters (OHQ) to SHAPE. In accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements NATO is providing planning, logistic and command support to the European Union's military forces (EUFOR). NATO is, however, maintaining its presence in the country. Under the command of NATO HQ in Sarajevo (NHQSa) the Alliance is assisting the government and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In addition, NATO forces are carrying out tasks related to counter-terrorism (NATO, 2004a; NATO, 2004b; NATO, 2010d; Rynning, 2005; Rupp, 2006; Lindley-French, 2007; Moore, 2007; Yost, 2007; Yost, 2010; Hitchcock, 2008; Cimbala and Forster, 2010; Goldgeier, 2010; Gyllensporre, 2010).

To summarise, the Bosnian case provides two key areas of cooperation:

- The European Union's police forces complementing NATO military forces in supporting the host nation.
- The European Union taking over responsibility for military operations from NATO and NATO providing support to EU-led military operations.

### **Case 3: Cooperating in Kosovo: June 2008**

In March 2007, the Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), Martti Ahtisaari, presented a proposal for the settlement of Kosovo's future status. The plan was welcomed by the Albanian population in Kosovo but rejected by the Serbian government. Without a mandate from the Security Council, the UNSG asked the European Union, the United States and Russia (the Troika) to try to negotiate an agreement on Kosovo's status. The negotiation was unsuccessful and in December 2007 NATO leaders hence decided to maintain the presence

of NATO forces (KFOR) in Kosovo. The decision was confirmed during the Bucharest Summit in April 2008. On 12 June 2008 allied leaders agreed to initiate the implementation of KFOR's new tasks. Although the tasks focused on assisting the local authorities in establishing the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), they also included coordination with the other international organisations and authorities such as the United Nations and the European Union. The latter had contributed to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with civilian resources for several years and had agreed to take responsibility for the police component of the mission. The European Union had announced its ambition to integrate the countries in the Balkans into the Union already in 2003. The European Commission Liaison Office was established in Kosovo in 2004 in order to support reconstruction and economic development. In 2005 the European Union declared that the Balkan policy also applied to Kosovo. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement, a step to further integrate a potential member into the European Union, was not, however, signed until 2008. The EULEX was decided on 16 February 2008, only one day prior to the declaration of independence. The resources were only deployed, however, in June 2008. EULEX is the largest civilian mission ever to be launched under CSDP. The mission aims to support local authorities in the areas of police, judiciary and customs (Hitchcock, 2008; NATO, 2010a; Cimbala and Forster, 2010; Gyllensporre, 2010).

To summarise, the case of Kosovo provides only one key area of cooperation:

- The European Union's civilian resources complementing NATO military forces in supporting the host nation.

## **Key areas of cooperation**

The structure of this section starts with the task to *provide security* in a high intensive environment. The next subsection focuses on both the *hand over* of military responsibility and the *support* to EU-led operations in a less intensive environment. The third and last subsection focuses on the concurrent *complementing* operations in various intensive environments. Whether the level of intensity is a precondition for the cooperation or not is, however, an empirical question to be analysed. Inter- as well as intra-institutional burden sharing based on the level of conflict is a field of research in itself (see e.g. Rynning, 2005, pp. 151–7 and p. 177; Lindley-French, 2007, p. 105 and pp. 115–7; Moore, 2007,

pp. 88–91; Noetzel and Schreer, 2009; Aybet, 2010, pp. 41–4; Goldgeier, 2010, pp. 14–18; Hallams, 2010, p. 119 and p. 127).

### Providing security

One of the objectives for *Operation Amber Fox* was to provide security for the European Union's monitors operating in Macedonia. The operation was launched on 27 September 2001 and ended 15 December 2002. The highly intensive environment, however, faded off already in late 2001. When the follow on operation, *Allied Harmony*, was launched on 16 December 2002 the stability had improved even further. Hence the focus shifted to a more supportive role (Gazzini, 2003, p. 233).

*Why was NATO action and cooperation with the EU needed?* NATO's interaction with the European Union was, from the political strategic level, not specific since the Alliance cooperated with almost all international actors involved in the initial phases of the crisis management in Macedonia. Since there was no organised cooperation between NATO and the other organisations working in Macedonia, the interaction took place on an ad hoc basis on lower levels than the political strategic (Interview 5). The respondent at the military strategic level gave a similar answer (Interview 6).

The representatives at both Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples and NATO HQ Skopje (NHQSk) argued that since both sides in the conflict had favourable views on NATO it was more or less considered to be an imperative that NATO got involved some way or another. Since both parts also strived for enhanced contact with the European Union the inter-institutional cooperation between the two organisations was, from the host nation's perspective, welcomed. The representatives stressed that the cooperation initially took place on an ad hoc basis but due to the character of individuals and their pragmatic approach it led to the establishment of informal mechanisms (Interviews 13, 14 and 16). One of the JFC representatives had personal experience of serving both in Skopje and Naples. He argued that since NATO's operational level had an interest in the overall developments, and since NATO had the resources needed it made sense to support the European Union's monitors. In the long run the results achieved by the monitors would benefit NATO (Interview 16).

*How was the burden-sharing between NATO and the EU tailored?* There was no organised dialogue on burden-sharing at the political strategic level. Each organisation contributed to the crisis management according

to its own individual considerations and decisions (Interview 5). The respondent at SHAPE gave a similar answer (Interview 6).

One of the JFC representatives mentioned NATO's capability to escort the monitors. He stressed that there were no written instructions on how to interact. The cooperation took place on an ad hoc basis in a pragmatic manner (Interview 16). The representatives in the theatre argued that the conflict intensity, the number of NATO troops involved and the tasks they were given might have been suitable for an EU-instead of an NATO-led operation. Since the European Union, as well as other organisations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations, was already operating in the field, and since it was considered desirable to give NATO a role to play, the burden-sharing between the two organisations was pragmatically arranged (Interviews 13 and 14).

### **Providing support to EU-led military operations**

#### *From conducting Allied Harmony to supporting Concordia*

When NATO terminated *Operation Allied Harmony* in March 2003, the European Union launched a follow-on operation, *Concordia*. When the European Union launched *Operation Concordia* NATO maintained its military presence in Macedonia. The military forces of the two organisations came to operate side-by-side during the nine months (April–December 2003) *Concordia* lasted. Even though *Concordia* was conducted under the Berlin Plus Agreement, in which NATO assets are available to the European Union, there was no formal mandate to interact on the operational level (Gazzini, 2003; Gyllensporre, 2010).

*Why was NATO action and cooperation with the EU needed?* In order to be able to withdraw and redeploy United States' (and NATO's?) forces from Macedonia to the Asian theatre, American officials sought already in 2001 to hand over the responsibilities to the European Union (Gordon, 2001, p. 98). An argument for the hand over in 2003 is that the Berlin Plus agreement had recently been made operational and the Europeans were eager to test the formula in practice (Rupp, 2006, p. 214). Another important argument for the hand over of military authority was the European Union's willingness to assume greater responsibility and to accept higher risks (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, pp. 119–20). The conclusions were supported by NATO representatives (Interviews 4 and 5). From the political strategic level the question of when the hand over should take place was more or less solely related to the willingness of the European Union to take the necessary

political decisions. The major obstacle within NATO itself was Turkey (Interview 5).

The respondent at the military strategic level argued that the reasons are to be found at the political level. The task, collecting arms, was relatively unimportant from a military strategic perspective and could have been given to the OECD as well. Someone at the political level, however, found it appropriate to 'give it to the Europeans', that is the European Union (Interview 6).

One of the JFC respondents recalled that the Berlin Plus Agreement was considered to be important among NATO's European non-EU members. The reason was (and still is?) that the arrangement provided them with influence within the European Union (Interview 15).<sup>2</sup> The other JFC representative argued that the answer is to be found in Brussels at the political level (Interview 16). The respondents at the theatre level argued, on the other hand, that the answer is to be found in the policy of the host nation. Since NATO has decided to remain in Macedonia with an advisory role ('a mission without weapons') the hand over to the European Union of the responsibilities to conduct operations ('a mission with weapons') was viewed as a tool to increase Macedonia's relation with the European Union as well. In addition they argued that the post-conflict role was, and still is, more suitable for the European Union than for NATO (Interviews 13 and 14).

*How was the burden-sharing between NATO and the EU tailored?* Since almost all NATO troops participating in Allied Harmony came from European members, and since these NATO countries in addition were members of the European Union it was relatively easy to change command. In some cases the very same units remained in the area of operations although with an EU badge on the uniforms instead of a NATO badge. In the Macedonian case the participating troops and capabilities came from the same pool of assets and resources. Hence no specific tailoring was necessary from the political strategic point of view (Interview 5).

The respondent at the military strategic level found 'burden-sharing' an inappropriate term since there was no real burden to be shared and since the objective of the European Union presumably was not to offload NATO. The respondent argued that the task could have been given to the police and points to the fact that the European Union replaced *Concordia* with a police force. Since SHAPE 'doesn't deal with police business' there was no military strategic coordination between the two organisations (Interview 5).

One of the JFC representatives stressed the importance of parallel structures. He had personally helped to establish the European Union command element next door to JFC's Joint Operations Center (JOC) in the JFC. He mentioned the sincere will among representatives from both organisations to cooperate and gave an example of how the obstacle with different fire walls in the information systems was managed in a pragmatic manner. He also gave an example of less unproblematic cooperation such as when the European Union asked for helicopter support and NATO was reluctant to provide it. He compared the situation with the experience he had from pure NATO operations and stressed that the situation was not unique. The similar reluctance is to be found within NATO among different troop contributing members (Interview 16). One of the respondents at NHQSk also pointed to the 'shift of badges approach'. A specific tailoring was hence not considered necessary from the operational point of view either. In addition he pointed to the small number of troops involved (Interview 14). Both respondents stressed that since Macedonia was part of the greater (but informal) 'joint operation area Balkans' NATO had plans to support *Concordia* with additional troops if it was considered necessary (Interviews 13 and 14). One of the JFC representatives gave a similar answer and pointed to NHQSk's former role as KFOR-rear (Interview 16).

#### *From conducting SFOR to supporting EUFOR Althea*

In June 2004, at NATO's Istanbul Summit, the members of the Alliance concluded that the improved security situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina enabled the Alliance to hand over the military responsibilities to the European Union. As a result it was decided to bring SFOR to an end. When the European Union launched the still ongoing *Operation Althea* NATO maintained its military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The military forces of the two organisations have been operating side-by-side since December 2004. In contrast to the Macedonian case, NATO is providing support to EUFOR at all levels (NATO, 2010d; Gyllensporre, 2010).

*Why was NATO action and cooperation with the EU needed?* Soon after the terrorist attacks on the 9th of September, Philip Gordon (2001, p. 99) concluded that the Bush administration would try to hand over the operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the European Union while keeping the overarching NATO umbrella for all operations in the Balkans. The administration had, according to Gordon, three arguments. First, the administration sought new principles of burden sharing in which



the United States would take responsibility for major combat operations and the Europeans, preferably the European Union, would take responsibility for peacekeeping. Second, the United States involvement in the Balkans had never gained high support from Capitol Hill. Third, since the ESDP was operational it ought to be put to a test. By maintaining the overall NATO authority one can presume that the administration sought to guarantee that the United States would not lose its influence. The negotiations between NATO and the European Union on replacing SFOR with EUFOR intensified the debate within the Union on transatlantic burden sharing regarding interventions and reconstruction. In addition, the increased willingness of the European Union to accept greater responsibility for European security made the hand over possible (Cimbala and Forster, 2010, 133). Another perspective is that the hand over was motivated by the focus on reconstruction rather than military risks (Rynning, 2005, p. 155 and p. 177). An additional explanation is that the success of the hand over in Macedonia contributed to the eagerness to test the Berlin Plus agreement under more demanding circumstances and with more troops involved (Rupp, 2006, p. 68 and p. 214). Rebecca Moore (2007, pp. 52–3 and p. 105) argues that NATO's success in stabilising Bosnia-Herzegovina was a precondition permitting the hand over from NATO to the European Union.<sup>3</sup> The interviews with representatives at the political strategic level support all these conclusions (Interviews 4 and 5).

The SHAPE respondent argued that the reasons to the hand over to *Althea* are similar to those related to the *Concordia* case: 'get a job at the lower end of the intensity spectrum to the Europeans'. The respondent claimed that the reasons were solely political and the hand over comparable to when the responsibility of a patient is being handed over from the doctor to a nurse after an (surgical) operation (Interview 6).

According to NATO personnel serving at both JFC and NHQSa, the arguments for the cooperation are not to be found at the operational level. Rather NATO is cooperating on the field due to political agreements in Brussels. They interpreted that the hand over of military authority was based solely on political considerations (Interviews 1–3 and 15). Once the politicians had decided that 'the time has come' it was up to the commanders in the theatre to solve all practical implications. The Bosnian hand over had, according to the NHQSa personnel, nothing to do with levels of conflict intensity or the numbers of troops required. Instead it was a question of international leadership and the national interests of the member states. The agreements have some practical impact on the day-to-day activities in the theatre which makes

it logical, also from the theatre level's point of view, to continue the support (Interviews 1 and 3).<sup>4</sup> The respondents at JFC support this view. They argued that the way the tasks are solved might not be the most efficient from an operational perspective, but include some benefits such as cost sharing (Interviews 15 and 16).

*How was the burden-sharing between NATO and the EU tailored?* NATO's mission has a clear liaison and advisory profile. NHQSa is said to complement EUFOR with specific competencies (NATO, 2010d). Since most of the NATO troops came from members that had contributed to the United Nations' forces previous to the IFOR- and SFOR-missions, and since most troop contributing NATO allies in addition are members of the European Union and, more importantly, were going to continue their military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina transfer of authority was more or less an exercise in switching badges on the uniforms. One important aspect was, however, the fact that the less intensive environment made it possible to change the mixture of the forces from heavily mechanised units to light infantry. In addition all combat support and combat service support units were not needed in the operations to be led by the European Union. Hence the tailoring exercise was, from the political strategic point of view, relatively uncomplicated (Interviews 4 and 5).

EUFOR are backed up on a military strategic level by NATO's contingency planning including reinforcements (Petersen et al., 2010, p. 86). The SHAPE respondent supported Petersen's conclusion and pointed out that SHAPE actually is appointed as one of the European Union's potential military strategic headquarters (Interview 6).

One of the JFC representatives stressed that supporting EUFOR is one of the core tasks for the JFC. He pointed to some practical arrangements such as the inclusion of a staff element from the European Union in the JFC and that the Chief of Staff of JFC is Dual hatted and, in addition, the operational commander of EUFOR (Interview 15). The primary role of NHQSa is supporting the Bosnian authorities in defence sector reforms. In practice this is to help them prepare for a NATO membership. The remaining obstacle to taking the final step is related to the ownership of the infrastructure of the Bosnian armed forces. The secondary role of NHQSa is to support EUFOR in, for example, tracing the war criminals. NATO has made a commitment to support EUFOR as long as they are operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once the European Union decides to leave the country there is no reason for NHQSa to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Interview 3). One of the JFC respondents did not agree with the last conclusion. He argued that even if ACO leaves, that is the military

strategic level, the political branch of NATO will always have an interest, and presumably representation, in the country (Interview 15). A practical arrangement between NHQSa and EUFOR has been organised leaving the tactical support to the Bosnian authorities to be provided by EUFOR while NHQSa focuses on policy and conceptual advice at the strategic and operational levels. The arrangement is not a direct support to EUFOR but rather a functional separation in the military support to the host nation (Interviews 1 and 3). When it comes to the direct support NHQSa is primarily supporting EUFOR with information, advice on how to conduct military training programs, communications including the command and control infrastructure, and the running of the camp where EUFOR is based. NATO owns the camp and is the landlord. With this role comes economic responsibility towards civilian contractors and so on. (Interviews 1 and 2). Since NATO was in the theatre first it has turned out to be practical that EUFOR not only took over the authority but almost the entire infrastructure. With this comes, for example, the camp with accommodations and computer facilities. Since NHQSa is the landlord NATO has to remain in the country as long as EUFOR (Interviews 1–3). NATO was, furthermore, initially responsible for counter terrorism activities (Interview 1).

### Functional separation

All the three Balkan cases provide examples of functional separation between the crisis responses of NATO and the European Union. The cases are, however, not similar when it comes to the level of contribution in each function. At the lowest level, as in the second phase in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Macedonia, each of the organisations is/was involved only with *advisory* teams. At the highest level, as in Kosovo, each of the organisations is involved with quite impressive *forces*. The third case, Macedonia, provides an asymmetric example with NATO's advisories and the European Union's forces.

#### *Military and police advisors in Bosnia-Herzegovina*

When the European Union deployed the still ongoing EUPM in January 2003, NATO was still conducting SFOR operations. Since the Alliance has kept its military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the termination of SFOR in December 2004, the two organisations have operated side-by-side for several years (January 2003–), NATO with military forces and advisors and the European Union with police advisors.

*Why is NATO action and cooperation with the EU needed?* The primary role of NATO's continued presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina is assisting

the country in its security sector reforms. One of the major aims of these reforms is to support Bosnia-Herzegovina in meeting the requirements needed to become a full worthy partner within the frames of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. In addition to supporting the host nation NATO still undertakes certain operational tasks including counter terrorism. NATO forces furthermore support the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia by bringing war crimes' suspects to court. The main argument for cooperation with the European Union is said to be related to the needs of intelligence-sharing (NATO, 2010d). Rebecca Moore (2007, p. 110) points at three arguments. The first is to bring Bosnia-Herzegovina into the existing transatlantic security structures, the second to foster regional cooperation and the third to bring all indicted war criminals to court. Neither of the interviews at the political strategic level fully supported the picture of close cooperation between NATO and the European Union regarding the advisory dimension. According to the respondents all cooperation is directed through the established military channels (Interviews 4 and 5).

The SHAPE-representative argued that since EUPM is focusing on police business, and since SHAPE doesn't deal with 'that kind of soft security' the answer to *why* is to be found at the political level. From a SHAPE perspective there is no need of cooperation (Interview 6).

One of the respondents at JFC did not even know that EUPM exists. All cooperation between JFC and the European Union goes through the EU cell at the JFC (Interview 15). NATO personnel in the theatre saw no merits in cooperating with EUPM. All cooperation going on between the two organisations is conducted between NHQSa and EUFOR (Interviews 1 and 2).

*How is/was the burden-sharing between NATO and the EU tailored?* According to personnel serving at NATO International Staff, NATO International Military Staff and SHAPE there is no cooperation going on between NATO and the EUPM. When NATO supports the Bosnian authorities on defence sector reforms, the EUPM provides support in other areas related to the broader security sector reform activities (Interviews 4–6). The SHAPE respondent argued that one reason for the lack of cooperation is that the Berlin Plus Agreement only includes military cooperation (Interview 6).

According to personnel serving at NHQSa the reform activities of the two organisations are not coordinated. Theoretically this might be considered to be a potential problem. Practically the problems are solved case by case in a pragmatic manner between representatives from the

organisations and the host nation (Interviews 1–3). When it comes to bringing war criminals to court NATO initially led the raids with support from EUFOR and not EUPM forces. The tasks were then conducted solely by EUFOR forces. Currently the tasks are carried out by Bosnian authorities with support from EUFOR and/or EUPM forces without the involvement of NATO (Interview 1).

*Military advisors and police forces in Macedonia*

When the European Union terminated *Operation Concordia* the Union shifted focus and launched a police operation, *EUPOL Proxima*, followed by a police mission, *The European Union's Police Advisory Team*. Since the Alliance maintained its military presence in Macedonia after the termination of *Operation Allied Harmony* the two organisations came to operate side-by-side for two and a half year (December 2003 – June 2006), NATO with military advisors and the European Union with police forces.

*Why was NATO action and cooperation with the EU needed?* The purpose of the remaining NATO presence in Macedonia is to support the country's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end, the Alliance has both civilian and military representatives in Macedonia. Their main task is to assist in security sector reform, but also to support the host nation's adaptation to NATO standards (NATO, 2010b). According to NATO representatives at both the political strategic and the military strategic levels the main reason for NATO presence in Macedonia is preparing the country for a NATO membership, not to cooperate with the European Union's police forces or advisors (Interviews 4–6).

Both representatives in the theatre stressed the importance of informal 'security principals forum', that is the informal meetings between representatives from NATO, the European Union, the OSCE and the United States. Even if NATO's role was related solely to the defence sector, the forum strived to coordinate all efforts aiming to improve the overall security environment in Macedonia (Interviews 13 and 14). One of the JFC representatives supported these arguments (Interview 16).

*How was the burden-sharing between NATO and the EU tailored?* None of the respondents at the NATO strategic headquarters in Belgium could recall any cooperation between NATO and the police forces of the European Union in Macedonia. Neither did they see any merit in such cooperation (Interviews 4–6).

Both representatives at NHQSk recalled the cooperation as constructive and unproblematic. The common objective was to harmonise the division

of labour between the Macedonian armed and police forces with the standard of NATO allies. One concrete example is the transfer of authority of border control from the Macedonian army to the Macedonian police. Since both organisations were involved in the transformation they had to cooperate. This was conducted in a pragmatic manner (Interviews 13 and 14). One of the JFC representatives supported these arguments. In addition he stressed the importance of different informal channels. He mentioned several forums arranged on a regular but informal basis: The fact that Skopje is a small town helped, according to the respondent, to establish informal channels for the international representatives to socialise and coordinate business in a pragmatic manner. The *International Spouses Club* is one example of these channels (Interview 16).

#### *Military and legal forces in Kosovo*

When the European Union deployed the still ongoing EULEX in June 2008, NATO forces (KFOR) had been in the country for almost a decade. The two organisations have operated side by side ever since (June 2008 –), NATO with military forces and the European Union with police and other legal forces.

*Why is NATO action and cooperation with the EU needed?* The improved security situation has allowed the Alliance to decrease its military presence in Kosovo. The mandate of KFOR is to cooperate with and assist not only the European Union but the United Nations and all international actors supporting the common goal of a 'stable, democratic, multi ethnic and peaceful Kosovo' (NATO, 2010a). According to the respondents at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels the cooperation between the two organisations is based on the shared understanding that there is a need of military back up in case of a re-escalation of the conflict. The European Union's police resources are, simply put, not enough in case of a higher level of intensity of the conflict (Interviews 4 and 5). The decision to decrease the numbers of NATO troops to approximately 5000 means that they will no longer fulfill an operational role but rather be a deterrent force. This new role can be fulfilled without having the troops deployed to Kosovo (Interview 5). The SHAPE representative argued similarly but with different terms such as 'over-the-horizon-forces' as back up (Interview 6).

One of the JFC respondents stressed that supporting the international community in Kosovo as a whole, and not specifically the European Union, is one of the JFC's core tasks. However, the European Union (EULEX) has implicitly and gradually taken a position as NATO's main

partner in the security sector reform efforts (Interview 15). Several respondents at KFOR HQ argued that the interaction is to be seen as a manifesto of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation the citizens of Kosovo are striving for. They want to be integrated and NATO and the European Union are the two fundamentals of the transatlantic community. The tasks EULEX are fulfilling could otherwise have been left to the United Nations or the OSCE (Interviews 7–11). One important reason for the cooperation was considered to be the need of cost efficiency. The cooperation's potential to be a 'force multiplier' is hence crucial (Interview 8). Another reason is that 'the credibility of both organizations is dependent on success in the theatre. Result is often easier to achieve in cooperation with others than alone' (Interview 9 and 12). Yet another reason is that the United States had decreased its presence in Europe over a long time and that NATO therefore lacks the capability to engage solely on its own. At the same time the European Union lacks some crucial components, especially regarding planning and command structure. The short comings of each of the organisations make it logical for them to cooperate (Interview 11). The national interests of key member states were, finally, considered to be an important aspect (Interview 12).

*How is the burden-sharing between NATO and the EU tailored?* The burden sharing in Kosovo is difficult to evaluate. According to Petersen et al. the NATO and the European Union activities are not coordinated because of 'unrelated political factors that thwart the development' (2010, p. 86). On the next pages, however, the very same authors conclude that the cooperation between NATO and the European Union 'was eventually effective in part because of an early, high level, political agreement on strategic goals and what each agency needed to accomplish' (2010, p. 88). According to the respondents at NATO Headquarters in Brussels there is an agreed procedure:

If there is an incident the Kosovo police are the first responder. The second responder is EULEX and the third responder is KFOR. However, sometimes circumstances demands KFOR to be the first responder. It depends on resources and capabilities but also on geographical aspects. EULEX has, for example, no riot control equipment and Kosovo police are insufficient.

(Interview 5)

The same respondent argued that the next political strategic decision to decrease the numbers of troops (from 5000 to about 2000) should, in

addition, include a hand over of responsibility to the European Union. NATO could, and should, guarantee a military back up with forces deployed in their garrisons (Interview 5).

The respondent at the military strategic level stressed that there is no formal agreement on how to coordinate the strategic efforts of the two organisations. Even if such agreement did exist the coordination at the military strategic level wouldn't be easy to achieve since SHAPE doesn't deal with police business and since the European Union lacks a permanent military strategic headquarters (Interview 6).

One of the JFC respondents stressed the unity of efforts between the two organisations. He considered EULEX as crucial for KFOR's success and 'the ticket home' for NATO's operational forces. He argued that KFOR probably would remain in Kosovo until the mission was completed even if the number of troops gradually decreases. He considered a key aspect of the functional separation to be NATO's manoeuvre forces and their role in more sensitive areas such as Serbian religious places and close to the Serbian border. In addition he stressed the importance of EULEX's role in ensuring the rule of law and fighting corruption (Interview 15). Two of the respondents at KFOR HQ stressed that the role of third responder is more or less a political ideal. The respondents argued that KFOR might very well be the first to manage a situation if the other two forces are not in place. From their point of view there should not be a handover of the military responsibilities to the European Union even if the situation allows it. As long as military presence is considered to be necessary NATO should, according to the respondents, finish the job the Alliance has started (Interviews 7 and 12). The logistical capabilities of KFOR were considered to be crucial not only in order to provide freedom of movement for all security forces in Kosovo, but also at the strategic level. Mutual reinforcement between EUFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo is, for example, dependent on NATO's KFOR-resources. A continued decrease of KFOR's personnel strength will presumably also lead to the withdrawal of some of these strategic combat service support capabilities (Interviews 8 and 10). How the burden sharing is tailored is not always up to the two organisations to decide but to the troop contributing nations as one of the respondents stressed. Semi military forces such as *carabinieri* and *gendermeri* could, for example, be designated both to KFOR and to EULEX. It is, according to the respondent, important to ensure that both forces are considered credible in their own strength. At the same time he argued that if the European Union launched a parallel military mission the cooperation would be much easier since military-to-military coordination could then, for example, be based on established



common procedures (Interview 9). An important aspect of the burden-sharing is the joint exercises between the host nation, the European Union and NATO. The exercises are a preparation for the hand over of responsibilities such as fixed guarding tasks but also for joint actions in case of necessity (Interviews 10 and 12).


## **Conclusions: Policy and pragmatism without strategy**

Why then is NATO considering cooperation with the European Union to be necessary? From the political strategic level the main argument is the option to withdraw American resources and/or to offload certain capabilities that are more urgently needed elsewhere but at the same time to ensure a remaining and overarching role for NATO. The key aspect is hence not the numbers of troops but rather the specific capabilities of the different units.

The military strategic relationship between the two organisations is asymmetric since the European Union has no permanent military strategic headquarters and since SHAPE actually is one of the identified potential headquarters of the Union at this level. The Berlin Plus Agreement seems to be a symbolic product created solely for political reasons but with military strategic implications. Deputy SACEUR personifies the Euro-Atlantic symbiosis but it is questionable if there really is a mutual military strategic cooperation.

The operational relationship between the two organisations seems to be artificial. The respondents at this level could not describe any convincing operational argument for cooperation. Instead the respondents argued that the motives are to be found at the political strategic level of both organisations and, as in the case of Macedonia, within the host nation. In addition the national interests of key members are considered to be a driving force.

How is the cooperation tailored? In case of a hand over of the military responsibility to the European Union, providing a back up force as a strategic reserve is an option that seems to be preferable for the political strategic level. The role as a host to the EU forces creates a dependency in NATO's favour. It might, however, be unfavourable from an economic perspective. It is not NATO but the European Union that strives to integrate the Balkans into the rest of Europe. Hence it is a political strategic symbolic value in the hand over of military responsibility. The hand over process seems to be driven by the political strategic willingness of the European Union. As soon as the European Union is ready to accept the political risks and economic costs that come with leading military



*Figure 5.2* The inter-institutional cooperation in practice: Policy and pragmatism – but no military strategy

operations, NATO seems to be willing to change the guards as long as the political strategic influence of the Alliance is guaranteed. Keeping military presence with advisory teams seems to be the preferred option.

Despite the introduction of a comprehensive approach to crisis management involving several governmental branches, the reluctance of SHAPE to include non-military aspects in its considerations is striking. The police missions of the European Union are hence more or less neglected by NATO's military strategic level. Since the Berlin Plus Agreement solely focuses on military cooperation SHAPE has been provided with an argument to continue its combat oriented approach to the inter-institutional cooperation.

Since the operational level has to live with the strategic realities the cooperation is conducted in a practical and pragmatic manner from case to case. NATO is hereby considered to be a back up or deterrent force for the European Union's missions. When the European Union is conducting a military and a police mission concurrently, NATO operational level cooperates solely with their military counterparts. When the European Union is conducting only a police mission, NATO operational level misses the military-to-military dimension.

The aim of this chapter has been to shed light on the shaping of NATO strategy in the context of inter-institutional cooperation in Europe. The conclusion is that NATO, so far, has neglected the opportunity to use the

experiences from the Balkans in the creation of principles for a *general* exit strategy to be applied where-so-ever in cooperation with whom-so-ever. I am aware of the impact of overlapping strategic cultures in the specific case of inter-institutional cooperation between NATO and the European Union. The European context presumably increases this impact. Nevertheless I argue that NATO ought to explore the merits of inter-institutionalism in non-European contexts and with other regional organisations.

Another conclusion is that when NATO does have a *general* strategy such as Comprehensive Approach (CA) it seems to be neglected in the European context. It is, for example, striking how cooperation with the European Union's police forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina is treated as uninteresting, or even unworthy, for NATO to deal with. Furthermore, despite the impressive work carried out by NATO in the theatre regarding defence sector reforms, the work seems to be uncoordinated, at least at the strategic levels, with the broader security sector reforms carried out by the European Union and other organisations. It might be excessive to accuse CA as being nothing more than an Afghanistan (ISAF-) strategy. It seems, however, difficult to find evidence of it being an approach to be implemented where-so-ever. One can, at a minimum, ask why NATO seems to be both unwilling and unable to implement the guidelines the CA-strategy provides in the Balkan cases.

It is striking that although NATO has been interacting with the European Union for almost a decade none of the key areas of the inter-institutional cooperation is explicitly mentioned in the joint doctrine of the Alliance, approved in late December 2010. Security sector reform, capacity building, interim governance, restoration of essential services and military outreach, that is the five activities mentioned in the doctrine, all fit very well when describing what NATO is doing in the Balkans regarding the bilateral relation with each of the host nations. *Providing security* to another organisation (read the European Union), *handing over* military responsibility and thereafter *supporting* a military operation led by another organisation, and *complementing* the activities of another organisation seem to have vanished from the agenda. Berlin Plus seems, in other words, to be nothing more than an idealistic vision without intention to have any impacts, whatsoever, on the theatre of operations.

## Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to all respondents for most interesting discussions. I am, in addition, sincerely thankful for all support provided by (in alphabetical order) Marko Cehovin (Skopje), Trond Arve

Fjell (Mons), Hallgeir Hagen (Pristina), Geir Holmen (Naples), Ragnhild Hustad (Brussels), Jan Morten Karlsen (Brussels), Jan Inge Markerud (Sarajevo) and Vanja Matic (Sarajevo).

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## Interviews (in chronological order)

### *NATO Headquarters Sarajevo (NHQSa), October 2010*

#### Interview 1:

Mr Rohan Maxwell, Chief Politico Military Section and Lt Col (German Army) Heiko Hoffman, Chief Planning Section, NATO Advisory Team (13 October 2010).

#### Interview 2:

Lt Cdr (United States' Navy) Scott Chappelka, Deputy Chief J2, Lt Col (United States' Army) José Rivera, Chief J4, Lt Col (Spanish Army) Enrique Viladeamigo, Chief J5, and Capt (United States' Air Force), Lewis Sorvillo, Deputy Chief J6 (13 October 2010).

Interview 3:

Col (Norwegian Air Force) John Olsen, Deputy Commander (13 and 14 October 2010).

*NATO HQ, Brussels, December 2010*

Interview 4:

Col (Danish Army) Per Mikkelsen, International Military Staff (IMS), Operational Plans Branch, Operations Division (7 December 2010).

Interview 5:

Mr Erik Sandahl, International Staff (IS), Operations Section, Operations Division (7 December 2010).

*SHAPE/ACO, Mons, December 2010*

Interview 6:

Anonymous respondent (9 December 2010).

*KFOR Headquarters Pristina, December 2010*

Interview 7:

Anonymous respondent (16 December 2010).

Interview 8:

Col (Slovenian Army) Robert Sipeč, Chief J4 (16 December 2010).

Interview 9:

Col (Turkish Army) Kazım Dalkıran, Chief J3 (17 December 2010).

Interview 10:

Brigadier General (United States' Army) Wilton S. Gorske, Chief of Staff (17 December 2010).

Interview 11:

Col (Albanian Army) Bardhyl Hoxha, Chief J6 (17 December 2010).

Interview 12:

Col (Austrian Army) Christian Riener, Chief J5 (17 December 2010).

*NATO Headquarters Skopje (NHQSk), January 2011*

Interview 13:

Mr Valentin Dinevski, NATO Advisory Team Skopje (18 January 2011).

Interview 14:

Brigadier General David Humar (Slovenian Army), Commander (19 January 2011).

*Joint Forces Command Headquarters Naples (JFC), January 2011*

Interview 15:

Lt Col (Norwegian Army) Bård Ravn, Balkans Team Head, Joint Assessment Branch (26 January 2011).

Interview 16:

Mr Mark Sellers, Balkan advisor (26 January 2011).

## Notes

1. In addition there has been cooperation between NATO and the European Union outside Europe, for example in Darfur, the Gulf of Aden and Afghanistan (Yost (2010)). This chapter focuses, however, solely on the inter-institutional cooperation between the two organisations in the Balkans.
2. Similar argument was used by other respondents although not on a direct question regarding the case of Macedonia (Interviews 9 and 11).
3. Jamie Shea argues, regarding the case of Afghanistan, that the European Union and other organisations should be 'ready and able to push ahead with governance and reconstruction as soon as NATO has stabilized the security environment' (Shea (2010, p. 24)).
4. Several of the respondents informed that informal discussions within NATO indicated that in the case of a potential take over in Kosovo it actually is a question of numbers. The appropriate number for an EU take over is considered to be just below 5000 troops. It is interesting to note that this was not confirmed from personnel actually serving in Kosovo or at the JFC.

# 6

## The Forgotten Dimension? NATO and the Security of the Member States

*Magnus Petersson*

### Introduction

In October 2008, *The Telegraph* 'revealed' that NATO's Supreme Commander, General John Craddock, had asked for the authority to draw up contingency defence plans for former Soviet bloc NATO allies in Central and Eastern Europe (McElroy, 2008). Why was not that already done? The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had then been members for almost ten years, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Rumania for almost five. Had NATO 'forgotten' its most central task – to guarantee all the member states territorial integrity – after the Cold War? Had a whole dimension of the Alliance's strategic and operational mission been lost in all the 'out-of-area' operations that had been conducted in the Balkans, in Africa and in Asia? The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise that issue.

During the Cold War, the initiation of strategy changes within NATO was – in principal – a top-down process, that is the politicians initiated, after negotiation, a new over all strategic concept (that is policy level), which was converted into strategic guidance by the military authorities on the strategic level and implemented on the operational level. The making of strategy in practice was also relatively logically consistent, that is the interaction between the political, strategic and operational level was rather hierarchical and followed a predetermined pattern (Wenger, 2006). In sum the making of NATO's strategy during the Cold War came quite close to the rationalist ideal that, for example, Richard Betts argues for:

If effective military strategy is to be real rather than illusory, one must be able to devise a rational scheme to achieve an objective



through combat or the threat of it; implement the scheme with forces; keep the plan working in the face of enemy reactions (which should be anticipated in the plan); and achieve something close to the objective.

(Betts, 2000, p. 6)

Betts demands a hierarchy of policy, strategy and operations: 'the logic at each level is supposed to govern the one below and serve the one above'. 'Strategy fails', he writes, 'when some link in the planned chain of cause and effect from low-level tactics to high-level political outcomes is broken, when military objectives come to be pursued for their own sake without reference to their political effect, or when policy initiatives depend on military options that are infeasible'. If there is no logical consistence between the levels, ultimately between political ends and military means, we cannot argue that we have a strategy to do (Betts, 2000, pp. 6–7).


However, as Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre suggest in the introduction of this volume, this rationalist ideal view of the making of strategy has in many ways been questioned after the Cold War, and perhaps especially after the 11 September 2001. Or, to put it in another way as Hew Strahan has done, the operational level of war has moved into the space 'created by the absence of strategy': 'the operational level of war is hijacking its political direction' (Strahan, 2010, pp. 164 and 170).

It can, in sum, be argued that the development of strategy after the Cold War, in general, has been initiated by the operational level rather than the political strategic level, and that the interaction between the levels has been quite logically inconsistent. It seems like the making of strategy has *not* been strictly hierarchical and followed a predetermined pattern.

The differences between the Cold War situation and the post Cold War situation can, thereby and somewhat exaggeratedly, be illustrated as in Figure 6.1.

If this is a correct observation, what does it mean for the making of strategy in general, for the concept of strategy in particular? Is strategy an illusion then, as Betts asks himself (Betts, 2000), or has the making of strategy just changed form? I intend to touch upon that wider issue as well, when analysing NATO's strategy for 'homeland defence' after the end of the Cold War in this chapter.

First of all I will try to identify to what extent strategic guidance for 'homeland defence' has been given after the end of the Cold War and



*Figure 6.1* The level of initiation (Bottom-up–Top-down) and the logic of interaction between levels (Inconsistence–Consistence) in the making of strategy during and after the Cold War

how that strategic guidance has materialised in terms of operational plans, or more general action, on the operational level. Second, I will discuss whether the strategic guidance, or the elements of it, has been initiated mainly from below (bottom-up) or from above (top-down), and how logically consistent the interaction between the political, strategic and operational level has been, compared to Betts's rational ideal type of the making of strategy. Third, and perhaps most importantly, I will try to estimate to what degree NATO has had a strategy for homeland defence after the Cold War.

## Homeland defence after the Cold War

In order to identify NATO's approach to homeland defence after the Cold War, the focus of the analysis will be both on the declaratory level and on the operational level. Such a distinction is, according to Mats Berdal – writing in the tradition of Paul Nitze and David Alan Rosenberg – 'central' to a more complete understanding of strategy (Berdal, 1997, p. xvi). In this subchapter I will therefore start with an analysis of the declaratory dimension, that is the level of politically agreed strategic concepts. After that I will scrutinise the operational dimension, that is, the level of operational plans and action.

*On the declaratory level* NATO has developed three strategic concepts since the end of the Cold War: the 1991 concept, the 1999 concept

and the 2010 concept (NATO, 1991; NATO, 1999; NATO, 2010). All three concepts were of course created in their special contexts, which is important to bear in mind. The first concept, Gülnur Aybet argues, mirrored 'the extension of the Western security community's liberal norms to the post-communist space in Central and Eastern Europe' and the second 'the Western security community's leadership in championing an international system of collective security' (Aybet, 2010, p. 35).

The 2010 strategic concept, finally, 'conveys' – as Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning put it – 'a collective intention to push NATO further in the direction of global engagement:' 'NATO is becoming more global and more political and concomitantly it is becoming less confined by regional and military considerations' (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2011, p. 7).

With that in mind, it is not surprising that the development of NATO's strategic concepts over the past 20 years contains fewer and fewer geographical limitations, and more and more diffuse tasks. It is, however, fair to argue that all three concepts attach great importance to homeland defence – at least on paper.

In the 1991 concept it was clearly stated that '[a]ny armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty', and that '[t]he primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged' (NATO 1991, paragraphs 12 and 40).

In the 1999 concept it was, in a similar way, stated that a 'fundamental' security task is to 'deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO allies as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty' (NATO, 1999, paragraph 10), that '[a]ny armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty' (NATO, 1999, paragraph 24), and that:

[t]he primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and – in case of conflict – to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw.

(NATO, 1999, paragraph 47)

In the 2010 concept, finally, it was stated that '[t]he primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states', and that '[t]he greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty' (NATO, 2010, paragraphs 4 and 16).

To sum up the declaratory level, it is reasonable to argue that the focus on military threats, territorial defence and geography has been continuously downplayed in NATO's strategic concepts since the end of the Cold War, and that a 'political approach' to security, a greater ability to conduct crisis management and to defend values (rather than territory) have received greater attention. In the last paragraph of the 2010 concept it is, for example, argued in the following way:

Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

(NATO, 2010, paragraph 38)

As Ringsmose and Rynning elegantly put it: 'This is not an alliance focused on Europe or the Euro-Atlantic area; nor is it a global alliance because it remains Atlantic and invokes global threats and issues in relation to its own security; it is rather an Atlantic Alliance focused on the globe' (Ringsmose and Rynning, 2011, p. 8).

However, as the analysis above shows, NATO's focus on homeland defence and territorial integrity of the member states has at the same time been *permanently and strongly underscored* at the declaratory level in every strategic concept since the end of the Cold War. It can therefore be concluded that strategic guidance from the political level for 'homeland defence' to a large extent has been supplied after the end of the Cold War.

*On the operational level*, it is well known that NATO has conducted a number of 'out of area' operations after the Cold War. In fact, it can be argued that these operations, especially the operations in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, to a large extent have shaped the development of NATO over the last 20 years (Sperling and Webber, 2009). The Alliance has been 'driven by its missions', Aybet argues, 'and less so by a grand strategy' (Aybet, 2010, p. 35).

NATO's focus on 'out of area' at the expense of 'in area' has also been criticised by several of NATO's members, by scholars and by practitioners. It can, as a matter of fact, be argued that the 'imbalance' between missions 'home' and 'away' was one of the most important issues that triggered NATO's development of the 2010 strategic concept (Coker, 2008; Hamilton et al., 2009; NATO, 2020; Fedyszyn, 2010).

Somewhat surprisingly, against this background, the lack of 'homeland defence' has been scarcely debated after the Cold War – especially if compared to the presence of 'out of area' operations – and the scarce debate has not focused on conventional defence of the territories of the member states.

It can, on the contrary, be argued that the two main issues of the discussion on NATO's 'homeland defence' has been missile defence and – especially after September 11 – civil emergency response. The former issue has, 'as always', been part of the larger strategic debate on how to balance strategic threats against the Alliance, and it has not, because of that, had so much to say about the defence of the individual member states, but rather concerns the wider defence of the Alliance (Rafferty, 2004; Yost, 2010).

The latter issue, on the other hand, has had its focus on the defence of the individual member states as such, but it has been quite vague and concerned with problems that NATO traditionally has not been supposed to solve, such as protection against terrorism, illegal immigration, trafficking, organised crime and pollution. The will to make civil emergencies a prioritised NATO topic has been lacking and common approaches have been rare. The most obvious sub-issue in that category, that can be said to fall within NATO's traditional core competence and mandate, is readiness for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks (Quentin, 2004; Moodie et al., 2007; Williams, 2009).

What is not so well known, however, or at least has not been central in the debate about NATO, is the not so few operations that the Alliance has conducted for the purpose of homeland defence since the end of the Cold War. Table 6.1 below – which is not exhaustive – gives an overview of the major operations.

As is evident in the table, most of the operations have been conducted from the air by NATO's Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. And there are several more minor operations of that kind, especially since 11 September 2001, than is shown in the table. For example, NATO AWACS aircraft regularly give surveillance support in connection with major NATO summits, but also at other 'high risk' events in member countries on request of national governments. In addition to the examples listed in the table, NATO AWACS aircraft

operated during, for example, the 'Euro 2004' European football championships in Portugal, an international summit on democracy, terrorism and security in Madrid in March 2004, the wedding of Crown Prince Felipe in Madrid in May 2004, and the Pope's visit to Poland in 2006 (NATO, 2005b; NATO 2006b).

However, for the purposes of this chapter – that is to characterise NATO's strategy of homeland defence after the Cold War in general and to scrutinise the relation between the political, strategic, and operational levels in particular – it is of interest to give some additional information regarding the major homeland defence operations listed in the table.

*Operation Anchor Guard* was conducted after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. NATO decided to protect its southern flank and to respond to any further developments. AWACS aircraft from NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF) deployed to eastern Turkey in order to help reinforce NATO's southern flank during the war. Their mission included monitoring air and sea traffic in the eastern Mediterranean and providing airborne surveillance along the Iraqi-Turkish border. The operation triggered an open discussion about NATO 'out of area' operations, for years a taboo within NATO (Dennis, 2008; NATO, 2011a; Veltri, 2004).

*Operation Ace Guard*, effectuated in the same context, was conducted on the request of the Turkish government to meet the threat posed by Iraq during the First Gulf Crisis/War. On the 2 January 1991, NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC), a political body on the same level as the North Atlantic Council (NAC), decided to deploy the air component of the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) to southeast Turkey 'to demonstrate the collective solidarity and determination of the Alliance in the face of any potential threat to allied territory and thus contribute to deterrence and defense'. Never before had the AMF been deployed for reasons different from training (NATO, 2011a).

*Operation Anchor Guard* and *Operation Ace Guard* are sometimes – together with all the action taken by NATO during the crisis – lumped together as *Operation Southern Guard*. The operation(s) was coordinated by Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, and involved a majority of the NATO allies (Veltri, 2004).

*Operation Agile Genie* was another 'homeland defence' operation that was conducted approximately a year after the First Gulf Crisis/War. After the United Nations Security Council had imposed sanctions, designed to induce Libya to surrender suspects in the bombing of a Pan Am airliner over the town of Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988, NATO provided increased AWACS coverage of the Central Mediterranean to monitor air

Table 6.1 NATO's major 'homeland defense' operations after the Cold War

Name	Content	Extension
<i>Anchor Guard</i>	To monitor the crisis and provide coverage of south-eastern Turkey in case of an Iraqi attack during the first Gulf Crisis/War.	10 Aug. 1990 – 9 March 1991
<i>Ace Guard</i>	To meet the threat posed by Iraq during the first Gulf Crisis/War, NATO deployed the ACE Mobile Force (Air) and air defense packages to Turkey.	3 Jan. 1991 – 8 March 1991
<i>Agile Genie</i>	To monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral during a period of growing Western tension with Libya.	1 May 1992 – 19 May 1992
<i>Eagle Assist</i>	To defend the airspace of the United States and prevent further attacks like those of 11 September.	9 Oct. 2001 – 15 May 2002
<i>Active Endeavour</i>	To provide a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate resolve during the crisis after the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001.	26 Oct. 2001 – on-going
<i>Display Deterrence</i>	To enhance the defense of Turkey during the second Gulf Conflict.	20 Feb. 2003 – 16 April 2003
<i>Distinguished Games</i>	To provided assistance to the Olympic and Paralympic Games held in Athens on 13–29 August and 17–28 September 2004.	18 June 2004 – 29 Sep. 2004
No operation name	To provide the United States with food, medical and logistics supplies and assistance in moving these supplies to the stricken areas after Hurricane Katrina.	9 Sep. 2005 – 2 Oct. 2005
No operation name	To provide air security support during the Turin Winter Olympics.	10 Feb. 2006 – 26 Feb. 2006
No operation name	To provide air security support during the FIFA World Cup in Germany.	7 June 2006 – 9 July 2006
No operation name	To assure the security of the Riga Summit.	22 Aug. 2006 – 29 Nov. 2006

Sources: NATO, 2006b; NATO, 2011a.

approach routes against NATO territory from the North African littoral. NATO AWACS aircraft flew a total of 36 missions with a total of 2336 flying hours (NATO, 2011a).

*Operation Eagle Assist*, almost ten years after *Operation Agile Genie*, was a consequence of the NAC's 4 October decision to take measures to operationalise Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time, following the 11 September terrorist attacks against the United States. On the day after the terrorist attacks the NAC decided that if the attack had been perpetrated from abroad, it would be considered an act covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The NAC confirmed this declaration on 2 October 2001. It was NATO's first direct support of operations in the continental United States, and NATO provided five aircraft from NAEW&CF to support the United States' *Operation Noble Eagle* to defend American airspace and prevent further attacks like those of 11 September. During more than seven months, more than 800 crew members from 13 NATO countries patrolled American skies in the NATO E-3A in 447 sorties with a total of 4719 flying hours (NATO, 2002; NATO, 2011a).

*Operation Active Endeavour* is NATO's only ongoing article 5 operation initiated as support to the United States immediately after 9/11 together with *Operation Eagle Assist*. On 3 October 2001, the United States requested that NATO provide a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate resolve during the crisis. The NAC agreed on 4 October, and on 26 October naval patrols in the Eastern Mediterranean began. Subsequent revisions to the plan included providing escorts to Allied shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar, conducting Mine Counter Measures (MCM) route surveys in defined areas and ports, boarding suspect vessels and extending the scope of the operation from the Eastern Mediterranean to the entire Mediterranean. The operation is under command of Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples, and conducted from the Allies Maritime Component Command Naples (CC-Mar Naples) through a task force, Task Force Endeavour. NATO forces have hailed over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded over 150 suspect ships during the operation (Cesaretti, 2005; NATO, 2011a; NATO, 2011b).

*Operation Display Deterrence* was conducted on request of the Turkish government during the second Gulf Conflict, when several of NATO's great power members could not agree on how to act against Iraq. Several scholars have described the heated atmosphere that created serious tensions between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and France and Germany on the other, that made the United States' Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, talk about 'New Europe' and 'Old Europe' (see, e.g., Moore, 2007).



In the end NATO deployed surveillance aircraft and missile defences to help protect Turkey in the event of an attack on its territory or population. NATO's Integrated Air Defense System in Turkey was put on full alert and augmented with equipment and personnel from other NATO commands and nations. Four NATO AWACS were deployed from their home base in Gelsenkirchen, Germany, to the Forward Operating Base in Konya, Turkey. Their mission was to monitor Turkish airspace and provide early warning for defensive purposes. The aircraft flew close to 100 missions and more than 950 hours. In addition, three Dutch ground-based air defence batteries were deployed to south-eastern Turkey. The main task of the batteries was to protect Turkish territory from possible attacks with tactical ballistic missiles. Preparations were also made to augment Turkey's air defence assets with additional aircraft from other NATO countries in the event that this would be required. Finally, equipment and material for protection from the effects of chemical and biological attack was offered by several NATO countries (NATO, 2003a; NATO, 2003b; NATO, 2011c).

Then the pattern changes, in a way. *Operation Distinguished Games*, in connection with the Athens Summer Olympics in 2004, was conducted on request of the Greek government. It can be argued that the new pattern was that NATO allies requested, and NATO operations included, territorial defence against internal – rather than external – threats.

The NAC, however, responded positively to the Greek request, and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was, as the strategic commander, authorised to execute NATO's assistance. The assistance consisted of a standby rapid reaction force, coastal security elements, intelligence support, provision of CBRN defence assets, and aircraft from the NAEW&CF. According to NATO, this was the first operation in which non-Article 4 or 5 assistance was provided within the borders of a member nation (Leibstone, 2004; 'NATO Assistance to Greece', 2004; Quentin, 2004; NATO, 2011a).

The operation in connection with *Hurricane Katrina*, another example of a response to an internal threat, was conducted on request of the United States' government on 4 September 2005. Food, bottled water, water purification units, tents and camp beds, generators, water pumps, ships, helicopters, financial contributions, forensic teams, medical support and logistical support was required. NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) coordinated the response to this request. Almost 40 NATO allies and partner countries offered assistance to the United States. On 9 September, the NAC approved a NATO transport operation to help move donations from Europe to the United

States. From 12 September to 2 October, 12 NATO flights delivered almost 189 tons of relief goods. A NATO liaison officer was dispatched to Washington to work with the United States' authorities, in particular the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to coordinate the assistance. With the completion of the NATO air transport operation on 2 October 2005 all donations accepted by the United States' authorities had been delivered, and the operation was suspended (NATO, 2005a; NATO, 2008; NATO, 2011a).

The operations in connection with the *Turin Winter Olympics* and the *FIFA World Cup* in Germany, as a third example of a response to an internal threat, were conducted on request of the Italian and German governments respectively. In the first case two aircraft from the NAEW&CF assisted Italian authorities in enhancing the air surveillance capability by providing additional radar coverage and communications facilities, and in the second case aircraft from the NAEW&CF Force provided airspace surveillance support. The Force Components carried out the mission from their main operating bases at Gelsenkirchen (Germany) and Waddington (the United Kingdom), respectively (NATO, 2006b; NATO, 2006a).

The operation in connection with the *Riga Summit*, lastly, was conducted on request of the Latvian government. NATO provided technical security, CBRN response capabilities, air and sea policing, improvised explosive device (IED) detections, communications and information systems and medical evacuation support (NATO, 2011a).

To summarise the action taken on the operational level, it can be argued that NATO has had some – one might say a lot of – focus on 'homeland defence' after the end of the Cold War, and contributed with what has been seen as suitable means when the member states have requested it. The changing character of 'homeland defence' operations over time is also quite evident. In the operations conducted after 2003, the threat against the NATO territory has not been perceived to come mainly from the outside of the territory, but rather from the inside. 'Homeland Defense', as François Quentin argues, 'means less ground defense and more security against asymmetrical threats, like terrorism' (Quentin, 2004, p. 245).

I will now go over to the second part of the chapter and discuss, more systematically, whether the strategic guidance, or elements of it, has been initiated mainly from below (bottom-up) or above (top-down), and how logically consistent the interaction between the political strategic, military strategic and operational level has been, compared to the rational ideal type of the making of strategy.

## Level of initiation and logic of interaction

When aggregating the 'data' from the declaratory level and the operational level the picture is quite clear. NATO 'homeland defence' after the end of the Cold War has been done by the book, that is, in accordance with the rationalist ideal type suggested by Betts: The initiation has come from above – that is 'top-down' – and there has been a high degree of logical consistence between the political strategic, military strategic and operational levels.

*First* of all there is no doubt that there has been quite clear and quite a lot of general strategic guidance for 'homeland defence' in all of NATO's strategic concepts after the end of the Cold War. That means that the initiation of strategic guidance has mainly emerged from the political level.

*Second*, and more specifically, regarding strategic guidance for operations conducted for the security of the member states, it is as clear that the guidance has been initiated from above. In most of the cases, individual member countries have requested NATO's support for homeland defence, the DPC or the NAC has dealt with the request and provided strategic guidance, which in turn has been effectuated by NATO's military authorities.

*Operation Display Deterrence* in 2003, for example, was requested by the Turkish government that had invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was authorised by NATO's DPC. The operation was conducted under the overall command of the SACEUR and run by NATO's regional headquarters Southern Europe (NATO, 2011c).

*Operation Distinguished Games*, as another example, was, as mentioned above, initiated from a member state (Greece). The NAC formally agreed to respond positively to the Greek request, and the SACEUR was authorised to execute the assistance as the strategic commander in coordination with the Greek authorities ('NATO Assistance to Greece', 2004).

*Third*, there are no signs at all of inconsistency regarding the logic between the political, strategic and operational levels. To paraphrase Betts, the logic at each level seems to have governed the one below and served the one above, that is, the interaction between the political strategic, military strategic and operational levels seems to have been quite hierarchical and followed a predetermined pattern.

In terms of Figure 6.1 above, it can be argued that the making of strategy for 'homeland defence' has not moved to the lower left corner in the figure as 'predicted', but stayed in the upper right corner of the figure just as during the Cold War, which can be illustrated in the following way as in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2 The level of initiation (Bottom-up–Top-down) and the logic of interaction between levels (Inconsistence–Consistence) in the making of NATO strategy for ‘homeland defence’ during and after the Cold War

Of course that does not mean that the making of strategy for everything else than homeland defence follows the same pattern that it did during the Cold War, quite the reverse. ‘Operational art’, Strahan argues, ‘has been stretched hither and yon because it is not contained by a sure grasp of the relationship between war and policy, and by proper structures to debate and guide strategy’ (Strahan, 2010, p. 177).

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that the initiation of a strategy for NATO homeland defence has come from above and that there has been a high degree of logical consistence between the political strategic, military strategic and operational levels does not necessarily mean that NATO has had a *sufficient* strategy for homeland defence after the end of the Cold War.

### A strategy for ‘homeland defence’?

As already has been mentioned there are many indicators that show that NATO’s strategy for ‘homeland defence’ after the Cold War has not been sufficient. Several of the member states have argued that the focus on ‘out of area’ operations has changed the character of the Alliance and made Article 5 less trustworthy.

Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, two scholars that have studied the development of NATO’s internal cohesion in depth, have argued that NATO is an alliance with ‘at least three constitutive tiers’, and that one of

the tiers, the 'neo-traditionalist' tier, that consists of member states such as Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic and Norway, advocates a refocus on NATO's classical tasks, that is 'collective defence', and 'providing protection against Russia' (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009, p. 540).

The obvious lack of contingency planning for some of these states – at least until 2010 – in spite of the fact that several of them seem to have formally demanded such planning, is not a sign of sufficient strategic planning for 'homeland defence' after the end of the Cold War. According to articles in the press in 2009–10 there were complaints within the Alliance that members such as Germany and Italy were 'blocking attempts to draw up formal contingency plans for all its members', and that the United States perceived the German attitude to such planning as 'counterproductive and unnecessary' (The Economist, 2009; Demmer and Neukirch, 2010).

The lack of planning has also given rise to explicit frustration from Polish, Czech and Bulgarian representatives. According to Alan Hester and Paul E. Bauman, the Polish ambassador to the United States in November 2009 'emphasized that NATO planning had grown stale in the aftermath of the Cold War', and that the contingency plans required 'much updating for current European circumstances'. Furthermore, the former Bulgarian defence minister, Boyko Noev, claimed that '[w]e don't have contingency planning. Lack of planning at the Alliance level doesn't give Bulgarian planners the information needed for them to plan, such as what forces would be available and when' (Hester and Bauman, 2010, p. 27).

Is sum, it can thus be argued that NATO has had a strategy for 'homeland defence' after the end of the Cold War, but an insufficient strategy, according to several of the member states. What that means, in a wider sense, is hard to tell, but it is – that seems to be sure – creating tensions within the Alliance. It might indicate that the strategic guidance for 'homeland defence' is insufficient because it is too vague and high flying (that is the strategic guidance received by the strategic concepts). It seems that several of the actors and scholars for a long time now have been demanding more concrete strategic guidance on a lower level.

## Conclusions

In this chapter NATO and the security of the member states has been in focus. In the first part I tried to identify to what extent strategic guidance for 'homeland defence' has existed after the end of the Cold War on the declaratory level, and how that strategic guidance had

materialised in terms of operational plans – or more general action – on the operational level.

The result was that there exists quite clear formulated strategic guidance in all the strategic concepts that NATO has developed after the end of the Cold War. Several ‘homeland defence’ operations after the Cold War also clearly indicate that NATO has had focus on the direct security of the member states during the period. NATO has contributed with what has been perceived suitable means when member states have requested it.

In the second part I discussed whether the strategic guidance regarding ‘homeland defence’ had been initiated mainly from below (bottom-up) or above (top-down), and how logically consistent the interaction between the political strategic, military strategic and operational levels had been, compared to the rational ideal type of the making of strategy (that is top-down and high degree of logical consistence). The result was, somewhat surprisingly, that the making of strategy regarding ‘homeland defence’ was similar to the ideal type of the making of strategy and, thus, quite similar to the situation during the Cold War.

In the third part I tried to estimate to what degree NATO has had a *sufficient* strategy for ‘homeland defence’ after the Cold War. The result is that it is not necessarily the case. Several of NATO’s member states – such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic States – seem to be frustrated by the ‘insufficient’ focus on ‘homeland defence’ and there was no, or at least only limited, contingency planning connected to several of these states until 2010.

Finally, in the introduction, I proposed, provocatively, the question of whether NATO had forgotten its most central task – to guarantee all the member states territorial integrity – after the Cold War, and if a whole dimension of the Alliance’s strategy had been lost in all the ‘out-of-area’ operations that had been conducted since then. That is not the case. NATO has not forgotten a whole dimension and there is a strategy for ‘homeland defence’. The important question is rather if the strategy is sufficient. There are different opinions about that, but that is – perhaps – quite normal in an alliance of 28 members that do not share the same threat perception and have different views of what the Alliance should do and be.

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# 7

## The Evolution of NATO's Strategy in Afghanistan

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### Introduction

Common wisdom has it that the Atlantic Alliance can hardly succeed in Afghanistan. It has too few troops to man the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Afghan government is too inefficient to provide good governance, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are too corrupt to take over responsibility once ISAF switches to a supporting role, allies are too tired to continue the war effort. And the list goes on.

Implicit in this pessimistic assessment is the assumption that NATO's 'strategy' – defined here as the 'the bridge between military power and political purpose' (Gray, 2006, p. 1) – in Afghanistan has failed, is failing or is bound to fail. Yet, reaching definite conclusions about this critical issue is a hazardous task. Specifically, since the operation is still ongoing at the time this article is written. Based on open sources, academic accounts and evaluations of the ISAF operation such as this one are prone to disregard some important data, particularly when it comes to strategic and operational planning of the military campaign. Thus, any analysis of NATO's strategy in Afghanistan can only be preliminarily based on selective evidence available to date. Nevertheless, a study on NATO's strategy making capability in what is arguably its most important operation since the Cold War can provide some important insights into the debate.

Important scholarly work has already been done on this issue. For example, Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell have looked at the progress and limitations in NATO's approach to the Afghanistan operation between 2009 and 2011 (Chaudhuri and Farrell, 2011). A study by James Sperling and Mark Webber examines the ability of NATO to

adapt to the changing realities on the ground until 2009 (Sperling and Webber, 2009). Former Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) General Stanley McChrystal's *Initial Assessment* of the campaign in 2009 (McChrystal, 2009) did a great service in identifying some of the key weaknesses in NATO's strategy.

This chapter aims to provide a new perspective to the critical issue of NATO's strategy in Afghanistan by not only providing a detailed account of the developments on the political strategic, the operational and the tactical levels of strategy. It will also situate the ISAF operation in the broader context of the changing nature of the alliance after the Cold War. The assumption here is that NATO's ability to 'make strategy' in Afghanistan has been as much shaped by the particular conditions in the Afghan theatre of operations as it has been determined by the transformation of NATO towards a global security actor focusing on crisis management operations. While in many ways a logical adjustment to the changing strategic environment, a greater emphasis on crisis management operations under Article 4 of the 'Washington Treaty' has also led to a rather fragmented commitment of NATO allies to operations which are not regarded as existential to their security. In turn, this structural characteristic of a rather 'polycentric' alliance has had significant implications for NATO's strategy making in Afghanistan.

In fact, the ISAF operation is a good example of the development identified by Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre in the introduction to this book (and also picked up by Magnus Petersson in his chapter of this volume). Unlike the ideal way of making strategy which follows a consistent, top-down logic between the levels of strategy, they point out that the development of strategy in modern times often has not followed this path. Instead, strategy often has been 'done' at the operational level of war and has worked its way up to the political strategic arena. This logic runs counter to the classical arguments made by strategists such as Richard Betts, who argues that strategy is bound to fail if there is a disconnect between the hierarchical levels of strategy (Betts, 2000). Colin Gray also underscores that while the relationship between the military and political levels of strategy can be seen as a 'two way street', the political level must dominate (Gray, 2006, p. 1). The chapter will examine how these dynamics played out in the context of NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

The chapter will proceed in four broad steps. The first part will set the overarching political framework within which NATO operates today. That is to say, even strategy making for an operation as important as Afghanistan is to a considerable degree shaped by the current overall

nature of the Atlantic alliance. The second part analyses the evolution of NATO strategy for ISAF between 2001 and 2008. This period saw a significant gap between the political strategic, the operational, and the tactical level. The third part then looks at the time between 2008 and 2011. In 2009, allies agreed to adjust ISAF strategy and threw some political weight around the notion of 'turning the ship around'. The goal is to examine if some of the strategy making problems that existed before 2009 were addressed effectively. The fourth and final part concludes by identifying some of the lessons learned for NATO's future strategy making.

### **Making strategy in a 'fragmented' alliance**

According to NATO's Guidelines of Operational Planning (GOP) of 2005, the use of force requires a clear, established hierarchy between the levels of strategy. And it is made clear that the making of strategy starts at the alliance's highest political body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC):

Before designing an operation or campaign, it is necessary to clearly identify the desired end-state of the Alliance [...] The alliance's end-state is established by the NAC, based on advice from the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) and the relevant NATO Senior Committees prior to the initiation of operational planning.

(NATO, 2005, pp. 3–6)

At first glance, it seems evident that NATO's ISAF operation fulfilled this criterion. After all, as will be shown, the NAC defined an 'end-state' for the different phases of the operation. However, the strategy making process for the ISAF mission can only be fully understood when seen through the evolution of the Atlantic alliance into a 'multi-purpose' security and defence organisation (Foster and Wallace, 2001, p. 111). During the Cold War, the primary objective for NATO strategy was clear and shared by all allies: to deter and, if necessary, to defeat an existential threat posed by forces of the Warsaw Pact. After the collapse of the former enemy, NATO adapted its strategic focus and became increasingly engaged in crisis management operations which, while certainly important, were not existential to its member states. Moreover, the alliance significantly expanded its membership from 16 at the end of Cold War to 28 members in 2009.

A new security environment characterised by less existential challenges and the increase of member states over time led to 'centrifugal

dynamics' (Canuela, 2009, p. 85) within the alliance. Individual allies reassessed their core strategic interests, which often differed quite substantially from each other. In turn, NATO's purpose and mission spectrum became subject to varying political interpretations. For example, while for the newer members such as the Baltic States and Poland collective defence under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty was their primary reason to join the alliance, the United States, the United Kingdom and others saw NATO's utility increasingly in its potential to contribute to global crisis management (see for example the British House of Commons, 2008). A third group of countries such as Germany and France also saw a declining relevance of Article 5 in the face of a greatly weakened Russia, but they were also sceptical of a much expanded global role for NATO. This growing heterogeneity led to shifting alignments and the formation of various coalitions within the alliance. NATO thus developed into a 'multi-tier' alliance (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009a). In recent years this 'heterogeneous club' (Ivanov, 2010) displayed enormous difficulties in reaching consensus on a whole range of strategic issues. As a result, a growing number of experts highlighted the problem of NATO's search for a 'new vision' (Aybet and Moore, 2010).

NATO operations in the twenty-first century have thus been characterised by difficulties of the alliance to make strategy at the political strategic level. The advent of crisis management operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area has led many allies to carefully limit their contributions to these missions. In their view, even a failure of operations such as in Afghanistan will not mean the end of NATO as a military alliance. This assumption is contrary to dire predictions made by some that NATO's fate hinges on success in the Afghanistan operation (Lellouche, 2004, para 5). Nor would such a failure automatically have disastrous consequences for their nations' wellbeing. At the same time, this approach carries a significant risk for NATO's cohesion and ability to muster significant resources for future operations of such kind (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009a).

The ISAF operation in Afghanistan has displayed some of the very features outlined above. NATO's involvement in Afghanistan 'crystallised persistent and deeply held disagreements about key aspects of NATO operations in general, past, present and future' (Sperling and Webber, 2009, p. 501). As will be shown, despite setting strategic objectives for the operation, allies until 2009 were often at odds about the nature of the mission and about the means required to meet the goals set. There was also a mismatch between defined ends and available resources. This led to a strategy making process which was characterised by bottom-up

attempts to adjust the strategic goals of the operation, albeit often unsuccessfully until at least 2009.

### **Disconnected: NATO's ISAF strategy between 2001 and 2008**

This part looks at the evolution of NATO's strategy for ISAF between 2001 and 2008. It analyses the interaction between the different levels of strategy during this period. The core point here is that difficulties at the political strategic level led to significant problems at the operational and tactical level of the operation. In essence, there was no common strategy for the ISAF mission within this timeframe.

To fully understand the problem of NATO's strategy making in Afghanistan, one has to consider the establishment of ISAF before the alliance took over command in August 2003. Despite NATO for the first time ever evoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States, the American President George W. Bush did decide not to plan the campaign through the alliance framework. Quite likely, this decision was partly informed by American memories that *Operation Allied Force* (OAF) against Serbia in 1999 was a cumbersome 'war by committee' which should be avoided. *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) in Afghanistan was to be a US-controlled 'coalition of the willing' to which individual allies such as the United Kingdom and Canada contributed forces.

The American decision not to use NATO for the intensive combat operation that ousted the Taliban from power had at least two significant implications for the course of the ISAF operation. First, many European NATO allies felt irritated that the alliance had been sidelined despite an overwhelming political support for the United States' administration and the willingness to contribute militarily. This would frustrate American efforts to drum up greater commitment from its allies for the ISAF mission in later years. Second, ISAF started out with a very limited mandate focused on maintaining security 'in Kabul and its surrounding areas' (United Nations Security Council, 2001). Even when the mandate was broadened in 2003, ISAF was only tasked with providing security and reconstruction assistance throughout Afghanistan (United Nations Security Council, 2003). This meant that some European allies came to Afghanistan with the clear expectation that they were engaging in a stabilisation and reconstruction mission only and that combat operation would be largely left to troops operating under OEF mandate. The separation of the overall war efforts into two different mandates also

prevented 'unity of command' and created major political problems when the Bush administration began to argue in 2005 for merging the functions and command of ISAF and OEF (Morelli and Gallis, 2008).

From the very beginning, the implementation of ISAF strategy was made considerably difficult by lack of significant manpower on the ground. The light footprint proved to be counterproductive once the Afghanistan operation turned into a full-blown counterinsurgency campaign from 2006 onwards (Jones, 2008, p. 25). ISAF commanders and NATO political officials calling for a troop increase met with considerable resistance at the political level of most allies, apart from Canada and the United Kingdom which recognised a greater need to send more combat troops as the security situation deteriorated in their area of operation. As late as 2008, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and others failed to persuade the other allies to contribute more combat forces. While 'ISAF's Strategic Vision', adopted at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, confirmed allies' long-term commitment to the campaign (NATO, 2008), reluctant allies did not promise to provide more troops.

Yet, there were even greater problems for NATO's strategy in Afghanistan. Despite allies agreeing upon general political objectives, they often had very different approaches of how to achieve these goals. This was very much a result of different operational realities. After the alliance took over command in 2003, NATO commanders over time developed and implemented four stages designed to bring all of Afghanistan under NATO's operational responsibilities. Stage One between 2003 and 2004 involved predominantly French and German forces moving into the northern part of the country. Stage Two saw mostly Italian and Spanish forces deploying to western Afghanistan. In July 2006 NATO started Stage Three when American, British, Canadian and Dutch forces got engaged in the southern region. Finally, Stage Four commenced in October 2006, when ISAF became responsible for securing the entire country. But while the northern and western parts of Afghanistan were relatively stable, allies deployed in the southern parts of the country, traditional Taliban strongholds, faced significant resistance and increasingly suffered significant troop losses (Dale, 2009).

The different operational realities developing by assignment of regional responsibilities created all sorts of problems. In fact, they jeopardised coherent strategy making for the ISAF operations. The operational level tried to institute changes to operational concepts for ISAF which were not fully supported at the political strategic level of NATO allies. For example, General David McKiernan (COMISAF 2008–09)

developed an ISAF Campaign Plan in 2008 which included counterinsurgency as a key planning factor (ISAF, 2008). Previously, General David Richards (COMISAF 2006–07) had called Stage Three of the ISAF campaign a 'combat operation' and had criticised some NATO allies which still made a distinction between OEF combat operations and low-level ISAF contingencies. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, in 2006 also fought an uphill battle to convince some European allies to reduce some of the 'national caveats' placed on their forces which in some cases prevented these contingents from participating in combat operations (Morelli and Gallies, 2008, p. 14).

Allies such as the Americans, Canadians, British and the Dutch which operated in southern Afghanistan fully embraced attempts from the operational level to adjust ISAF strategy. They also publicly complained about the lack of alliance solidarity and burden-sharing among the allies (Smith and Williams, 2008). However, allies deployed in the north and west resisted changing their focus on reconstruction and stabilisation. Germany was particularly articulate on the political level in denying the necessity for ISAF to get engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Thus, despite agreeing on general political goals for the ISAF operation such as in the 'Final Communiqué' in 2005 (NATO, 2005) or in 'ISAF's Strategic Vision' in 2008 (NATO, 2008), key allies still entertained very different interpretations of the conflict and the means to tackle it (Morelli and Gallis, 2008, pp. 18–26). As a result, '[i]nternally, the alliance [was] beset by fundamental disagreements over Afghanistan: over the security interests at stake there and over key aspects of the operation itself' (Sperling and Webber, 2009, p. 501). In this context, NATO's decision making process based on 'consensus rule' proved to be a liability for making ISAF strategy (Kay and Khan, 2007, p. 165).

It must also be noted that the making of ISAF strategy in this period was negatively affected by the broader context of transatlantic relations. When some European allies refused to support United States' President Bush's decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003, NATO faced a significant internal crisis (Cornish, 2004). While the alliance managed to heal the rifts caused by these disagreements, European allies found it subsequently difficult to persuade their publics to support the effort in Afghanistan which was regarded by many as another 'Bush war'. In essence, the Iraq War made a change in ISAF strategy a very cumbersome task (Morelli and Gallies, 2008). NATO's strategy making in global crisis management operations is thus shaped by internal alliance dynamics that are disconnected from the actual operation.

NATO's problem in executing strategy in Afghanistan at the strategic level also stemmed from shortcomings largely outside its direct influence. These problems included the inefficiency of the Afghan central government to provide 'good governance', the lack of civilian actors to deliver their share to a 'comprehensive approach', the dismal state of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the often not very helpful role played by important neighbors like Pakistan (Jones, 2008). In September 2009, the United States' Defense Secretary Robert Gates testified before Congress that 'absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there [...] no amount of troops, in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan' (United States' Department of Defense, 2009). In a sense, one could even ask if ISAF was bound for a 'mission impossible', given that the political strategic goal of the overall campaign to sustain a central Afghan government in the eyes of many commentators did not match the country's established socio-political patterns and preferences (Lister, 2007).

As the 'top-down' process of ISAF strategy making was beset by the manifold problems outlined above, attempts were made at the tactical and operational level to initiate more bottom-up attempts to change and implement strategy. Apart from the repeated pledges by strategic and operational commanders to send more troops and to decrease national caveats, regional commanders tried to adjust their contingents' operational mindset to the changing situation on the ground. This willingness to circumvent the top-down process, for example, became apparent when the German commander of Regional Command North (RCN), General Mark Warnecke, initiated a large counterinsurgency operation in November 2007. Named Harekate Yolo II, this operation was designed to drive insurgent forces from the area and to establish long-term stability in the places cleared. However, Warnecke lacked support from his own government and strategic leaders in the German Ministry of Defense. In the end, the operation could not enter into a sustained 'hold and build phase' (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009b). ISAF troops were thus often unable to translate their tactical successes on the ground into long-term strategic gains.

Between 2001 and 2009, the disconnect between the levels of NATO strategy making for the ISAF operation was therefore too severe for bottom-up initiatives to compensate for this problem. Not only did the national caveats limit operational effectiveness since commanders did not have the ability to use contingents as flexibly as needed (Sperling and Webber, 2009, p. 509). Moreover, ground commanders were not in a position to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations which



depend on the capacity to 'clear, hold and build' an area. There were too few troops available which prevented promising concepts such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Joint Security Stations (JSS) and the Special Military Liaison Teams (SLMTs) from having decisive effect on overall stability. Internally, NATO allies could also not agree on a joint Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine which could have provided more guidance to the operational and tactical level.

Further, ISAF commanders faced the difficult task of coordinating a variety of chains of command. NATO, the United States' and Afghan forces often conducted military operations in parallel and through different command arrangements (Roberts, 2009, p. 50). This rendered 'unity of command' (all forces operating under one chain of command) or 'unity of effort' (all forces plus civilian actors working in an integrated manner towards a common objective) almost impossible. Rather, ISAF became a classic case in which a large coalition with 'small troop concentrations, with restrictions on their rules of engagement, can create confusion in the chain of command' (Kay and Khan, 2007, p. 164). Indeed, making effective strategy was hazardous for the tactical and operational level since in reality ISAF amounted to an 'array of national troop elements dispersed all over the country, largely disconnected from other allied components' (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009c, p. 535).

In sum, NATO's strategy for the ISAF operation between 2001 and 2008 suffered from significant problems. At the political strategic level, allies could neither agree on how to make strategy, apart from supporting some very broad political objectives, nor were they willing to provide adequate resources to implement ISAF strategy. Bottom-up initiatives sought to address these deficiencies but only partially succeeded given the magnitude of the challenge. Strategic experts thus increasingly warned of a failure in NATO's strategy if it did not adapt at the political and strategic level (Biddle, 2009). Insurgent groups had increased their momentum and many domestic audiences in NATO countries had lost faith in the operation. The arrival of Barack Obama as the newly elected American President at the end of 2008 provided an opportunity to readjust NATO strategy. During the election campaign, he had made it clear that the war in Afghanistan would become one of his foreign policy priorities.

## **Strategy renewed? ISAF between 2009 and 2011**

After President Obama took office in January 2009, he set out to deliver on his campaign promise. In February 2009, he ordered the deployment

of an additional 17,000 American troops to Afghanistan (Barnes and Miller, 2009). In March 2009, the President announced an integrated civil-military strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. He promised to adequately resource the war effort, in essence acknowledging the existing gap between ISAF goals, strategy and means (The White House, 2009a). The need for an extensive review of the Afghanistan strategy – both politically and militarily – only increased after the widespread fraud in Afghan presidential elections in the summer of 2009 diminished the credibility of the central government of Hamid Karzai even further.

In August 2009, COMISAF General Stanley McChrystal's *Initial Assessment* was leaked to the press. It summarised the many problems ISAF had at the operational and tactical level to effectively implement NATO strategy. The assessment explicitly stated the 'urgent need for a significant change to our strategy' and called for an extensive counter-insurgency 'strategy' (McChrystal, 2009: 1-1). In a way, McChrystal's 'strategy' reflected all the problems related to NATO's Afghanistan strategy which lacked clear political objectives of the mission, and which subsequently forced commanders at the operational level to develop strategy:

McChrystal's strategy [...] was shaped from the bottom-up; without a clear articulation by NATO or the United States of their political objectives and hence of their strategies, it could not be anything else. The planning flow ran in one direction only [...] COMISAF's initial assessment was the best and fullest statement of what ISAF was seeking to do in Afghanistan in 2009. However, its attention was on the how rather than on the why; its focus was on the means, as the ends with which it was concerned were, in the standard hierarchy of military plans, essentially operational, not strategic, even if they posed as strategy.

(Strachan, 2010, p. 173)

General McChrystal's assessment was considered by some in Washington as an attempt to put pressure on President Obama, particularly since it stood in contrast to evaluations by the United States' Ambassador to Afghanistan, John G. Eikenberry, who appeared to be critical of COMISAF's key recommendations. Yet, what made his report controversial was that the Obama team was divided over the best strategy for Afghanistan. One camp, led by Vice-President Joseph Biden favoured a counterterrorism approach which did not include a significant troop increase but focused instead on increased Special Forces operations

against high-value targets, decreased support for the Afghan government, and a short-term exit. Conversely, a camp led by the United States' Defense Secretary Robert Gates and State Secretary Hillary Clinton, and supported by the United States' Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General David Petraeus, argued for the McChrystal line.

The result of this struggle within the American administration over the course in Afghanistan was a middle path solution. President Obama announced the pillars of his new Afghanistan strategy in a speech at West Point Military Academy on 1 December 2009 (the White House, 2009b). He struck a compromise between the two camps. While an open-ended nation-building process in Afghanistan was no longer a viable policy option, a hasty withdrawal was also not considered by President Obama as a sensible step to take (Baker, 2009). Instead, the United States' administration opted for a 'surge' with a faster troop increase than envisaged by COMISAF, but also with a date for the beginning of a troop drawdown from July 2011 onwards. Under the new strategy, the United States would deploy an additional 30,000 troops. Defense Secretary Gates also revealed that the United States would ask its NATO allies to add another 5000–7000 troops to the mission (the United States' Senate, 2009). In his speech, President Obama called for a common effort by all NATO allies, stating that the credibility of the alliance was at stake (the White House, 2009b).

President Obama's speech had a number of significant implications for NATO's strategy in Afghanistan. First, the administration put the political level back in the driving seat with regard to making ISAF strategy. Second, more than ever, the Afghanistan operation was being 'Americanized' in the sense that the United States would drive the process of implementing strategy; with NATO allies being largely in a supporting role. Third, the administration had made it clear that it would end the operation in due course. Transition of responsibility to the ANSF was to occur sooner rather than later. Privately, the President acknowledged that the new strategy needed to 'be a plan about how we're going to hand it off and get out of Afghanistan' (Woodward, 2010, p. 301).

Fourth, this announcement opened the door for European allies to start debating their exit too. There was an understanding among NATO allies that this was a last dedicated effort to reverse the 'Taliban momentum', yet one which had limits in terms of time and resources spent. 'Transition' became the strategic goal determining ISAF strategy, as evident at two international conferences on Afghanistan in London in January 2010 and Kabul in July 2010. The Kabul communiqué

emphasised that the transition 'should' be completed by 2014, a target endorsed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai (Kabul International Conference, 2010). NATO's Summit in Lisbon in November 2011 supported this timetable. It also became obvious that the allies would withdraw the bulk of their forces by 2014 (Traynor, 2010). In fact, in the face of declining domestic support, important European allies such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany signaled their intention to start withdrawing some troops in line with the American deadline of 2011. In May 2011, for example, the British government announced that it would start drawing down its troops in the same year, even so in very small numbers. This move was widely interpreted as making it even more unlikely that NATO would sustain a large troop presence beyond 2014 as other European allies might follow the British example (MacDonald, 2011). By-and-large, NATO leaders have been unable to 'craft a convincing strategic narrative' for the operation; indeed many analysts have concluded that '[n]o matter what officials say about transition being based on conditions on the ground, the political reality is that, come 2014, NATO combat troops will almost certainly withdraw' (Chaudhuri and Farrell, 2011, p. 290). This meant that for NATO troops, the ISAF campaign after 2009 became a 'race against the clock' (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, p. 9). As of April 2011, NATO OPLAN 3832 identified ISAF's mission as follows:

ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government and the international community, conducts comprehensive, population-centric counterinsurgency operations in order to: protect the Afghan people; neutralize insurgent networks; develop Afghan National Security Forces; and support the establishment of legitimate governance and sustainable socio-economic institutions.

(United States' Department of Defense, 2011, p. 7)

To meet these ambitious goals, COMISAF General McChrystal and his successor General David Petraeus between 2009 and 2010 initiated some very important changes at the strategic, operational and tactical level of the ISAF operation. They were greatly assisted by a significant troop increase during that period. As of May 2011, ISAF troops totalled 132,400 troops, out of which 90,000 were American forces (NATO, 2011). This allowed ISAF troops to mount sustained counterinsurgency operations, particularly in the Taliban strongholds in the southern parts of the country. It seems fair to conclude that only after mid-2009 did the campaign receive the adequate resources required to conduct

such missions more effectively. Indeed, it took until the end of 2010 to complete the troop build-up.

Nevertheless, by then significant adjustments to ISAF strategy had already been made at the strategic, operational and tactical level. At the strategic level, there was a clear and consistent guidance by COMISAF on principles of population-centric COIN operations. This involved tactical directives by COMISAF to minimise civilian casualties – even at the cost of operational effectiveness (NATO, 2009; NATO, 2010). Even more critically, McChrystal also addressed the aforementioned problem that ISAF was fighting different ‘wars’ and lacked coordination between the five different regional commands. The establishment of an immediate operational headquarters – ISAF Joint Force Command – aimed to ‘synchronize operational activities and local civil-military coordination and ensure shared understanding of the mission throughout the force (McChrystal, 2009). Finally, by also taking over command over American forces, COMISAF contributed to improving unity of effort between ISAF and OEF.

Moreover, many allies were willing to take greater risks for their troops at the tactical level of operations. The number of national caveats on how to use troops was reduced, allowing them to conduct offensive counterinsurgency missions and to engage in more integrated training and other activities with the ANSF. Moreover, while the jury is still out at the point of writing, indications are that ISAF made progress in building up the ANSF, including the chronically corrupt Afghan National Police. In 2010, ISAF also regained military momentum by conducting two major operations in the South, first *Operation Moshtarak* to secure central Helmand, and then *Operation Hamkari* to expand security in Kandahar. While press reports were particularly critical of *Operation Moshtarak*, more nuanced analyses concluded that these missions did indeed bear fruit and pushed the Taliban to the defensive (Chaudhuri and Farrell, 2011, pp. 276–83). By early 2011, ISAF troops appeared to have made progress in the embattled Southern part of the country (Chandrasekaran, 2011).

In sum, between 2009 and 2011 efforts were made to closer align the strategic, operational and tactical levels of strategy for the ISAF operation. Yet, significant uncertainties remained. At the time of writing, it is of course still too early to tell if the new strategy will actually achieve its goals. A Pentagon report of April 2011 assessed that ‘tangible progress’ had been made but also noted that the progress towards transition remained ‘fragile and reversible’. The report also noted that President Karzai had announced in March 2011 that in seven areas transition to

ANSF lead would begin later this year (the United States' Department of Defense, 2011, p. 1). In contrast, a White House report to the Congress of March 2011 was much more cautious (the White House, 2011). Obviously, it remains to be seen if the complex Afghan insurgent movements will be significantly weakened over the long-run. Moreover, apart from the political pressure by allies to hand over responsibility and to start withdrawing troops, huge questions regarding the quality of the ANSF remain. And finally, it seems unlikely that by 2014 the endemic corruption within the Afghan central government and other problems of accountability will have been resolved.

These weaknesses, however, point to a key problem remaining for NATO's Afghanistan strategy. While the strategic, operational and tactical levels of strategy were harmonised, there was still a gap to the political level. Experts concluded that in 2011 ISAF still suffered from a 'campaign disconnect' between 'operational progress and strategic obstacles' in Afghanistan (Chaudhuri and Farrell, 2011). They also stress that even after 2010, American and NATO allies' political approach to Afghanistan amounted more to an 'alibi' than strategy (Strachan, 2010). It is entirely conceivable that ISAF troops will enable the ANSF to provide for security in the major Afghan population centres after having reduced their footprint and having switched into a largely supportive role after 2014. Some rural areas might then be controlled by Taliban and other insurgent groups, yet they might not be able to pose a strategic threat to the Afghan government and would be subject to selective raids by allied Special Forces. It might thus well be the case that ISAF might reach its military objectives by 2014 devoid of a supporting long-term political strategy.

## Conclusions

In conclusion, at least four observations can be made about NATO's strategy for the ISAF mission between 2003 and 2011:

First, the first phase of the NATO strategy making process between 2001 and 2008 is a good case study for the dynamic of a reversed cycle of strategy making mentioned at the beginning of this article. In the absence of coherent leadership at the political level of NATO allies, the operational and tactical level aimed to adjust strategy and strategy making capabilities through a series of bottom-up initiatives. Yet, the lesson to be learned was that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations such as Afghanistan by reverting to a bottom-up process of strategy making when support at the political level is seriously lacking.

In that sense, the strategy logic developed by Betts, Gray and others was vindicated: precisely because the political level dominated resource allocations and the conduct of operations, but was also affected by severe internal disagreement about the course to take, ISAF strategy largely failed.

Second, between 2009 and 2011 the strategy process for the ISAF operation was 'harmonized'. That is, substantial efforts were made to better link the different levels of strategy. Importantly, the political strategic level largely set aside the differences between allies and agreed on a renewed strategic effort in Afghanistan. It must be stressed, however, that non-US NATO allies largely 'outsourced' strategy making after 2009 in the sense that the conduct of the ISAF operation became 'Americanized' given the disproportionate amount of political, economic and military resources spent by the United States. NATO strategy for ISAF in fact was largely a strategy driven by the United States, not to the dismay of the European allies which, in the first place, had signed up for the Afghan operation as a means of supporting the United States' ally, rather than to defend Europe at the Hindu Kush. While declaring ISAF strategy a success in 2011 is premature, there is no doubt that progress has been made since 2009 in reversing the strategic momentum. Again, this seems to support the paradigm that a top-down process of strategy making is needed if the alliance is to stand a chance to make strategy effectively, despite the fact that the political level of NATO strategy still seemed to suffer from some disconnection to the other levels in 2010–11.

Third, NATO strategy making for ISAF has been significantly determined by broader considerations of alliance cohesion which had nothing to do with operational realities in Afghanistan. The reluctance of many European NATO allies to get involved much more in the ISAF mission between 2001 and 2008 was as much related to an internal dispute about the general course of the alliance, as it was the result of a deep transatlantic rift over the United States' decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Opposition to American President George W. Bush's foreign policy came to influence the approach of many European allies to NATO's Afghanistan operation.

Fourth, NATO strategy making in complex operations such as Afghanistan critically depends on the political leadership provided by the United States. European allies expected American leadership in what they basically perceived to be an operation led by the United States. The benign neglect by the Bush Administration of Afghanistan in the course of the Iraq War led to reciprocal behaviour on part of the European

allies. Other allies were only willing to invest more capital themselves when President Barack Obama threw his political weight behind a renewed effort in Afghanistan. However, this implies that strategy in large-scale NATO operations will be dominated by the United States.

Finally, the Afghanistan operation has exposed the problem of NATO in making strategy for complex crisis management operations. This goes back to the structural development of NATO into a 'multi-tier' alliance introduced at the beginning. While certainly important, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is not existential from the perspective of the member states. In other words, failure in Afghanistan would not mean the end of the alliance (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009a, p. 543). This assumption, however, leads to varying and shifting allied commitments to NATO's crisis management operations. As seen in Afghanistan, this can seriously downgrade NATO's ability to agree upon, let alone to make strategy. This is unlikely to change. As the current operation in Libya (*Operation Unified Protector*) demonstrates, some allies opting out of a mission or even opposing participation will become more not less likely, in turn posing new strategy challenges in a polycentric alliance.

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# 8

## NATO Engagements in Africa: Is There a Strategy for the Continent?

*Dennis Gyllensporre*

We want to help implement African solutions to African problems.

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer  
(NATO, 2005a)

### Introduction

The sixth, and last, empirical study is opaque in that it covers both interventions and inter-institutional support. While previous chapters have established a distinction between these ways of engaging NATO militarily, this chapter takes a geographical perspective to unpack the dynamics of NATO's involvement on the African continent. To this end, it addresses the pertinent question *where* political objectives are supposed to be defended, as discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, the quotation above suggests that NATO may operate differently in Africa, based on the unique setting and context of the continent. If so, is there a NATO strategy on Africa that can be induced from its engagement on the continent? How can such a strategy be understood in terms of politico military interaction?

To date NATO has engaged in eight missions in, or in the vicinity of, Africa. Three missions have focused on inter-institutional support while the five remaining include traditional military operations. The Alliance provided inter-institutional support to the African Union's peacekeeping mission in Sudan (AMIS) during 2005–07, discussed in detail below. NATO also provided similar support to the follow-on UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) during 2007–08. When the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was planned and organised, during 2007–09, NATO once more stepped in and offered inter-institutional support.

These inter-institutional support engagements include activities short of conventional military operations. According to Jürgen Rüländ inter-regionalism activities can be subdivided in two categories; bilateral inter-regionalism, characterised by ad hoc cooperation in specific policy fields; and trans-regionalism that takes a broader and longer term perspective by inter alia setting up common institutional arrangements to formalise the cooperation (Rüländ, 2002). Since the NATO-Africa cooperation is nascent and only specific missions are studied, the perspective adopted in this chapter is within the former category that is bilateral inter-regionalism. The concept of bilateral inter-regionalism in crisis management must recognise that the supporting NATO mission is not directly aiming at addressing the security problem, but to fill capability voids and provide expertise based on what the supported entity deems desirable. As a consequence, these NATO missions are fielded to augment and strengthen the supported organisation to perform its assigned mission. The missions are also a way to demonstrate Alliance commitment while avoiding some of the risks and costs associated with taking responsibility for the mission. Moreover, being involved in such a way gives a seat at the table when political consultations are taking place and adds to the Alliance's visibility.

As discussed by Magnus Petersson in a previous chapter of this book NATO launched *Operation Active Endeavour* in 2001 in the Mediterranean to patrol the Mediterranean and monitor shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity (NATO, 2011a). As this is an Article 5 operation it does not specifically address African security, still it is performed at the borders of Maghreb nations and more importantly it also include African partners. Following a request by the United Nations Secretary General in September 2008 NATO provided naval escorts for World Food Programme (WFP) movements to supply life support to the Somali population under *Operation Allied Provider*. The NATO ships also provided deterrent presence patrols at routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant vessels. The mission has been redesigned twice and rebranded *Operation Allied Protector* and later *Operation Ocean Shield*. Most recently, in 2011, NATO launched *Operation Unified Protector* to provide a no-fly zone over Libya and enforce an arms embargo at sea to protect the civilian population.

The method applied in this chapter takes as a point of departure a limited set of missions for scrutiny. Three missions; NATO support to AMIS, *Operation Allied Provider*, and *Operation Unified Protector* are selected in order to capture all three arenas, that is ground, sea and air operations, and to reflect the evolution in African involvement. NATO support to

AMIS was the first mission in Africa and *Operation Unified Protector* the most recent. The selected missions also involve different regions of the continent. Moreover, the institutional settings with African entities are different in these three missions. The first mission is dedicated to assisting the African Union, in close coordination with similar efforts by the European Union. *Operation Allied Provider*, off the coast of Somalia, provided a concerted indirect support to the fragile Somalia state authorities together with several entities from the international community, including the European Union, the United States, India and China operating in separate missions but based on the same mandate by the United Nations Security Council. Finally in the case of Libya, the mission aimed at protecting the Libyan population from its authoritarian dictator.

Written NATO information, in particular official documents and statements by NATO officials, are used as the main empirical source. In some cases it has been necessary to draw on secondary data to fill the void, bearing in mind the limited unclassified documentation that is disseminated from military operations. The key questions follow those applied by Håkan Edström in a previous chapter of this book:

- *Why* was NATO action and cooperation needed?
- *How* was the conflict response tailored in relation to the direct needs to address the situation?

In addition a question relating to the dynamics within the organisation is addressed:

- *What* was the character of the internal interaction between levels of command?

## NATO-Africa cooperation

The scope of the NATO-Africa cooperation is elusive. From the onset NATO's relations to Africa have been ambiguous. The bipolarity during the Cold War rendered Africa an area of peripheral interest. Still it became an arena for the Cold War at times. Due to the colonial legacy and a history of self-interest on the continent, Western involvement was often viewed as more problematic by Africans than expansion of Soviet Union influence. While the Soviet interventions in Angola and Africa's Horn in the 1970s enjoyed broad support in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner to the African Union (AU), NATO's alleged intervention in Zaire, in 1977, was approached with much more

scepticism (see for instance Orekhov, 1978). On the part of NATO, Africa was recognised as important in terms of security but not a continent to intervene in (Coker, 1982). The Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly summarised the mindset in 1978: '[U]ndoubtedly Africa is of immense importance to the alliance, strategically, politically and economically. This does not mean that the alliance as an alliance should encompass Africa' (Coker, 1982, p. 335). This stance remains unchanged. In 2006 the Alliance issued a Comprehensive Planning Guidance (CPG) with the aim to provide a 'framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10 to 15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence' (NATO, 2006a). Although the CPG does not indicate any regional perspectives it is still instructive in that it repeatedly stresses the cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union, but in the midst of the Darfur crisis fails to make reference to the African Union.

Notwithstanding this cautious approach to Africa, cooperation has developed. The Strategic Concept issued in 1991 recognised the importance of the Mediterranean rim due to the threats emanating from military build up, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles: 'The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance' (NATO, 1991). As a consequence, NATO engaged in consultations with countries in the Southern Mediterranean. This informal cooperation gradually evolved into a formalised dialogue with the objective to foster mutual confidence (NAC, 1993; NAC, 1994a; NAC, 1994b; NAC, 1994c; NAC, 1997). The initial participants included four African countries; Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria. This venue catered for bilateral arrangements as well as a forum for broader dialogue to safeguard the southern flank of the NATO territory. Moreover some countries contributed to NATO operations. Egypt and Morocco provided forces to the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Morocco is also participating in KFOR in Kosovo (NATO, 2007a; NATO, 2010b). The CPG identifies terrorism and proliferation of WMD as the key threat to the Alliance (NATO, 2006a). The strategic concept builds on this threat perception (NATO, 2010c). These threats, and a plethora of others, emanating from Africa are relevant for NATO, including energy security, HIV/AIDS, environmental disasters, civil war, instability, refugees, and failed or failing states (Lambert, 2007). These security concerns are particularly relevant for the Alliance members at the Mediterranean rim.

When the African Union was established in 2002 it also embraced peace and security as an important policy area. This was underpinned by an ambition to take more responsibility for the continent's security. An ambitious plan for capability development was introduced, including regional African Standby brigades (Franke, 2006). This development opened up a new dimension of potential practical cooperation with NATO with a long term perspective (NATO, 2007c). When the African Union's Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit, visited NATO HQ in March 2007, the second high-level visit by an African official to NATO, he argued that the Alliance commitment opened up for a wider cooperation: '[...] NATO has been providing support to the African Union in Sudan through support of the African mission in Sudan on the one hand and we have been also exploring possibilities for expanding the cooperation to other areas [...] and we are looking forward to discussing to expand that cooperation to include the long term capacity building of the African Union' (NATO, 2007b). One of the NATO efforts became to engage with sub-regional organisations and to foster capability development. NATO participated in the concept development and training of these forces, often in concert with the European Union. Simultaneously the European Union has stepped up its efforts to support the African Union in the same domain (Gyllensporre, 2006). It is a key provider of development aid. In addition, three military EU-operations have been conducted on the African continent. The United Nations as well as the Group of Eight (G8) have also demonstrated their readiness to bolster the African Union. In addition, several nations have advanced bilateral cooperation. The recent increased interest in the African Union and African crisis management has materialised in a new American military strategic command (AFRICOM) designed to focus on the continent. In addition an American ambassador has been accredited to the African Union.

NATO has operated from Djibouti with a small detachment but never deployed forces on the ground in Africa to conduct operations. However it has demonstrated the ability to intervene in Africa in other ways. In 2006, NATO Response Force (NRF) conducted a validating exercise in Africa for its high readiness expeditionary capabilities (*Allied Command Operations*, 2006).

### **Case 1: On the land – Inter-institutional support in Sudan**

From June 2005 until December 2007, when the African Union's Mission in Darfur (AMIS) was transferred to the United Nations/African

Union's Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), NATO provided support to AMIS (NATO, 2009a). Based on a Resolution by the United Nations Security Council and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the African Union's mission aimed to end violence and improve the humanitarian situation in a region that has been suffering from conflict since 2003. NATO support entailed airlift for the transport of peacekeepers and police into the region and training the African Union's personnel. The NATO mission did not involve any combat troops (NATO, 2009a).

### **Background**

Sudan has a long history of civil war. The violence related to the Darfur crisis has its root in tensions between the Arab (Muslim) population and the black African (Christian) population. The most recent phase of the conflict dates back to February 2003, when government installations and forces in the western part of the country were attacked by two local rebel groups – the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudanese Liberation Army. The government responded by aerial attacks and by engaging proxy Arab militia, the Janjaweed (Jones, 2005). The Janjaweed forces were trained, armed, funded and mobilised by the leadership in Khartoum to attack civilian bases in the Darfur region that provided support for the rebel insurgency (Brunk, 2008). The conflict escalated rapidly. Media reported government aircraft bombing villages, and militias that would slaughter, rape and steal (BBC, 2006). A humanitarian cease fire was signed in N'Djamena, Chad, in April 2004. It is estimated that the conflict had resulted in some 50,000 to 80,000 deaths and approximately a million displaced persons by mid 2004 (Jones, 2005). According to SACEUR the aim of the African Union's deployment was to enhance security and stability to allow the Sudanese authorities to provide life support for its people (Jones, 2005). A string of United Nations Security Council resolutions provided support to the cease fire and the evolving AMIS deployment (United Nations Security Council, 2004a; United Nations Security Council, 2004b; United Nations Security Council, 2004c; United Nations Security Council, 2004d). These resolutions also aimed to galvanise support from the international community to assist the African Union's mission, including logistical, financial and materiel support. Efforts by the international community led to a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January, 2005 and the DPA in May 2006.

### **Political strategic level**

At the political strategic level there were several issues that had to be considered when deciding upon NATO action. First and foremost, there



was a humanitarian crisis with the potential of deteriorating to genocide. Based on the experiences from the genocide in Rwanda there was a need for action. In particular the United States, Belgium and France were subject to harsh criticism for not doing enough during that infamous event. The United States' Secretary of State, Colin Powell, labeled the Darfur Crisis as genocide in September 2004 with support from the President (CNN, 2004; the White House, 2004). Still, there was reluctance to commit NATO forces to Darfur.

It has been argued that the relationship with the European Union had a key role in the NATO deliberations. In 2003, when the European Union conducted its first military non-Berlin Plus mission, operation Artemis, it triggered strong reactions in Washington as NATO was not consulted in the way the United States interpreted the NATO-EU agreement (Keohane, 2006). During the discussions on how to support the African Union in Darfur, the Bush administration reportedly argued that 'NATO should take the lead and the EU should stay out' (Keohane, 2006). In contrast pro-EU Alliance states, including France and Belgium, voiced concerns over the NATO involvement (Lambert, 2007), in particular France argued that 'Nato is not the world's policeman' (Dombey, 2005a). They advocated for the utility of the European Union, the major financial supporter of the mission, to also extend assistance on the ground (Lambert, 2007).

According to NATO the formal initiation of the commitment in Darfur was made in April 2005, when the African Union requested NATO support, including logistical assistance, in the expansion of its peacekeeping mission in Darfur (NATO, 2005b). The following month the Chairman of the African Union's Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, conducted the first ever official of the African Union to visit NATO to follow up on the request. In conjunction with this visit the North Atlantic Council (NAC) deliberated on possible NATO assistance and requested military advice, as a matter of urgency. This was the initiation of the formal military assessment. Only a brief and compressed assessment was possible as the options were to be presented to the NAC within a few days. Still the military advice was prepared in consultation with the European Union and the United Nations (Segell, 2009). The options included support in the areas of strategic airlift deployment, training in command and control and operational planning, and training to improve the ability of the African Union mission in Darfur to use intelligence. NATO support did not imply the provision of combat troops (Segell, 2009). The Secretary General argued that the African Union remained 'in the driving seat to solve this difficult

conflict' and the role of NATO was to support the African Union's mission (NATO, 2005c). In fact, any option including combat troops was ruled out before the request from the African Union was received. During the informal Foreign Ministers' meeting in Vilnius on 20–21 April 2005 the topic was discussed over lunch. Making reference to the conversation, the Secretary General denounced the idea of deploying NATO troops (NATO, 2005d).

On 24 May NAC agreed on military options for possible NATO support (NATO, 2005e). These options then provided the mandate to the NATO Secretary General, de Hoop Scheffer, when attending the International Pledging Conference in Addis Ababa on international support to the African Union's mission in late May. The European Union's Secretary General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Solana, also attended the meeting and presented a comprehensive package of additional European support of additional military and civilian assistance, including the measures that NATO offered (the European Union, 2005). The European Union had initiated their support much earlier. When the agreement of the ceasefire implementation was finalised, in June 2004, the European Union decided to provide observers at the disposal of the African Union, one of them being the Vice-President of the Ceasefire Commission (Solana, 2004). At the time of the International Pledging Conference, in May 2005, the European Union had already provided financial support including some 600 million Euros, and more funding was being made available (Solana, 2005). In essence the European Union financed most of the African Union's mission and made it possible.

The NATO decision gained international support, yet some, including a group of former foreign ministers, argued that NATO should do more (Albright et al., 2005).<sup>1</sup> Based on the Responsibility to Protect Concept, it was argued that NATO should deploy brigade-sized element of the NATO Response Force (NRF) at the disposal of the United Nations and seek authority from the United Nations' Security Council for a Chapter VII resolution to enforce a non-flight zone over Darfur. Clearly, China would be reluctant to support this, but with the humanitarian catastrophe on-going this option should also be exhausted.

Following the meeting in Addis Ababa, NATO agreed on detailed arrangements of Alliance support (NATO, 2009a). This was not without problems as the rift continued within Alliance states as to how support should be provided, that is through NATO or the European Union. On 8 June, the day before the ministerial meeting at which NATO was expected to decide on the mission, the issue was still open. While the

United States and Canada wanted to give the mission an alliance's 'branding' France wanted the effort to be coordinated by the European Union (Dombey, 2005b).

In the end NATO was able to agree on a decision to assist the African Union peace support operation in Darfur with the coordination of strategic airlift and staff capacity building at the Defense Minister's meeting on 9 June 2005 (NATO, 2005f). It was the urgent situation on the ground in Darfur that made it possible to reach an agreement (Segell, 2009). This did not settle the issue of ambition for NATO. In February 2006 President Bush voiced concerns over the lack of progress by the African Union mission in what he regarded as genocide (Van de Hei and Lynch, 2006). He called for a bigger role for NATO, possibly taking the lead (Sanger, 2006). However, the calls did not generate any tangible results. Further NAC decisions were made as the United Nations was considering assuming responsibilities for a follow-on mission in Darfur (later labeled as UNMID).

Once NATO support operations commenced, in July, several additional requests were issued by the AU. It created a dynamic relationship at the political strategic level between the NAC on the part of NATO and the African Union's Commission. Several NAC decisions were taken in response to new requests. In August it was agreed to assist in the transport of civilian police to Darfur (NATO, 2009a). In September the NAC agreed to extend the duration of NATO's airlift support for the remaining reinforcements of the African Union until 31 October 2005, and in a subsequent decision they agreed to extend NATO's coordination of strategic airlift, until May 2006, to support the troop rotation schedule (NATO, 2009a). Following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement the African Union's Commission requested yet another extension of NATO's airlift and training support and additional assistance in other areas (NATO, 2009a). Within a week, the Defense Ministers declared NATO's willingness to extend its support and broaden its training assistance in the areas of Joint Operations Centers (JOC), pre-deployment certification and lessons learned (NATO, 2006b). The continued support was reiterated by heads of state and government at the Riga Summit, in November 2006, where NATO reaffirmed its support to the mission (NATO, 2006c). In the beginning of 2007 NAC agreed to provide additional staff capacity for training (NATO, 2009a).

### **The military strategic level**

The SACEUR, General James Jones, was involved in the early political discussions. He participated in the donor's conference 26–27 May 2005

(Jones, 2005). Later, the NAC tasked SACEUR to execute the support and to organise a liaison team. As discussed in Chapter 2, the position as SACEUR is held by an American high ranking officer that is dual-hatted, being strategic commander for the United States' European Command (EUCOM). The Commander of EUCOM, General Jones' testimony to the United States' Congress is helpful in understanding the perception at the military strategic level. Although he testifies in his national capacity, he makes specific references to his multinational role (Jones, 2005). Excerpts of his testimony are used in the analysis below.

### **The operational level**

The mission issued from the NAC was passed further from the military strategic level to Joint Command Lisbon that assumed the Operational level responsibility. The practical aspects of the operation were relayed to the Allied Land Component Command Headquarters in Heidelberg. Brigadier General Andre Defawe, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, became the Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO). The team comprised another three personnel.<sup>2</sup> The SMLO team was stationed at Addis Ababa from mid-June 2005, in the proximity of the African Union's HQ (AUHQ), and acted as NATO's single military point of contact with the African Union. According to the African Union's Charter the sub-regional organisations are to be responsible for conducting the operations, primarily with elements of the African Standby Force comprising five regional brigades. However, this structure is still in the making and the interaction with the Joint Forces Command (JFC) Lisbon, the designated JFC for Africa, is not merely focused on the sub-region cooperation but also at coordinating efforts directly with AUHQ. Another unique feature with the African Union mission was the set up of an additional headquarters in Addis Ababa, the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF). It was established due to the lack of capacity within the African Union's Directorate of Peace and Security that constituted the military strategic level at the AUHQ. The DITF coordinated support in three specific areas: strategic airlift; support of the United Nations led map exercise; and execution of staff capacity building training for the DITF staff and the force headquarters.<sup>25</sup> The team was also interacting with the representatives of the partner community including the United Nations and the European Union (Segell, 2009).

The practical support was provided by national forces, in particular the United States Air force stationed in Ramstein, Germany, had a key role. In general, the support required a limited number of soldiers to become involved. For example, when NATO conducted its first airlift

operations on 1 July 2005, some 680 Nigerian troops were deployed by American C-130 and C-17 aircraft. It only required eight NATO personnel (Segell, 2009).

A key element in the practical cooperation with the European Union was comprised of the air movement coordination. In Europe the Allied Movements Co-ordination Centre at SHAPE and the European Airlift Centre in Eindhoven coordinated their efforts. At the AUHQ in Addis Ababa NATO and the European Union staff supported the African Union in the Joint Administration Control and Management Centre (Jones, 2005).

### Summary

From the account of this mission it can be concluded that the mission evolved over time with no clear end-state. It was driven more by political factors than changes in the situation on the ground. In the following three aspects of the mission will be addressed: The rationale (*Why*) of the mission, the mission design (*How*), as well as the interaction between the three levels as defined in the initial chapters of this book.

#### *Why was NATO action and cooperation needed?*

The political deliberations were shaped in a complex environment of many interrelated factors. In essence, the action taken was justified from a humanitarian perspective, to address the urgent situation. Underneath the surface rhetoric, the examination in this chapter reveals other, more compelling, drivers, as well as obstacles. Internally, there was a restraining factor to commit. Due to some nations' military experience in Africa and policy towards the continent as well as a divided view of the proper delineation of tasks in African affairs between NATO and the European Union there was reluctance to commit NATO in ambitious military operations. According to Ryan C. Hendrickson the slow paced response by NATO can also be explained by de Hoop Scheffer's deliberately cautious and reactive approach in public diplomacy (Hendrickson, 2009). In his view, de Hoop Scheffer's early statements, starting in September 2004, shaped the NATO posture as he specifically detailed that a request by the African Union was required for NATO to consider action and that NATO could only contemplate assisting the African Union with logistics and similar support. The internal deliberations were on the one hand shaped by a polarised internal debate that related to the role of NATO vis-à-vis the European Union in Africa and on the other hand by the reluctance to commit militarily on the continent. Clearly, some Allies preferred the European Union as the agent on the African continent to

promote Western values, as enshrined in the NATO treaty. Moreover, the United States experience from Somalia and other African missions instilled a cautionary approach to commit. In addition, SACEUR also stressed early on that command and control limitations within the African Union were a major obstacle (Jones, 2005).

The external perspective took into account the alleged genocide and the moral responsibility to protect as the obvious rationale to act. However, the action was at all instances qualified with the African ownership and that the African Union was responsible. Indeed there are several facts that point to the fact that the mission was driven more by a mutual interest between the African Union and NATO to develop relations than the situation on the ground. The situation gave both parties a platform to foster long term relations.<sup>3</sup> A key feature in this operation is the emphasis on the African Leadership. When reflecting on the mission in 2008, the Secretary General emphasised that the African Union was 'in the driving seat to solve this difficult conflict and that the Alliance's role is to contribute to strengthening the African Union's capability to meet this challenge' (NATO, 2005g). In short, NATO demonstrated a clear limit to the commitment. The principal of African ownership appears to have taken precedence over the effectiveness of the operation. President Bush's attempt to galvanise the effort was in vain. If the key driver was the situation on the ground, then it would have been insufficient to limit the action to supporting the African Union, in particular when its mission was regarded as failed by President Bush. Moreover, President Bush was also early in his assessment that genocide was taking place. It has been argued that China would block a resolution by the United Nations Security Council to endorse a NATO mission in Darfur. However, the responsibility to protect commitment goes beyond the legal regime of the Security Council. Moreover it is instructive to compare this situation with Kosovo in 1999. As Hendrickson outlines in a previous chapter of this book, NATO felt compelled by a moral obligation despite a resolution by the United Nations Security Council being unattainable. A plausible explanation for the different approaches is geopolitical in that there exists an implicit African strategy that is more restrictive regarding interventions in Africa than in Europe. Another driver for the mission was the institutional rivalry with the European Union. Clearly, the two organisations were providing similar support to the extent that a joint mechanism for transport coordination was established.

Glen Segell argues that the mission was successful, albeit from another perspective. NATO support to AMIS was the first tangible commitment

in Africa and it bolstered inter-institutional cooperation between NATO and the African Union (Segell, 2009). It was of mutual interest that the organisations found modalities to cooperate on. In the aftermath of the mission not only was NATO in support of the follow-on hybrid mission, it also paved the way to providing support to the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and to bolstering longer term cooperation and the build up of the African Standby Force brigades.

*How was the conflict response tailored?*

The NATO support was very responsive to the evolving needs articulated by the African Union. A series of political decisions tailored the support. It can not be excluded that the African Union requests were formulated in close cooperation with NATO representatives. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess that NATO influence exerted on the perceived needs of the African Union. Looking beyond these needs it is clear that much more could have been done, given the grave situation. Despite President Bush's pleas there was no desire to commit to addressing the situation on the ground. African ownership took precedence over the humanitarian situation. NATO's design of support was conditioned by the sensitivities of the African Union and its desire for 'African solutions' (Jones, 2005, p. 4). What if there are no African solutions in sight for the African problems? With the genocide ongoing is that a sufficient rationale for the world's most potent security alliance? What would have been required for it to operate as it did in 1999 in Kosovo?

From a military perspective it is reasonable to assert that the combined support of the European Union and NATO would have been more efficiently coordinated through one of the organisations. Preferably NATO as the Alliance support was to a large extent provided by American forces and thus not interchangeable. The NATO support response option to AMIS is not anchored in NATO doctrine. Notably, the revised doctrine issued in 2010 does not reflect this type of mission nor does it envisage that inter-institutional cooperation would encompass the African Union (NSA, 2010).<sup>4</sup>

*How was the character of the internal interaction between levels of command?*

Due to the many high level but explicit and detailed requests with a sense of urgency, quick NAC responses limited the dynamics between the levels of command. This was further perpetuated by the limited military contributions by NATO. Hence, the need for considering different

options was minimal, in particular on the military strategic level. The picture that emerges is a top-down driven interaction.

In summary, the NATO mission had a limited supporting scope. It was justified by the humanitarian situation but driven and shaped by inter-institutional factors involving the African Union and the European Union as well as an implicit Alliance posture to refrain from direct action in Africa. The mission was reactive and insufficient to address the humanitarian situation. Still it portrayed NATO as actively engaged and it promoted relations with the African Union. In comparison, the European Union response appears more proactive and credible although it also fell short of a genuine commitment to prevent genocide. In terms of internal dynamics, the mission aligns to Betts's theory on top-down strategy. The politico military interactions were conducted with limited influence from the military level. This was due to the evolving nature of the mission with a series of requests, often at short notice, that required NAC decisions. Moreover the limited military contribution did not require any substantial military assessment; in particular when the requests were specific in nature, for instance to move a battalion from X to Y or train staff elements in subject Z. As a final rationale on the interaction, the limited scope of the mission, that is to support the African Union as opposed to, alleviate human suffering is more conducive for political deliberations than military.

## **Case 2: At the sea – *Operation Allied Provider* in the Gulf of Aden**

In the Gulf of Aden NATO has conducted three consecutive maritime operations to counter the piracy threat. The first mission, *Operation Allied Provider*, was conducted October – December 2008 to provide naval escorts to World Food Programme (WFP) vessels. The mission also patrolled the waters around Somalia to deter acts of piracy in support of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838, and in coordination with other international actors, including the European Union (United Nations Security Council, 2008a; United Nations Security Council, 2008b; United Nations Security Council, 2008c). At the end of the operation, responsibilities were relinquished by the European Union's Naval Force, EUNAVFOR. With the increase in pirate attacks it was decided to employ a NATO force in tandem with the EUNAVFOR. *Operation Allied Protector* was conducted from March to June 2009 to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. Piracy and armed robbery



are disrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, as well as threatening vital sea lines of communication and economic interests off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. At its termination it was succeeded by *Operation Ocean Shield*, with a mandate to the end of 2012. Based on the two previous counter piracy operations, *Operation Ocean Shield* has a slightly different focuses on at-sea counter piracy operations. It involves, for instance, helicopter surveillance operations to trace and identify ships in the area, as well as preventing and disrupting hijackings. In addition, at the request of the United Nations, the force escorts the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) supply vessels. Moreover the Alliance has broadened the scope of this third operation by exploring ways to offer regional states assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities (NATO, 2011b).

### Background

Somalia became an independent state in 1960. It became a military regime in 1969 under the auspices of General Mohamed Siad. The country experienced a war with Ethiopia in 1977–78, followed by a failed *coup d'état* that triggered a long period of intermittent civil war. Somalia disintegrated due to the internal conflict. In late 1990 President Siad Barre went into exile, and the fragile Somali state collapsed (Elmi and Barise, 2006). Several international initiatives to broker peace failed. Three consecutive missions by the United Nations were launched with a degree of success. However when 18 American Rangers were killed and 75 wounded in an engagement with the units of a warlord, Aideed, in Mogadishu in 1993, the international community's commitment to address the conflict faded (Gyllensporre, 2001). By 1995 even the International Red Cross and the United Nations had left Somalia due to the insecurity (Sörenson, 2008). Since 1991, Somalia has not had a functional, central government. The launch of the Transitional National Government in 2000 aimed at re-establishing a central state experienced no success. By the time NATO deployed its naval force Somalia was at the top of the comprehensive index of state weakness in the developing world (Rice and Patrick, 2008). Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Horn of Africa once more was given attention. The absence of state structures created an environment conducive to rebels and criminals generating cash by piracy. Piracy in this region, including the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia, is extensive. In 2008, at the time of the deployment of *Operation Allied Provider*, it ranked as the number one piracy hot spot in the world, accounting for almost a third of the overall reported attacks.<sup>5</sup> There are two aspects to the piracy

threat. The Gulf of Aden is a strategic chokepoint for global merchant shipping and the piracy has serious consequences for global trade. Also it is a humanitarian problem. Some 3.2 million people in Somalia are dependent on humanitarian assistance (United Nations News Centre, 2009). The World Food Programme is the most active agency to address this problem. Since some 90 per cent of their deliveries are supplied by sea communications the humanitarian impact is great, amounting to 40,000 metric tons of WFP-food every month (WFP, 2008). Prior to *Operation Allied Provider* the United Nations Security Council had adopted three resolutions that provided a mandate for countering piracy off the coast of Somalia. The initial resolution focuses on the political process in Somalia. It stresses the importance of unhampered passage of humanitarian goods to the country (United Nations Security Council, 2008b). The second resolution takes as a point of departure the reporting on piracy by the International Maritime Organization. With reference to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the resolution calls upon states and organisations to coordinate and render assistance to vessels threatened by or under attack from pirates or armed robbers (United Nations Security Council, 2008c). The third resolution urges states to 'use on the high seas and airspace off the coast of Somalia the necessary means, in conformity with international law, as reflected in the Convention, for the repression of acts of piracy' (United Nations' Security Council, 2008a).

### **Political strategic level**

*Operation Allied Provider* was launched in response to the request by the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, and in support of the aforementioned resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. On 25 September 2008 the United Nations Secretary General issued a letter to his counterpart in NATO requesting assistance with providing naval escorts to vessels of the World Food Programme on a temporary basis, as the European Union was expected to launch a mission. NATO responded in October, at the Defense Ministers Meeting in Budapest by not only agreeing to the request but also by assigning the Standing Naval Maritime Group to the mission (NATO, 2008b). Arguably, the response was modest in ambition. On the one hand it was argued that the effort was complementary and that there was 'no competition here and plenty of work to go around' (NATO, 2008c). On the other hand the Allies agreed that NATO would make use of Standing Naval Maritime Group, not necessarily all of the seven ships, but some of those ships (NATO, 2008c). This restrained and reactive approach was continued

when the foreign ministers met in December. They argued that 'NATO stands ready to consider further requests for the use of Alliance naval assets to combat piracy in this region' (NATO, 2008d).

The rationale for the mission was two-fold. NATO was assisting the World Food Programme shipments in support of the Somali people and to assist in international trade and indirectly the world's economies by deterring piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia. While the NATO rhetoric emphasised support to the World Food Programme, the NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai, revealed another order of logic during the press brief at the meeting of Defense Ministers in Budapest: 'Ministers began their discussion today on the issue of piracy, in particular off the Somali coast. Piracy is a serious problem for shipping in that area. It is *also* an immediate threat to the lives of the people in Somalia' (NATO, 2008c, emphasis added). In a similar vein the official statement from the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 2008 explained that '[...] NATO and individual Allied nations' naval forces are providing a deterrent presence and are escorting WFP-chartered vessels carrying humanitarian aid to Somalia' (NATO, 2008d). Notably, the European Union exercised a similar rhetoric to NATO, but an in-depth analysis of the official texts of the European Union naval operation concluded that while there were two interests at stake the Union acted primarily in self-interest to ensure international trade (Gyllensporre, 2010).

When NATO started to consider involvement the European Union had already stepped up its efforts as the United Nations Security Council was addressing the problem (Gyllensporre, 2010). Based on the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1814, the European Union officially acknowledged the piracy threat by stressing the implications on international maritime traffic as well as the humanitarian effort (the European Union, 2008a). In June, appropriate bodies of the European Union were tasked to provide options for how best to contribute to the implementation of the second resolution by the United Nations Security Council (1816) and in August and September two consecutive decisions were taken to set up a military coordination unit (European Union's NAVCO) in Brussels to support the activities of Member States deploying military assets in theatre, with a view to facilitating the availability and operational action of those assets (the European Union, 2008b).

Only some three months after handing over responsibilities to the European Union's force, NATO launched another anti piracy operation in the region. The rationale provided by NATO is ambiguous; it justifies the renewed mission with the success of *Operation Allied Provider* without

making reference to its successor and the continued naval operations of the European Union 'The results of the operation were extremely encouraging and led to an expanded role for NATO's counter piracy efforts that continued with the successor *Operation Allied Protector*' (*Allied Command Operations*, 2011). A more plausible explanation is the escalating piracy operations both in numbers, adapted tactics and operations in a wider area. Indeed, the *Allied Command Operations* argued that the growing threat was rationale for the new operation (*Allied Command Operations*, 2010a; *Allied Command Operations*, 2011).

### **Military strategic level**

It appears that the launch of *Operation Allied Provider* included limited military strategic deliberations. As discussed above, only two weeks after the United Nations inquiry NAC decided to provide support as requested. When the decision was announced the force composition and deployment time were declared as well (NATO, 2008c). The limited military impact by the NATO chain of command was also voiced by SACEUR, General Craddock. He argued that the response option was curtailed to the extant NATO capabilities, that is the standing NATO naval force. No additional capabilities were to be pledged by the Alliance members (Craddock, 2009). Furthermore, SACEUR informed the NATO Parliamentary Assembly that the response was not planned for:

NATO took on this latest mission in response to a request by the United Nations. We should not underestimate the importance of this decision, nor the precedent it sets for our alliance. NATO's political leaders approved a mission for which there was no detailed contingency or operational plan. We are demonstrating that we can react, quickly, in times of crisis.

(Craddock, 2008)

Indeed General Craddock delivered some blunt criticism on NATO after leaving office. In particular, he finds the organisation too consensus driven on routine matters and that the military resources to fulfill the political ambitions are pledged by the Alliance members (de Borchgrave, 2009). Clearly, this criticism reflects a commander that, in his view, has not been able to exercise the military strategic influence on the operations.

The official mandate was primarily to assist the World Food Programme and there was no ambition to extend the operation to become more ambitious. A call in November 2008 on a military blockade along

Somalia's coast to intercept pirate vessels heading out to sea was rejected by SACEUR as the 'mandate is solely to escort the World Food Programme ships to Somalia and to conduct anti piracy Patrols' (Ng, 2008). However when the second NATO mission, *Operation Allied Protector*, was launched in March 2009 it was equipped with a broader mandate. In addition to continued contribution to the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation, *Operation Allied Protector* was also conducting surveillance (NATO, 2011b). In the third mission, *Operation Ocean Shield*, the mandate was expanded further by including a security sector task. The mission was mandated to offer assistance to countries in the region to enhance their capacity to address the growing piracy threat (NATO, 2010a). This broader mandate resonates with the Alliance Maritime Strategy that identifies four roles for NATO's maritime forces: deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security including outreach through partnerships; and maritime security (NATO, 2011c). Notably, the strategy does not explicitly address piracy.

### Operational level

Following the NAC decision in October 2008 planning started to engage in anti piracy operations (*Allied Command Operations*, 2010b). Allied Maritime Component Command Naples, one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples, was tasked to launch *Operation Allied Provider*. The military chain of command for the operation was a result of the forces that were assigned. NATO has at its disposal two maritime Immediate Reaction Forces: the Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) and the SNMG2. These forces comprise a multinational, integrated maritime force. Navy vessels are continuously available to NATO to perform tasks based on NAC decisions. At the time of the operation, SNMG2 was scheduled to conduct port visits in the Gulf region, including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The extant plan called for transiting the Suez Canal on 15 October (*Allied Command Operations*, 2010b). The planning for the operation involved redirecting some of the naval forces to the coast of Somalia (*Allied Command Operations*, 2010b). The force comprised seven ships. Three of those were assigned to *Operation Allied Provider* while the other vessels continued their pre-planned visits (*Allied Command Operations*, 2010b). Upon arrival in the area, on 25 October, the mission was declared started (*Allied Command Operations*, 2008). These adjustments were in essence what SACEUR called the 'ability to quickly react to the United Nations request for support [which] demonstrates NATO's military flexibility to respond to real security challenges

on the seas as well as on the land, and in the air' (*Allied Command Operations*, 2008).

When the operational responsibilities were relinquished to the EUNAVFOR, on 12 December 2008, the multinational operational capabilities to address piracy increased as the European Union's force included some 20 ships and 1,800 personnel (Gyllensporre, 2010). Further enhancements were made when NATO re-entered the region in March 2009 with another naval force, working in tandem with the European Union and other deployed naval forces. The second deployment was initially made by SNMG1 with five vessels (NATO, 2011b). SNMG1 comes under the overall responsibility of Joint Command Lisbon, Portugal, and the tactical control of the operation is under the Allied Maritime Component Command (CC-Mar) Northwood, the United Kingdom (NATO, 2010a). Despite rotations between SNMG1 and SNMG2 the command arrangements linked to Northwood remained, and were maintained during *Operation Ocean Shield*. This allowed for close operational cooperation with the European Union's force as they had activated and multi-nationalised the national British headquarters at Northwood as the operational headquarters for the operations. In reality they are even collocated in the same building.

## Summary

### *Why was NATO action and cooperation needed?*

NATO provided a bridging operation to allow the European Union to muster its forces for deployment. The rapidly increasing piracy activities in the region called for a swift response. It is unclear whether the support to the World Food Programme and the humanitarian situation in Somalia, the hostage threat of Allied citizens or the vulnerable and strategically important trade at this naval chokepoint was the key driver for action. Mindful of the different priorities among Allies it is likely the combination was an important factor that allowed nations to adjust their arguments tailored to the national audience. Moreover, addressing piracy gives 'navies a noble new mission' that justifies their relevance and budgets in an area that carries minimal domestic resistance (The Economist, 2009). Given the low risk posed against NATO vessels it offers an opportunity to gain positive visibility (Scheffler, 2010).

### *How was the conflict response tailored?*

The decision making for Allied Provider met the timely requirements, however NATO was less proactive in anticipating the need for a maritime deployment in the early phases compared to the European Union.

The force level allocated to *Operation Allied Provider* was a far cry from what would have been needed. It was not tailored to address the threat but rather show force and commitment despite Allies' lack of willingness to assign national forces to the deployment. To address the root causes of the threat crisis management effort needs to be conducted in Somalia on the ground. Accordingly, SACEUR, General Craddock argued that 'You don't stop piracy on the seas. You stop piracy on the land' (Defense News, 2008). To date, this seems not to have been considered at the political level, although SACEUR has entertained the idea (Defense News, 2008).

The cooperation with the European Union appears to have been fruitful. Following the initial bridging operation by NATO the two organisations operated side by side in the vast basin off the coast of Somalia. The command arrangements catered for close cooperation at the military strategic and operational level. As with the first case one can question the effectiveness of having NATO and the European Union operating two separate missions with similar mandate. Moreover, the fact that Allies chose to provide naval forces to the European Union's mission while the NATO missions have to rely on the pre-assigned forces begs for a separate analysis.

*How was the character of the internal interaction between levels of command?*

Considering the follow-on operations by NATO, the account of this mission demonstrates an engagement that evolved over time with no clear end-state, as was the case for the support to AMIS. The initial engagement was based on a top-down approach, driven by political factors as opposed to the need for addressing the insecurity. However in the follow-on operations it is clear the military considerations gradually increased in impact as the mandate was broadened, taking into account important military factors.

### **Case 3: In the Air – *Operation Unified Protector* over Libya**

In late March 2011 national operations by France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada were relinquished to NATO. The Alliance assumed responsibilities for the implementation of the United Nations Security mandate including operating a no-fly zone and enforcing a weapons embargo. The force includes naval and air components. At the onset the force was provided by 14 NATO nations, and comprised 205 aircraft and 21 vessels. The mission was gradually expanded to include

partners. This section focuses primarily on the air component of the operation. This operation was ongoing when this book went to press on 31 May 2011.

## **Background**

It started as protests and demonstrations in Tunisia in December 2010. Soon the discontent over governance, democracy and other aspects of quality of life created a ripple effect with an unprecedented speed in the Middle East. By mid-February the Arab Spring, as the phenomenon soon became known as, had propagated to Libya. The unrest was promptly suppressed by the authoritarian Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, by employing military force against his own population. In a national broadcast he proclaimed that all protesters would be hunted down and killed. Reports on civilian casualties created an international outcry. The situation escalated further as armed militia units started to counterattack forces controlled by Colonel Gaddafi. A Transitional National Council, in Benghazi, was set up to organise the resistance. On 26 February the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution that called for an arms embargo and travel ban as well as asset freeze for key persons in the regime. The swift response by the United Nations also referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and addressed the humanitarian situation (United Nations Security Council, 2011a). However, the unified<sup>6</sup> response by the United Nations had little impact on Colonel Gaddafi as his forces continued to advance to the eastern part of the country to defeat the armed militia. As the civil war continued, the United Nations' Security Council responded by adopting another resolution on 17 March (United Nations' Security Council, 2011b).<sup>7</sup> In essence, the resolution provides legal authority for the international community to use force to protect civilians. In particular, it calls for a 'complete end to violence' and urges states to 'protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory'. Notably, the text is ambiguous about the authority to conduct ground forces and it does not explicitly call for the removal of Colonel Gaddafi from office. The resolution also mandates a no-fly zone to be enforced and called upon the Arab League to be engaged.

On 19 March, a meeting was conducted in Paris with key leaders. The meeting brought together not only Allies but other key partners including, the United Nations, the European Union and states from the Arab World (United States' State Department, 2011a). Following the meeting, only



two days after the adoption of the United Nations Security Council's resolution, air operations commenced to enforce the no-fly zone. This endeavour was conducted through parallel national operations as opposed to a multinational operation. The effort was spearheaded by France (*Operation Harmattan*) and followed by the United States (*Operation Odyssey Dawn*), the United Kingdom (*Operation Ellamy*) and Canada (*Operation Mobile* from 21 March). As these simultaneous operations were mounted the confusion of the leadership added pressure to find a solution. While NATO was not the first choice for commanding the military effort it turned out to be the only option. These national operations were terminated by end of March and authority of forces transferred to NATO command as the Allied operation *Unified Protector* was launched.

### Political strategic level

While France and Britain, and to a lesser extent the USA, spearheaded the political debate over action in support of the Libyan population, the impetus provided by the Arab League was crucial to the agreement on a robust United Nations mandate. On 12 March the Arab League encouraged the United Nations Security Council 'to shoulder its responsibilities by imposing an air embargo on Libyan airspace to protect the people of Libya' (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011a). This initiative received immediate support by the United States and others (United States' State Department, 2011b). Initially there was no political unity within the Alliance to launch the operation. On the surface the aforementioned ruling of the United Nations Security Council suggested that the United States, France and the United Kingdom were advocating military action while Germany was hesitant as it abstained (Jones, 2011). However, beneath the surface the political calculus involved a *mélange* of institutional considerations and bargaining of national positions before a NAC decision on military action could be agreed. Clearly, the consensus effort was not timely as regards to the perceived need for military actions by some of the Allies. Still the newly adopted Strategic Concept recalled the threat to the Alliance posed by conflicts beyond NATO borders and called for the need to 'engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction' (NATO, 2010c). However, the Secretary General downplayed the impasse:

Consensus is absolutely essential! It is at the core of our alliance [...] There was a consensus [...] we had a discussion, yes. But we made a decision quickly. All 28 allies agreed NATO should take full responsibility.

The operation started as a coalition of the willing. I appreciate this, because it was at the very last minute that coalition partners took action to stop Gaddafi from massacring his own people.

(Schreiber, 2011)

The United Kingdom was an early advocate of military action and the need for a no-fly zone. On 28 February Prime Minister Cameron argued that 'we must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people' (Dombey, 2011). While the United States was in support of action they were reluctant to intervene in another Muslim country. Although arguably the Libyan development would qualify as a national interest according to the United States' National Security Strategy this policy document also calls for an indirect approach by limiting their own military commitment and at the same time leveraging alliances and coalitions (The White House, 2010).<sup>8</sup> The United States feared being entrapped into a military action by the British statements and the Secretary of Defense, Gates, raised concerns regarding the military capabilities needed to enforce a no-fly zone (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011a). The other proponent of the military action was France, and its proactive president. France was the first to recognise Libya's Interim Governing Council located in Benghazi as legitimate. France tried to galvanise support in the European Union. However the reluctance from Germany and others rendered this option impossible (Tisdall, 2011). For military action there seems to have been arguments for making this a Franco-British operation and thus bolstering their newly launched military cooperation (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011b).<sup>9</sup>

When seeking a NATO solution to the problem the position of Turkey also became a key point. It was hesitant from the onset as it involved breaching the sovereignty of a Muslim nation (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011b). When the negotiations were taking place in late March between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, the French representative argued for a non-NATO option. President Sarkozy agreed to give NATO military command of the operation, but denied its authority to exercise political and strategic control, calling for the establishment of a coalition of the willing. It turned out that the United Kingdom and the United States were determined that NATO was the only option for running the operation at all levels. Although hesitant of the operation Turkey rather supported it in the framework of NATO than allowing France to pursue its economic interests. Also, the resistance to France was grounded in its opposition

to Turkey's accession to the European Union. Still Turkey insisted that the NATO mission should be confined to an arms embargo when NAC was negotiating an agreement on the mission. It was only after a phone call made by President Barack Obama to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Turkey accepted a broader mandate (Kardas, 2011). Following these negotiations, on 23 March, NAC agreed to launch *Operation Unified Protector* to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya (NATO, 2011d). At that time the Secretary General could offer little on the scope of the NATO operation as a coalition operation was still expected to work in tandem (NATO, 2011e). It was not until 27 March that the Secretary General announced that the Alliance would be able to assume full responsibilities for the military operation in Libya based on the United Nations mandate (NATO, 2011f). Still the true NATO authority over this mission has been questioned. Instead it is argued that the real political and strategic guidance is exercised in Washington, London and Paris (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011b).

Following the NAC decision to engage another source of division seems to be the scope of the mandate. It pertains to support the rebel forces and the authority to target Colonel Gaddafi. When President Obama, President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron published a joint op-ed calling for NATO to sustain its operations to allow for the opposition to set conditions for a new regime to take control (The White House, 2011) they arguably saw the role of NATO beyond the current mandate. Also the United States, France and the United Kingdom provided military advisors to the opposition on a bilateral basis. The United States also considered providing military equipment to the opposition, another source of dispute (Stringer, 2011).

Another facet of the political deliberations pertains to the European Union. Based on its newly adopted amendment to the Treaty its focus and mandate to act in international crisis was strengthened. Arguably, a conflict in neighbouring Libya would generate top priority for the European Union in accordance with its foreign and security policy ambitions. Still, the Union was indecisive and reactive in its response to the crisis, reflecting some Member States' reluctance to engage in the conflict. It immediately sparked a discussion on the credibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union in general (Menon, 2011). The High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy, Catherine Ashton, did not play an active role on the international stage, partly hamstrung by hesitant member states and partly due to lack of own conviction (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011b). A willing European Union could have been an attractive

option for commanding the operation from an American perspective, to distance itself from the military engagement (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011b). Instead the European Union embarked on another path. On 1 April the Council of the European Union decided on a military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya (The European Union, 2011). If requested by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the European Union would launch EUFOR Libya to contribute to the safe movement and evacuation of displaced persons, and to support, with specific capabilities, the humanitarian agencies in their activities. The operation did not call for Berlin Plus arrangements to gain support from NATO nor did it co-locate its headquarters. At the time when this book went into press the operation had not been launched.

### **Military strategic level**

Perhaps due to the strong role of the military in Turkey, SACEUR, Admiral James G. Stavridis, played a role when forging the agreement on NATO action. This elevated role should also be attributed to his dual-hatting as the commander of the United States' forces in Europe. He was dispatched to Ankara to arbitrate a deal (Benitez, 2011) as Turkey had declared its unwillingness to support a NATO operation.

*Operation Unified Protector* included air and naval forces. Immediately following the NAC decision on 23 March, NATO forces in the air and at sea immediately started to patrol international waters in the vicinity of Libya to reduce the flow of arms, as addressed in the United Nations Security Council's resolution 1973 (NATO, 2011g). Likewise the air assets that were employed to enforce the no-fly zone were transferred to NATO. As operations were already ongoing when NATO entered, the room for influencing the design of the operation was minimal. Also, the tempo of strikes and operations were maintained. The change made was related to target selection as the regime was actively relocating its forces and purposely co-locating them in proximity to civilian facilities (Stavridis, 2011a). In addition to readjusting target sets the focus was initially to integrate forces (JFCN, 2011a). In addition a robust chain of command was established (Stavridis, 2011a). Still there were some deliberations at the military strategic level on the longer term strategy. An operational outlook provided by SACEUR generated headlines in the USA. At a Senate hearing in conjunction with the initiation of *Operation Unified Protector* Admiral Stavridis was asked about a possible NATO ground mission following a regime change. He argued that it would be conceivable but at that stage not planned for (Ackerman, 2011).

The military chain of command for the operation includes SACEUR, Admiral Stavridis, at the military strategic level. Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Italy assumes responsibility at the operational level headquarters with its deputy commander, Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, as the operational commander. The Allied Air Command in Izmir, Turkey, is responsible under the operational level to conduct air operations and the Allied Maritime Command in Naples, Italy assumes corresponding responsibilities for naval operations (NATO, 2011h).

### **Operational level**

According to the Operational Commander, Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, the operational design some thirty days into the mission comprised three lines of approach: to enforce a maritime embargo and to prevent the movement of illicit weapons in and out of Libya; to enforce a no-fly zone to prevent that weapons are employed by the regime to harm the population; to help protect civilians and civilian populated areas (JFCN, 2011a). He also stressed the importance of remaining focused on commanding control nodes operated to direct military forces to attack civilian population.

Initially the force comprised 205 aircraft from 12 countries and 21 vessels from 11 nations (JFCN, 2011b). During the first month of operation NATO launched more than 5000 total aircraft sorties, including 2000 of them targeting air defences. Only some 25 per cent of the support sorties (intelligence, refueling, surveillance, reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defence) were provided by the United States. In addition NATO hailed and boarded hundreds of ships at sea (Stavridis, 2011b).

### **Summary**

#### *Why was NATO action and cooperation needed?*

The urgency associated with the humanitarian situation in Libya triggered the responses that eventually converged in a NATO-led operation. Arguably the humanitarian situation in other Middle East countries, including Syria, could also have qualified for a response from the international community at that time. However, there are no indications of such deliberations. Libya distinguishes itself by being a pariah in the Arab world and having a history of engaging in state sponsored terrorism. These attributes are directly linked to the head of state, Colonel Gaddafi. Against this backdrop, the United Kingdom and France, in particular, pushed for military actions in Libya, whereas other Middle East countries with on-going humanitarian violations were not considered. While the mandate stopped short of specifically targeting Colonel

Gaddafi it is clear that this is the desired end-state for those propelling the efforts.

From a political perspective NATO was not the optimal organisation to harbour the operation; the Allies were too divided in their outlook and prospects regarding Libya. However, it would turn out that other feasible options, including an operation led by the European Union, a coalition led by the United States and a concerted approach of national operations would appear even less attractive. NATO embodied the only credible multinational option with robust command and control arrangements. Put simply, this became a NATO operation because no other viable option materialised. The contribution by Allies is limited, only half of the nations joined the operation upon commencement and with few exceptions the national contributions were limited. This is striking given the proximity of the conflict and the potential spill over effects on security in NATO territory. According to Jörg Himmelreich the Allies appear to have been pursuing their own national agendas, 'with few showing much willingness to compromise with their other partners' (Himmelreich, 2011). Mindful of the newly adopted Strategic Concept this raises concerns regarding NATO's ambitions in non-article 5 operations.

*How was the conflict response tailored?*

From the on-set, before NATO took over responsibilities, the ambition was set high in relation to the mandate of the United Nations. For instance, another plausible interpretation of the mandate could have been to limit the scope of the air operations to preventing aircraft from operating in the no-fly zone. The early aerial attacks by France on mechanised columns and the targeting of command installations triggered a debate over the scope of the mandate. As the NATO operation followed suit in operational design it can be argued that the operation reflects the aspirations of the most proactive Allies as opposed to the Alliance as whole.

In terms of strategic responsiveness NATO was reactive due to the divergent views of the Allies. There was no common ground to build on to become involved in the early stages of the conflict.

*How was the character of the internal interaction between levels of command?*

Inherent to the circumstances in which NATO became involved, this operation was driven by a top-down approach. The military levels of NATO became involved in the midst of on-going operations designed by those nations that chose a proactive posture. Arguably, it was more

urgent to ensure continuation of operations rather than rethinking how the strategy should be designed. Also, the political outlook beyond this first phase of engagement was absent and there was no clear view articulated with regards to the political endstate. What would be the NATO posture following a regime collapse? Without a political framework there is no fertile ground for providing military input to the strategy formulation. The reaction to SACEUR's contemplations on a ground force is a case in point.

## Conclusions: Unpacking a NATO strategy on Africa

NATO does not have a strategy on Africa, at least not officially. This final paragraph aims to reconstruct and codify what might be a NATO *de facto* strategy based on the empirical examination provided in this chapter. For this purpose, *ends*, *ways* and *means* are utilised as the building blocks for strategy formulation, based on the discussion by Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre in Chapter 2.

First, when it comes to ends, the long term political objective is to project the Alliance's shared values, as enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty, to the continent in order to prevent it from destabilising NATO territory, in particular in neighbouring Allied Mediterranean countries. The threats that may emanate from the African continent include organised crime, terrorism, piracy, proliferation of WMD, illegal immigration, and the spread of diseases. To mitigate these threats, the African continent must become secure and stable based on improved quality of life for the African people including advancement of human rights, democratic governance and economic growth. Notwithstanding, the short term political objective is to accept the status quo. There is no ambition to address the root causes of insecurity in Africa. Immediate threats to the prosperity of the Alliance and urgent humanitarian violations may qualify for NATO actions.

Second, in order to meet the ends NATO pursues a strategy of indirect and reactive approach. Africa must develop its own regional capacity to address the security challenges on the continent. African problems are best addressed with African solutions. NATO remains engaged in consultations and provides support to capacity building. A credible perception of NATO must be fostered. The indirect approach does not preclude NATO from striving for a visible role and being a part of the solution without significant military commitments.

NATO's military clout must be utilised to influence African counterparts. Military actions are to be conducted by proxy organisations like the

African Union. Sometimes there are no African solutions. Military actions are reactive and only contemplated based on specific invitations by the United Nations and/or the host nation. If military actions are considered they should aim at containing the situation. More importantly, the considerations on military engagements will be done based on a politically driven top-down approach, with limited impact from the military level. Endorsement from the international community is pivotal.

The perception of NATO and the European Union is fundamentally different in Africa than in Europe. In Africa the European Union has a track record of proactive deployment of forces on the continent, albeit on short assignments, whereas NATO has no such history. Also the European Union is a major donor and political key player throughout the continent with a long tradition of involvement on the continent. The desired NATO posture can generate competing and overlapping efforts with the European Union. Rather than surrendering autonomy NATO accepts the inefficiencies that come with operating in parallel with the European Union, and to a large extent dealing with the same issues with separation only in geography.

Finally, when it comes to ways, as a point of departure no NATO troops will deploy on the ground in Africa. Other indirect means can be used such as employing naval and air forces to contain the threat. The African context produces a unique institutional context. The African Union is a key partner but it lacks many critical functions and capabilities to plug into the NATO system as an equal partner. The limited ability of the African Union's military institutions to conduct consultations at the military strategic level and operational level hampers military cooperation and provides a driver for top-down consultations at the political level.

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## Notes

1. The group included Madeleine Albright (the United States), Robin Cook (the United Kingdom), Lamberto Dini (Italy), Lloyd Axworthy (Canada), Ana Palacio (Spain), Erik Derycke (Belgium) and Surin Pitsuwan (Thailand).
2. The information is provided by Africa Development Information Service, *NATO Organisation Record*, [http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org\\_56574.html](http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_56574.html), date accessed 7 June 2010.
3. The long term relations continue to be an important topic for NATO; See for instance NATO (2009b).
4. The doctrine identifies a set of military supporting activities short of military operations. The set includes Security Sector Reform to reform security institutions; Capacity Building to enhance national and regional institutions; Interim Governance by an intervention force to build authority and restore order; Restoration of Essential Services in the immediate aftermath of a conflict or natural disaster; Military Outreach to shape and influence ideas and values.
5. Information obtained at International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Services website at [http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedented-rise-in-piratical-attacks&catid=60:news&Itemid=51](http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedented-rise-in-piratical-attacks&catid=60:news&Itemid=51), date accessed 7 January 2010.
6. All members of the United Nations Security Council voted in favour of the Resolution. The Council included four countries from the Middle East and Africa; South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria and Lebanon.
7. This resolution was not adopted in complete unanimity. Ten states in the United Nations Security Council agreed while five abstained: China, Russia, India, Germany and Brazil. For a discussion on the abstentions, see Jones (2011).
8. The four identified interests included 'respect for universal values at home and around the world'.
9. In November 2010 a new United Kingdom-France Defence Co-operation Treaty was announced.

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